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Transcaucasus MD Cdr Col Gen V. Patrikeyev on Military Reform

90UM0701A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Jun 90 p 2

[Interview with Col Gen V. Patrikeyev, commander, Transcaucasus Military District, on the occasion of Krasnaya Zvezda Day: "Three Questions for the Commander"; commander's response to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Jun 90 request for information; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] As previously reported (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 June), we asked the commanders of military districts, groups of forces, and fleets to answer three questions related to carrying out the military reform.

The above was done on the suggestion made by many guests attending the Krasnaya Zvezda holiday at the TsPKiO [Central Park of Culture and Rest] imeni M. Gorky that the press print statements made by key military leaders on various aspects of the changes initiated in the Army and Navy. The first to respond was Colonel General V. Patrikeyev, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] 1. What changes in the life and activity of your troops have come about as a result of the military reform?

[Patrikeyev] Whether we like it or not, the troops are still organized the same as before; their activities are spelled out in detail by a large number of regulations which to this day do not reflect many changes that only now are being proposed. However, there has been progress, some of it substantial. The defensive concept is clearly evident in the combat training system. Offensive armament types are being overshadowed by defensive types. This reflects the spirit of our military doctrine. Our setting of quality parameter goals for commanders tends to offer them a large amount of freedom in planning the training process. We base our planning on the natural conditions peculiar to the geographic area: Every soldier should possess skill in mountain warfare, which means that he must be proficient in handling weapons, skillful in driving combat vehicles, and agile in overcoming obstacles. That is why we are interested in providing each regiment with a "mountain laboratory," i.e., a suitable training facility, the creation of which is nearing completion.

I believe that the process of democratizing our life and service is definitely under way. To be more specific, assemblies of officers are becoming more actively involved in determining the future of future officers by dealing with problems related to social protection of military personnel. This lays the groundwork for reform.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] 2. What do you see as the ultimate purpose of the Armed Forces reform?

[Patrikeyev] To answer your question, I believe that it makes sense to identify not one, but several components.

The first—the major one—is assurance of a high level of combat readiness on the basis of applying quality parameters. The second one is optimization of troop personnel structure, being guided by the spirit of the times and present political realities existing here at home and in foreign countries. Today, to have more certainly does not mean to fight better. Importance attaches to carefully devising and introducing a contract system that would assure a supply of expert personnel to fill a number of vacancies in key specialties.

In addition, it is important that reform include transformation of the Army into a school of life that teaches lessons in interethnic contacts, patience, and respect for customs and traditions peculiar to the country's peoples. Deserving of consideration is the introduction of special disciplines related to the history and ethics of interethnic relations, etc. Finally, it is important that the Army regain its former high prestige. This is not only a concern of the Army, but definitely of society as a whole: politicians, economists, cultural workers, and mass information media. The ideal of the businessman, rock star, successful manager, or enterprising cooperative member should not displace in the minds of youth the ideal of the soldier, a defender of the Fatherland.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] 3. What do you think are the major obstacles standing in the way of extensive changes in the Army and Navy, as dictated by the times?

[Patrikeyev] Rather than give you an all-inclusive reply, I will limit myself to the situation in the Transcaucasus as I see it. First and foremost, we are hindered by the wildly proliferating thistle that is the interethnic enmity. This includes the ceaseless provocations by Armenian ruffians, and the caustic inflaming of anti-Army sentiments in Georgia, with the Georgian leadership standing by idly. It is enough that the spring call-up—with the exception of Azerbaijan—is facing the threat of collapse. On top of that, there is a growing number of soldiers from indigenous Transcaucasian nationalities becoming fugitives from their military units.

Another hindrance is the fact that these difficult conditions force us to divert a considerable number of troops from regular duties to perform guard duty and strengthen the guard complement on military installations, routes of communication, and at weapons and ammunition depots. There is another adjustment we must make. Many of the district's units are operating at reduced manning levels, and it is a fact that the general military regulations are written with full personnel complements in mind. Nevertheless, we must maintain continuity of the training process, assure the primacy of combat training, and carry out normal operations. This causes overburdening of personnel and sometime makes it difficult for us to grant them the normal rest periods.

There is another roadblock impeding adaptability to changes. Our reform will be merely spinning its wheels if we do not resolve the problem of social protection of military personnel. Local organs are noticeably more

discriminatory in providing servicemen with living quarters. A specific example is Tbilisi, where we were handed a refusal to erect housing on a share basis. We must arrange all kinds of conferences and meetings with leaders of republics to literally "wrest" apartments from them. What does this lead to? Reform should provide the districts with an independent construction basis, not only financing, which at times cannot be utilized due to the causes I mentioned above. In a word, reform is more than a purpose: It is also a means for military service to regain its genuine prestige.

Col Gen D. Grinkevich on Problems Caused by Troop Withdrawal

90UM0623A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 90
(Signed to press 23 Apr 90) pp 59-60

[Interview of Col Gen D. Grinkevich, chief of the Ground Forces Main Staff, conducted by *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* correspondent Colonel V. Roshchupkin, under the rubric "Requesting an Explanation": "The Troops Are Coming Home. How Are the Problems Being Solved?"]

[Text] "The withdrawal of Soviet forces from the eastern European nations of Czechoslovakia and Hungary began in March. What is the USSR's position on this? I am also interested in the following. I heard that certain difficulties arose at the negotiations with the Hungarian side. If this is the case, what were the nature of these difficulties and the positions of the parties on the contentious problems?"

"I would also like to know how the social problems associated with redeploying our forces in military districts at home are being solved. Won't the process of redeployment have an effect on the combat readiness of our forces and in what frame of mind are our officers and their dependents returning to the homeland?"

G. Isayev,
Leningrad.

Our correspondent Colonel V. Roshchupkin met with Colonel General D. Grinkevich, the chief of the Ground Forces Main Staff, and asked him to speak to the point on these issues. Here is what he said:

[Grinkevich] It seems to me that the discussion should begin with the last point (in sequence, but not in importance) in the reader's letter. Of course, a long journey cannot help but affect the rhythm of combat training. But unit commanders can amend combat and political training programs and change the dates of field training exercises. So that the time spent on redeployment will be made up for by an intensification of the training process at the new location.

As to the officers' frame of mind, they and their dependents have accepted the troop withdrawal as appropriate. On the whole, despite the fully understandable everyday anxieties, the mood of the people today is normal.

In view of the stormy events in the eastern European nations, the situation there is changing to be sure and certain problems are cropping up. But nevertheless the Warsaw Pact continues to exist.

Today the position of the USSR is such. We are in favor of bringing all our forces back within our national borders by 1995-1996 and of eliminating all foreign military bases by the year 2000. And speaking of troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, it is being carried out in absolute conformity with the aforesaid position. As is generally known, a Soviet-Hungarian intergovernmental agreement on removing Soviet forces from the territory of the Hungarian Republic was signed on 10 March 1990. By the middle of 1991, all of our soldiers and officers in the Central and Southern Groups of Forces must return home.

Did difficulties arise at the negotiations with Hungary on the withdrawal of Soviet forces? No particular difficulties cropped up. Of course, numerous practical problems—military, technical, and social problems associated with the withdrawal—were solved. But the different opinions of the sides concerning these problems is a normal occurrence. The negotiations are conducted to find mutually acceptable solutions. And they were found.

Today, the problems associated with the troop withdrawal worry many people, who are not directly connected to the army. The reason for this is not merely human interest, but also the tense sociopolitical atmosphere in many regions, which is caused by the chronic shortage of foodstuffs and manufactured goods and the acute housing shortage. Unfounded rumors that the housing of those on the waiting list will allegedly be given to the families of servicemen returning to the Soviet Union have even begun to circulate in some places.

And certain foreign mass medias, which irresponsibly reported that part of the forces being withdrawn from Czechoslovakia would be deployed in the Baltic republics, added fuel to the fire. One can imagine how such reports were received in this region, where passions about the army are seething as it is...

The troop withdrawal is a military and political problem. But when the troops return home, a multitude of social problems will immediately arise. Suffice it to say that just in the initial stage of the withdrawal, about 100 troop trains with personnel, vehicles and weapons, and military gear will arrive in the Moscow Military District alone.

How can we guarantee the servicemen, who are returning to their homeland after performing military duty abroad, the complete realization of their social rights? How can

we ensure that none of them will be taken advantage of and abandoned without attention or support?

If one is talking about soldiers and sergeants on compulsory military service, things are simpler here. They will be billeted in barracks, which were prepared beforehand, and upon the expiration of their fixed term of service, they will be transferred to the reserve. Those officers and warrant officers who reserved apartments before going to the Groups of Forces (about 20 percent of those returning fall into this category), will also have fewer problems. The availability of housing for this category of servicemen should be taken into consideration as far as possible when assigning them to new positions.

But how can we solve the problems of those officers and warrant officers who did not have apartments in the Soviet Union before going abroad? And they are the majority. This is in addition to those 173 thousand families of "apartmentless" servicemen serving in the Soviet Union. And in the Moscow Military District alone, we will have to house the families of 1200 officers from a tank division, which is returning from the Central Group of Forces.

There also is an acute housing shortage in many other military districts besides the Moscow Military District. One of the reasons for this situation is that the local Soviets owe the Ministry of Defense 833 thousand square meters of dwelling space (16 thousand apartments). In Moscow alone this debt is 70 thousand square meters. Moreover, the families of servicemen who have been transferred to the reserve are aggravating the situation. But can one blame them for everything, if in some cases the local authorities are unable, and in other cases they take their time to allocate housing for reserve officers and retired officers?

[Roshchupkin] So, what is being done today and what is envisaged to be done in the future in order to solve the burning problem of housing for officers?

Shortly before the beginning of the troop withdrawal, this problem was given special consideration at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security Issues. According to a composite Ministry of Defense plan, in 1991-1993, the construction of 227 apartment houses for 17,500 people is projected at military bases, where units arriving from abroad will be stationed. In addition, schools, nursery schools, and bachelors' quarters will be built there. Fifteen military construction detachments, taken from facilities in the national economy, have been redirected to the construction of additional housing.

Military authorities received understanding and support from the leaders in Gorkiy Oblast in connection with the return of the troops. This should be the case everywhere! In spite of the housing difficulties in the city and oblast, the oblispolkom allocated several homes and 100 rooms in factory resident halls to the families of arriving tank crewmembers. And nevertheless, for the present it is possible to provide only about 250 families with housing

in the military district. And the others? We will have to provide them with temporary lodging in resident halls, barracks, and other reequipped accommodations.

However, there is nothing more permanent than "temporary". And the misgivings automatically arise: will this business with housing be dragged out, and will this have an effect on the mood of the people and of their family members. It is clear that the Ministry of Defense will not be able to cope with this problem alone. The active support of the government and the local Party and Soviet organs is required.

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Need for Army Political Workers Defended

90UM0516B Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 6, Mar 90
(Signed to press 16 Mar 90) pp 18-19

[Article by Lt Col V. Koltsov: "This is Not the Time to Enter the Reserves"]

In the pages of the central newspapers and in some radio and television broadcasts this question is being raised: "Is there a need for a zampolit [deputy commander of the political unit] in the army?" Some "wise guys" hasten to blame the many shortcomings in the military units upon the unsatisfactory work of the political workers. Blatant steps are being taken to undermine their political influence upon the masses of military servicemen. Even in sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet some people are trying "to find additional funds" by eliminating the jobs of the political workers. In my opinion, a candid effort is being made to undermine the authority of those who today bear full responsibility (both on-the-job and party) for the day-to-day living and activity of the military units and subunits.

In this regard here is what I think: in the armies of the USA and the FRG there is a broad network of well-educated training officers, psychologists, and chaplains who are responsible for the moral climate within the military collectives. In considering this I want to pose two questions to my possible opponents. Who realistically as of today can speak out within the military units with a force capable of solving the problems of training the soldiers in the fundamentals of political culture and instilling in them a sense of discipline, patriotism and unity? Who can organize leisure-time in the subunits?

During the years of WWII the fascists understood the value of those who dealt with these matters; for this reason they ordered the communists and the commissars to step down.

I also think that somewhere along the way we lost the dignity of the commissar. Can this be why some people generally are casting doubt upon the need for political workers in the army? If it appears that we are doing a poor job then we need to improve our methods of work. But this must be done in a way that corresponds to the purpose of our institute.

They are saying that the reduction of the army is the mandate of the times. Moreover, they are raising questions about the political organs. They say that they are not needed and that today's army does not need political education. I categorically disagree. I believe that political workers are needed in the companies, battalions, regiments and divisions. I am not going to expand upon why they are needed. I am speaking about another issue. A deputy company commander of a political unit, Senior Lieutenant I. Chernov, and Lieutenant I. Shinkarenko, a member of the Komsomol committee, have written reports requesting that they be released from the armed forces. Let us suppose that they do release these political workers, who, by the way, are intelligent and energetic officers. I am convinced that things will only suffer from such an action.

What should be done? First, I think, one cannot give in to political demagoguery, ignorance and blatant hypocrisy. By taking an active position through a clear word and convincing examples we can prove our case. The time has not come for the political workers to enter the reserves.

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Future of Political Bodies Under Perestroika Debated

90UM0559A Moscow *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 7, Apr 90
(Signed to press 26 Mar 90) pp 29-38

[Discussion by Col N. Petrushenko and Lt Col V. Podziruk, people's deputies of the USSR, recorded by Maj I. Plugatarev, *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* correspondent, in January of this year: "Face up to the Realities or Take the Path of Denial?"]

[Text] The discussion of the CPSU Central Committee's Platform for the 28th Party Congress intensified the debate on the CPSU's place and role in the life of our society. We know that the platform calls for a reform of the Armed Forces. This places the future of the political organs in question. I believe that the dialogue between Col Nikolay Semenovich Petrushenko (right photo [photos not reproduced]) and Lt Col Viktor Semenovich Podziruk will provide some idea of the nature and the depth of the debate on this acute problem.

[N. Petrushenko] Viktor Semenovich, you could be a little more loyal to the political organs. After all, as far as I know, you engaged in journalism fairly fruitfully, and this calls for close cooperation both with them and with the party aktiv.

[V. Podziruk] If we follow this logic, you, and not I, should be the one "taking up arms" against the political organs. After all, you have a tank command school in your background....

[N. Petrushenko] The fact is that I went over to the "camp of the political workers" while I was still performing my extended-duty service. Furthermore, I have behind me not just a command school, but a political school as well.

[V. Podziruk] A political school... later for that.... Seriously speaking, however, I did complete the school of journalism at the state university in Tartu and my pen truly never ran dry for a certain period of time at the beginning of my military service. Incidentally, my first conflicts with the political organs began following publication of my articles.

[N. Petrushenko] Were they awfully caustic?

[V. Podziruk] Not exactly caustic.... You should make allowances for the times. Khrushchev had been replaced, and the voices of "children of the 20th congress" had slowly fallen silent.... Generally speaking, I did not write so much caustically as hit the nail on the head, let us say. That was not to their liking. They invited me in, summoned me, talked with me, advised me.... But you are a political worker, and you know more about this process.

[N. Petrushenko] That is, one might say that you have long harbored a certain dislike for the political organs. Is that so?

[V. Podziruk] Reducing it all to a matter of my personal ambitions would make it a very simple matter: Oh, they offended him. They rubbed him the wrong way. Now he is getting even and that is why he became the chosen one of the people. Incidentally, this is also a tested method of modern "party-political action": to compromise a person, to slander him if possible. If that is not possible, at least to show him in an unfavorable light in order to divert attention away from the serious issues he has raised, as is frequently the case.

[N. Petrushenko] Viktor Semenovich, let us stop making unfounded accusations. It would be more interesting to retrace the path to your speech at the session which discussed Comrade Yazov's candidacy for the post of minister of defense, to the positions which you continue to hold....

[V. Podziruk] Fine, but first let me say this. A few days after my speech an article was published in one of the central military publications in defense of the political organs, let us say. But that is alright. It is understandable and explainable. My speech could not go "unpunished." Something else puzzles me. If you recall, Sr Lt Nikolay Tutov followed me at the session with a speech containing similar criticism. That article reproached us, asking how we could evaluate the political organs when one of us had served nine years in the army, the other somewhat longer. A cheap shot, I would point out. I have served in the army since 1962. I served as a commander, "bided my time at headquarters" and engaged in research. So I can certainly judge the political organs from something more than casual impressions. With respect to Nikolay Tutov, I believe that the argument

about his nine years is also a weak one. It simply did not take him as long to arrive at conclusions similar to mine. This underscores what a crisis the political organs of the Armed Forces are in today.

[N. Petrushenko] I would not be in a hurry to make such a statement.... And in general I am forced to deny your objectivity in this matter. I also can judge the political organs from more than hearsay. I gave them slightly less than 20 years, and I have served in the army only slightly less than you. One needs adequate grounds and proof to make such statements. You will pardon me, but what we have here is demagoguery.

[V. Podziruk] Well, we have the grounds and the proof and examples. Perhaps I should begin with them. I consider this one to be the most illustrative. At one time we had a competition for several years in the air force to see who could run up the most flight hours. There is no point in explaining the absurdity of this initiative. The situation reached the point of the absurd, however. Crews would take off, and aircraft would fly back and forth in the area of the airfield, "cranking out" flight hours. And the political organs zealously "promoted" and publicized all of this, called upon us "to fight" and "skinned alive" anyone who did not try to excel. The results were compared at headquarters, the winners were honored.... I once addressed the matter at a party meeting. "What kind of money are we throwing out the window?" I asked. We are using up kerosene, oil and service life, wearing out the equipment. In the final analysis, we are deceiving the people. This was because the objective of the competition was vague to the point of being ridiculous.... So I was summoned to the commander. The deputy commander for political affairs was present. It seemed that I was perverting party policy. Had I not forgotten the color of my party card? They could check it, you know. And the deputy commander for political affairs so cleverly made it appear that I had not been addressing the essence of the matter but, according to him, was attacking the foundation of socialist competition laid by Vladimir Ilich himself.

[N. Petrushenko] And what about the commander?

[V. Podziruk] What could the commander do? He sat there and was a yes-man. What else could he do. After all, according to Article 6 of the Constitution, the party is "our helmsman." This situation is changing today.... And so, we were both warned that if we spouted off again, we would be exchanging the aircraft cockpit for the levers of a tractor. I cite this example to underscore how far removed the political organs were from the reality, from the pressing concerns of the units and subunits, so they thought up work for themselves, "went all out" in it, and all who "disagreed" with their directives were accused of failing to understand party policy. Many honest officers suffered from this during the years of L.I. Brezhnev.

[N. Petrushenko] I agree. We admit, however, that during that unforgettable period many of us wore

blinders, only infrequently looking around. You yourself failed to write in the newspaper about the competition for the greatest number of flight hours. Did you even speak out in a narrow circle of people?

[V. Podziruk] To write about this in the newspaper at that time would have been tantamount to suicide. It would clearly not have been published, but they could have sent it through channels, and it is clear today that I might perfectly well have long ago begun operating a plow or manning a lathe....

[N. Petrushenko] That is logical! But what did the political organs have to do with it? One might say that the deputy commander for political affairs even saved you by limiting the matter to a warning, albeit a fairly unequivocal one.

[V. Podziruk] And I thank him!

[N. Petrushenko] You refrained from writing such articles after that, did you not?

[V. Podziruk] Let us put it this way: I knew how far to go.... It was during that period, however, that I automatically began questioning the role of the political organs. When did they come into being? For what purpose?

[N. Petrushenko] A trip into the past, into history?

[V. Podziruk] Yes. I think that this is essential.... You recall that the main reason for their establishment was, for one thing, to vigilantly monitor the military specialists, former czarist generals and officers, many of whom actively cooperated with Soviet power following October of '17, were among those who established and built up the Red Army and then served in various command positions in it. Incidentally, Frunze himself wrote that historically, the commissar emerged on the scene as a Soviet controller.

In the second place, the party established the political organs to work among the Red Army men, the majority of whom were peasants with little education and with a poor understanding of policy. Furthermore, most of the commanders were not party members. And at that stage the political organs, commanders and political instructors unquestionably played a prominent role, one might say... "keeping watch," educating, grounding ideologically, indoctrinating.... But tell me, who needs to be watched today? Who needs to be persuaded?! Why, our soldiers, not to speak of the officers, are so well indoctrinated, conditioned and aware in the performance of their military duty—yes, despite all of the current trends, the pacifist propaganda, the use of "dedovshchina" as scare-tactics in the press—that they simply do not need such an inflated (I stress this once again) staff of indoctrinators and agitators! This is obvious! Take the war in Afghanistan. It is said today that the war was criminal. On the other hand, however, our soldiers and officers graphically demonstrated in that war that they are worthy of the heroic traditions of previous generations of

Soviet fightingmen. They continued and added to those traditions with their actions and their feats.

[N. Petrushenko] Probably not without the participation of the political organs? Or is that not so?

[V. Podziruk] Perhaps it is. I want to say, however, that the training and political indoctrination should not be separate today. The commander is also an indoctrinator! But this is still only a slogan for us, one which is convenient to the commanders, permitting them in the case of a number of failures in their work to point to the political workers and say: "They failed to indoctrinate well enough. Also for the political workers themselves, in order for them to justify somehow the need for their existence. I am not against political workers per se. I reject the impossibly inflated superstructure in the person of the political organs and the political apparatus, however. Tell me why we need a deputy commander for political affairs at a sanitarium or in a military hunting association? Or a chief of a political section, let us say, for district rear services or the General Staff? Do we need them? And everywhere they are monitoring someone, teaching someone "how to live"....

I recently spoke with a deputy, a doctor of sciences, professor and sociologist, who was part of a delegation to Finland. This is what he told me. The delegation was at a lumbering section. Everyone was busy: sawing, cutting, loading, hauling.... The professor asked them whether they had a foreman. "Why do we need a foreman?" was the surprised reply. "What about a tally clerk?" "No." "Don't you have some kind of boss?" "Why would we need one?! However much we cut and deliver, that is how much money we receive. Everyone shares it equally"! And so I ask you: Why does our army need these intermediate elements, "tally clerks" in the person of the political organs, during the period of ever-increasing awareness on the part of the people? We do not need them! They are superfluous! They are a hindrance!

[N. Petrushenko] With that premise we could reach the point, let us say, that the manuscripts of articles and commentary would be sent right to the printing office, right to the type-setters, and we could eliminate the editorial board of this very KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL as an "intermediate element"....

[V. Podziruk] You don't need to exaggerate. I am saying something different. Most of the officers in our army today are Communists. And the title of Communist requires one to conduct both agitation and propaganda among the people. Why are the rank-and-file party members not trusted to perform it? Why has the role of the party assignment been reduced to naught in this respect? Who benefits from the lack of initiative on the part of the Communist? The forces have party bureaus, party committees, party groups, party commissions.... Essentially my position is that it is time to abandon the monitoring and tutelage of the Communists and to begin

actually trusting them. If we do this the need for the superstructure of political organs will disappear.

[N. Petrushenko] But this structure is directly linked also to one-man command, supporting and bolstering it. I hope that you are not opposed to one-man command?

[V. Podziruk] A rhetorical question.

[N. Petrushenko] Without the political organs one-man command would soon turn into one-man power, into usurpation, because far from all of our commanders have mastered the culture of one-man command. Some of them place themselves above criticism, above the party organizations. Have you actually not encountered this?

[V. Podziruk] I have, of course, more than once. Also libertarian commanders, commanders with little competence in certain areas, out-and-out petty tyrants.... When one of these "luminaries" says something, that is it....!

[N. Petrushenko] What should be done with such people?

[V. Podziruk] In this area individual political workers do have all the cards. I stress, individual. I do not suggest eliminating all of them. The propagandist, the Komsomol secretary, the club chief (if the unit has a club, of course)—let them remain in the regiment....

[N. Petrushenko] If there is no club, then the cultural and educational worker is essential to organize and conduct cultural and educational work!

[V. Podziruk] ...I would elevate the position of propagandist to the battalion level. He could cover more and work more objectively. The secretary of the party committee, truly an elected official, should remain in the regiment, of course, but not the one appointed from the top under the screen of "unanimously elected." But why do we need a deputy commander for political affairs, a political section chief, a deputy political section chief, an instructor for party organizational work...?

[N. Petrushenko] I do not reject the actual approach of reducing the apparatus, but I would point out once again that someone must direct the propagandists, the cultural and educational workers....

[V. Podziruk] There are party organizations and party committees for this. Even the Officers' Assembly could become involved....

[N. Petrushenko] How is a party committee or a party organization to oversee these officers in the situation of one-man command? Let us imagine a situation in which the commander orders the club chief or the propagandist to take on a job not related to his direct duties (and this happens over and over today, even with live deputy unit commanders for political affairs, so to speak!), what is the party committee to do? Nothing. What kind of administrative authority does it have? One-man command is one-man command.

[V. Podziruk] What I am trying to prove was actually stated by M.V. Frunze. Back in 1922, in a report on the military-political indoctrination of the Red Army at a conference of commanders and commissars of the army and navy, he said that these two lines, military and political, must merge into military-political indoctrination. And later, speaking about the institution of commissars, he noted that when we have conditions ensuring the advancement to leading command posts of people who have come out of the lower ranks, people with close links to the workers' and peasants', capable of serving not just as technical leaders but also as political leaders, the institution of commissars will no longer have any purpose.

[N. Petrushenko] Permit me to make a significant correction to your references to M.V. Frunze. Otherwise, the readers of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL will get the wrong impression of his regard for the political organs. I have heard perorations on Mikhail Vasilyevich's views in auditoriums of officers and political workers: at round tables and debates and in Marxist-Leninist study groups. Like you, some of them call upon him for assistance in demonstrating that today's military political apparatus is not needed.

It should be borne in mind, however, that before becoming a military leader Frunze was a professional revolutionary, and he, of all people, was an expert on and knew something about the selection of means and methods of political struggle and of exerting political influence upon the masses. And it was no accident that after he donned the overcoat, he repeatedly stated that the means of struggle of the political organs—political organs, I point out—are and shall continue to serve as an additional powerful weapon in the battle against enemy armies in the hands of the good command element.... You forget about this for some reason, Viktor Semenovich.

[V. Podziruk] That is just it! Today, during the period of glasnost and democratization, the political organs are a powerful weapon in the hands of the sole-commander for taking reprisals against "other-minded individuals." I have in mind not just perestroika-minded officers with constructive ideas.

[N. Petrushenko] I want to point out that you are contradicting yourself. Are you saying that the bulk of the blame no longer lies with the commanders but with the political organs? I first want to complete my thought about M.V. Frunze's views. In fact, to the end of his days, he never uttered anything about the political organs having spent themselves. On the contrary, he did everything possible to strengthen them. And....

[V. Podziruk] And I am not denying that! Frunze was far-sighted in military matters. He understood that sooner or later a war with imperialism was inevitable, and his understanding of the role of political organs in the forthcoming war stemmed from this. The political organs played a role in the Great Patriotic War. We did

not need endlessly to procreate political workers after that, however. We did not need to open up more and more political establishments. We should have reduced them everywhere. The funds should have been spent primarily on the preparation of professionals in military affairs....

[N. Petrushenko] Perhaps. Right now, though, you are considering things from the narrow, parochial view of today, when it is primarily the qualitative aspects of the military training which are on the agenda.... The ideological struggle has never ceased, however, and it even intensified following the war, when the "cold war" began. It became more than essential to exert a political influence on the young generation at that time. In fact, we had to understand ourselves, to comprehend and, most important, to explain to the people why the U.S.A. and England, our former allies in the war, had suddenly become our enemies.... In addition, there was the 20th party congress, at which an attempt was made to debunk the cult of the individual... the "Caribbean Crisis" was approaching, and the world was on the brink of nuclear war.... That is when the party began reinforcing the army and navy political organs.

[V. Podziruk] The bottom line, however, is the fact that our doctrine is defensive today, and the Armed Forces are being reduced. The political organs continue to be "aggressive," however. Everything may be reduced, but not them. Why do we have a political worker in the company today, for example? Except for setting up the Lenin rooms, they do nothing. They are capable of nothing. They are poorly trained at the schools.

[N. Petrushenko] This is a debatable issue, and I myself have pondered it more than once. All the same, however, I am not inclined to take and abolish the deputy company commanders for political affairs in one fell swoop. This would be unjustified and premature. Once again, you are considering the company political worker of yesterday. He has different concerns today. The Lenin room, which was indeed used in great part to impress the leadership, is not his main job....

[V. Podziruk] Here you are talking about the "growing role" of the deputy commander for political affairs again.... And just when will the commander's role grow?! Once again, Frunze pointed out that the highest and most desirable kind of one-man command would be the combining in a single individual of both military functions per se and political leadership!

[N. Petrushenko] That is correct. He stipulated, however—and more than once—that this kind of combination would require features and qualities of the commander which are found in far from every commander, even a party-member. Even a party-member! He spoke of this desirable combination as a long-range thing. Do you think that the time has come?

[V. Podziruk] If it has not completely arrived, it is close, and the restructuring underway in the nation is contributing to it!

[N. Petrushenko] Oh, you are an optimist.... I shall cite yet another example for you, which illustrates just what political work and the political worker are. A separate company in one of the units was in mess in all respects. It would barely succeed in assigning existing "deds" to a disciplinary battalion when new ones would appear. A commission headed by the chief of the formation staff arrived in the company. It detected significant shortcomings in the internal order and the organization of the guard service, as well as disarray in the equipment pool and a lack of understanding of their duties in the commanders and soldiers.... The conclusion was that the commander, the so-and-so, had allowed things to get out of hand, to deteriorate, and this accounted for the "dedovshchina".... Members of the district staff also visited the subunit. They made a more in-depth study, but the conclusion was the same: to remove the company commander, to hold him accountable.... No one got down to the real causes, however! An officer from the division political section assisted. He gained the confidence of the company commander, encouraged the latter to be candid and was able to understand him. It turned out that he had a seriously ill wife and problems with a child. And the commander had been rushing back and forth between his home and the service. The personnel had moved into the background, and something bad happened. Commissions followed, and the same conclusions: remove the "so-and-so".... Incidentally, six months ago he won a competition for the position of company commander.

[V. Podziruk] Were you by any chance that political worker?

[N. Petrushenko] No. But what was my reason for citing this example? Why, in order to demonstrate an area in which we need first of all to take a professional approach. The professional political worker is one who proceeds "from the individual" in his work. You will say: "goes toward people." I believe that this is the wrong formulation of the matter. To say people is not actually specific. But to go toward a person—Ivanov, Kerimov, Akopyan.... Is there a difference?

[V. Podziruk] Of course there is. This is in the area of an individual approach to everyone. But we expect the commanders also to do this. Are you not trying to say that the reins of individual work with people are exclusively in the hands of the political workers?

[N. Petrushenko] No, I have no intention of placing restrictions on the commanders. But the commanders... they engage more in training....

Take the problem of inter-ethnic relations. The army today is receiving youth who have participated in picket lines, in demonstrations by people's fronts, even in extremist actions.... Can a sole-commander, without the support and assistance of a professional, get to the bottom of such complex aspects of the problem, work out some kind of position with respect to specific groups

within the subunit, who are also united on an ethnic basis, find psychological approaches to them? I doubt it. What about you?

[V. Podziruk] Well, yes.... But I do not agree, of course, that the commander must possess some kind of skills, knowledge and know-how in this area....

[N. Petrushenko] "In this area...." Viktor Semenovich, how many such "areas" do we have today?! People are being drawn into the nation's political life, demonstrating an interest in history and pondering the prospects for our development. They are disturbed by international, ecological problems.... Who is to orient them, to help them work out their stance?

[V. Podziruk] If the commander himself is well prepared.... He does have the party bureau, after all!

[N. Petrushenko] No, Viktor Semenovich. At any rate, you are exaggerating their capabilities. One has to learn how to do political work and then to perfect his work on a daily basis. Only then will it be worthwhile. Only then will it produce results. And the commander has his own concerns. Those commanders and service chiefs may be members of that very party bureau.... In addition, their composition changes from year to year. The aktiv is renewed, and people are elected who frequently have never engaged in party work before, of if they did, it was at the level of recording the minutes. So that, in any case, they will not focus entirely on indoctrinational work. Most important, they will lack the professionalism for this difficult job. This fact has been demonstrated more than once and, as they say, verified by experience.

In my opinion, we should be talking not so much about reducing the political organs—and particularly, not about eliminating them—as about a rapid and substantial restructuring of their work methods, about a decisive switch from pressuring and ordering to political methods.

[V. Podziruk] I can see that you are truly a professional, Nikolay Semenovich. You have drawn me into this discussion.... Well, let us continue. Here are several dozen documents, complaints, inquiries from deputies, appeals.... Call them what you like. The Air Defense Forces. Party members in one of the units, two colonels and a captain, submitted a proposal at a party conference that a movement called "Army Communists for Restructuring" be founded. They read the program and sent it to the superior party organ, and... they were all soon discharged from the Armed Forces. I have a letter defending them. The officers and Communists ask that the initiators of the movement, honest and conscientious fellow servicemen, be protected from repression and discrimination. Another example. A major informed the Ministry of Defense that large-scale thefts were occurring at a depot. The matter was taken up by... the political organ. The major was expelled from the party. And there are lots of examples like these.

[N. Petrushenko] What can I say? In this case the political organ acted not in the very best manner with respect to the initiators of the movement. If the initiative was truly worthwhile, it could have been successfully used! I still believe however, that every individual case has to be looked into separately. And the blame should not be laid entirely onto the political organs.

[V. Podziruk] I want to say that these incidents also show the political organs have not found a place in the restructuring and are seeking it by....

[N. Petrushenko] Again, why put it in such absolute terms?! In the first place, I contend that far from all of us, as you try to depict it, "have not found our place." In the second place, restructuring is not accomplished instantaneously. Furthermore, it lags several years behind in the military. The political organs are restructuring themselves, and restructuring does not come easy for them. One cannot lie down in the evening and wake up in the morning restructured. One would want the restructuring to proceed more rapidly and substantially, of course, and for the return to be greater and more perceptible.

[V. Podziruk] I have to add grist to your mill. Your colleagues themselves express such a desire, even a demand. I cite this from a letter: "I myself am a political worker and have served as deputy regimental commander for political affairs going on 5 years. I have a fair understanding of the situation in our system. And I want to say that you are absolutely right...." He is referring to my speech at the session. He goes on to say: "It is not enough simply to say this, however. I propose to you the following: Suggest that the Committee on State Security and Defense of the USSR Supreme Soviet discuss this issue, after first thoroughly studying the opinion of all the officers-and-political workers."

[N. Petrushenko] I have the same kind of letters in my deputy's file. I wanted to cite them, but since you already have....

[V. Podziruk] And so, Nikolay Semenovitch, has the time not come to submit this matter for general discussion by the military?

[N. Petrushenko] You know, I raised the question of holding an all-army party conference on a democratic basis two or three years ago. I happen to know that Communists in other districts have also discussed it. It is long since time to hold a general military discussion on these problems. The proposals were sent to the Main Political Directorate.

[V. Podziruk] And the matter is still hung up there.

[N. Petrushenko] But everything is leading in that direction, and one simply cannot fail to see that. It is another matter that we have to make some substantial preparations.

[V. Podziruk] But have they been started? That is the question. I understand that you are not the one to ask.

[N. Petrushenko] And why not? Like it or not, by directive or at an initiative from "lower down," I believe that these preparations are already actively underway in the forces. The political organs are even now being given evaluations, and this would not be the first all-army conference. This is being done at meetings of the party aktiv and at party conferences. Incidentally, I myself was beaten at a conference in my formation. My only consolation was that others benefited. And I cannot say that the rank and file Communists, while criticizing the political organs, are calling for their elimination. No! Their speeches actually indicate concern for them. And in addition to resolving other matters, the all-army conference of secretaries should also take an objective look at the political organs through a high-powered microscope. This would motivate the organs objectively to evaluate themselves.... All of this would help to accelerate the restructuring in the political organs. I believe that it would be feasible to hold such a conference following the 28th party conference.

[V. Podziruk] And I think that the time is now. The Central Committee platform for the conference is being discussed. The party itself has proposed revising Article 6, and the struggle for its vanguard role in the society will be conducted on a democratic basis.... One would like to hear what the army and navy Communists think about this.

[N. Petrushenko] No, such haste would hardly be appropriate.

[V. Podziruk] Look before you leap?

[N. Petrushenko] Even in the restructuring we have more than once done the opposite and only looked after we have "leaped." Are you suggesting that we once again act without thorough deliberation?

[V. Podziruk] I simply continue to advocate more decisive and vigorous steps. To wait.... Delay, you know, will only lead to greater stagnation, or in any case contribute to its continuation.

[N. Petrushenko] No doubt, but... we eliminate the political organs. What will take their place? The other "parties" are not yet submitting their own platforms, and the military Communists are in no hurry to take up some other banner. I'm sorry, but your idea is based on a generally shallow analysis of the facts and processes. You have no fundamental, constructive proposals, Viktor Semenovitch, except for reducing, eliminating, disbanding, farming out all political work exclusively to the unit and subunit party organizations. Even to the officers' assemblies, which is very strange in general. It seems to me that this is precisely why you were not particularly supported by the deputies at that memorable session. Nikolay Tutov actually does not count. He was essentially just copying you.

[V. Podziruk] Possibly. But you cannot understand that I am expressing the opinion not of just one or just two

officers, that there is "dislike" for the political organs among some of the officers in the forces.

[N. Petrushenko] Yes, such opinions do exist among a certain part of the officers. Otherwise, there would be no point in these debates with you.... This is precisely why, I believe, the editors of *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* gave us the opportunity "to bring out" these problems in the magazine, to define our positions. Or, perhaps, to delineate them? But remember, Viktor Semenovich, that I am not simply defending the political organs. I have long struggled for a restructuring in them. I am not alone in this. And we will not permit the discussion of pressing problems to be drowned in negation of the political organs.

[V. Podziruk] I hope that you will not use in your "refusal to permit" methods from the arsenal from "the era of Stalinism and stagnation."

[N. Petrushenko] Viktor Semenovich, I have already said that we are restructuring, and certain costs still lie ahead.... We are sensing our role in the restructuring more and more deeply. I am confident that the political organs, together with all the Communists in the Armed Forces, will be the vanguard in this process. I simply see no alternative. And you?!

[V. Podziruk] ?!

From the editors: And so, the positions have been explained. Obviously, the opponents do not claim to be the ultimate authorities. And it would be at the very least unwarranted to accept one opinion absolutely and reject the other just as totally. We know that the matters of establishing party structures from top to bottom in the army and navy and of delimiting their functions with those of the political organs were discussed at the March Central Committee plenum. They are also reflected in the draft of the new CPSU Charter. It is not yet clear how the reform will proceed. Proposals for the party Central Committee and the nation's Supreme Soviet are only being prepared. All points of view and all constructive proposals are therefore important. We invite all of our readers, both Communists and those who are not party members, to become involved in the discussion. We await your letters.

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Difficulties of Soviet Troops in Nationalist Conflicts Examined

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[Article by *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* Special Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Gavrilov: "Between Two Fires Is Where the Army Ended Up in Carrying Out a Decision by the Country's Leadership To Stabilize the Situation in the Transcaucasus"]

[Text] Feb-Mar—They stood silently on the shoulder of the road, squeezing small bundles in their hands. Women, old men and children. There were neither protesting exclamations nor angry looks. One could read on their faces a resignation to their fate and a hopelessness, from which there was a rather eerie breath of the Middle Ages. Kazakhskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department Deputy Chief Major Mefrali Bayramov, in whose UAZ vehicle we were driving along the route, began fidgeting in the front seat. Then he sighed and turned around to explain: "Again they are not letting our people into the village, although they are hurrying to a funeral. That is how it is every time—they will find some kind of excuse and close the road. Live where you like, they say..." By the way, I did not catch any particular resentment in his voice. It was more a statement of a customary fact.

Several minutes later our column of two Volgas of local leaders, the police UAZ and a ZIL with a platoon of soldiers stopped at the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate post. The Kazakh-Yerevan main highway was closed off by a simple structure of welded metal pipes on wheels. A group of people in paramilitary uniform could be seen behind it. Suddenly a person separated from the group, furtively pressing a shotgun to his side. He crossed the highway in a couple of bounds and ended up outside our field of view. Events developed further almost as in an adventure film. Leaping from the forward vehicle, Major General A. Murylev gave a brief instruction to Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel V. Koperchak, pointing beyond a wire fence behind which even lines of a vineyard stretched as if stitched by an experienced seamstress. Soldiers in bulletproof vests and helmets jumped over the side of the vehicle onto the asphalt. Two of them jumped across the fence and the others threw the barrier aside onto the shoulder. Suddenly automatic rounds chattered, lashing at the nerves. The soldiers were firing in the air. Behind the wire we soon caught sight of a pale face overgrown with a thin bristle. One of the soldiers, giving a good-natured little shove in the back to a young lad in a dirty green, quilted jacket drawn in by a leather belt, was repeating: "Come on, come on, crawl back over." The other carried an old double-barreled shotgun.

But it seemed that this entire scene was of interest to me alone. Not paying it the slightest attention, B. Eyubov, first secretary of the party's Kazakhskiy Raykom, charged over to a short, compact man in a dark raincoat, uttering reproaches. Only fragments of his emotional words carried to me: "...as much as possible, but we agreed. . . . Who is your boss in the rayon? Is there Soviet power here at all or not?"

The athletic figure of Major General S. Korobko towered next to Eyubov. His deep bass had a conciliatory tone: "We have to look into everything quietly..." Drilling the leader of the "boyeviks," a young man with an intelligent appearance and a short, tidy beard, with a sharp look, Anatoliy Yegorovich Murylev insistently demanded: "Explain who you are and what you are doing here." (By

the way, the term "boyevik" is used indiscriminately by our civilian journalist colleagues both for the peasants armed with antediluvian guns who guard the outskirts of their villages and for the rather well trained groups of overt bandits welded by rigid discipline, whose arsenal includes automatic weapons, grenades and even combat equipment.) The other responded, trying to preserve a cool appearance: "Why so much noise, Comrade General? We are not harming anyone, but simply wish to protect our people..."

A small man with a long moustache wearing a ridiculous quilted jacket with long flaps was standing to one side. He suddenly flitted into the bushes behind the concrete box of the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate post and brought out one more shotgun. He decided to disarm himself voluntarily.

Here is where I realized that all this was new only to me, but it was the usual humdrum episode for the others—Afghan veterans generals A. Murylev and S. Korobko; Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel V. Koperchak; the soldiers; B. Eyubov; G. Pogosyan, second secretary of the CPSU's Idzhevskiy Raykom (it was toward him that Eyubov had run so temperamentally); and for all the Armenians and Azerbaijanis who bunched up on the narrow length of highway. It was then that it really became weird for me from realizing that all this was happening in our days, on our soil.

Several years ago I had occasion to visit Tugoleskiy bor, which is near Shatura, at a time when fires were raging in the peat bogs there. Pacing next to the fire brigade chief, with the lightheartedness of a person of little knowledge I persistently pumped him about some kind of especially acute and gripping episodes of the fight against the elements. The sullen captain in smoky canvas overalls initially put me off with monosyllabic responses and then, not able to contain himself, flung out: "Well, any abomination can be expected of this damned bog at any second. We flooded this area here with water this morning. Now look..." Selecting some kind of bough, the captain drove it forcefully into the soil. Smoke emerged from the hole that formed and sparks began to fly. The fire was raging beneath us again.

Why did I recall this? In my view, the events in the Transcaucasus largely resemble that fire in the peat bog. Things have gone so far and nationalist intoxication has so strongly clouded the heads of the majority of Armenians and Azerbaijanis that one need not hope for some kind of miraculous measures which will put out the conflict at a single stroke and will smooth over the numerous contradictions between what were at one time two fraternal republics. The moment was missed. A political solution was not found for the Karabakh problem at the time when certain possibilities still remained for resolving it within a constitutional framework. Now years are needed for the mutual offenses to subside and for the pain of losses of those near and dear to be dulled. But for now, popular fronts and various

"left" and "right" organizations of Armenia and Azerbaijan attempt to find a way out of the deadlocked situation according to their own understanding by forming numerous detachments of "boyeviks" and resorting to threats and violence. And one need not labor under delusions when reading the optimistic information reports published almost daily in the central press: so many weapons have been surrendered and so many enterprises have renewed work. The fire has been knocked off the branches of the trees, but it continues to burn deep beneath our feet.

It so happened that I became familiar with the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th party congress in Gyandzha, having just returned from Kazakhskiy Rayon, which is on the border with Armenia. Glancing over paragraph after paragraph, I was looking above all for what I had been pondering the last few days: a clear, precise assessment of the situation which had taken shape in the sphere of ethnic relations, recognition of a crisis in this sphere and a determination of the main ways to overcome it. I found it, and read: "The position of the party, which unites people of all nationalities, enables and obligates the use of this political potential for settling inter-ethnic arguments and conflicts." And for some reason I recalled a story told by Lieutenant Colonel G. Sinkov, an airborne formation political department official, about February events in 1988:

The city resembled a stirred-up anthill. Tens and hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets. Crowds of teenagers 14-18 years old attempted to force their way into the Armenian part of Gyandzha, shouting ethnic slogans. This seemingly occurred spontaneously, but the feeling did not leave me that someone's experienced, firm hand was controlling all this confusion. Party and soviet officials unfortunately proved unready for a dialogue with the people in that extreme situation. R. Bagirli, at that time still first secretary of the CPSU's Kirovabad Gorkom, and the other "apparatchiks" preferred to sit it out in their offices. They were frightened and confused to the extreme. Now and then there would be calls from them to the political department and to the division commander's office. They would ask us to assign soldiers to break up the mass rallies and "impose order." Gorkom Department Chief Yu. Pashazade literally went into hysterics before Formation Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel A. Rudyuk: We will perish, he said, because of your inaction. Why don't you post a guard at the gorkom? At this time the officers and men were saving women and children and were trying to bring the pogrom-makers to reason. No one was able to give us precise instructions as to how to act, so we made many decisions on our own responsibility and at our own risk. Today we are accused of substituting for party and soviet entities in a self-willed manner and of putting down "popular demonstrations." Well now, was it better for us to sit twiddling our thumbs watching extremists who had lost human appearance jeer helpless people?

The party aktiv in Gyandzha and adjacent rayons essentially let the situation get out of control. In essence, the very same also can be said about many other cities and

villages of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Difficult, painstaking work lies ahead to restore the people's trust. Obviously the draft Platform should have spoken frankly about this. Most important, it should have suggested a specific mechanism for using the party's political potential for stabilizing the situation in the country's hot spots.

For now, however, using the Army to settle inter-ethnic conflicts is almost becoming the rule. Therefore it would appear that the time has come to ponder how such a role of a unique buffer between the populace of different rayons, republics and even regions, blinded by ethnic passions, reflects on the people's attitude toward the Armed Forces and on the mood among officers and soldiers. This question troubles officers, warrant officers, NCO's and privates not only in the Transcaucasus or, let us say, in Tajikistan, since in acting as a peacemaking and stabilizing force, the Army simultaneously attracts the most serious accusations of anticonstitutional and illegal actions on the part of various informals and ultraradicals throughout the country.

We rode to the headquarters of the Gyandzha organization of the People's Front of Azerbaijan with Senior Lieutenant S. Vlasenko, a formation political department official. Around a hundred persons thronged in the square near a single-story building of old construction. No sooner had we clambered out of the vehicle when men of the most varied ages, but with a similar expression of somber resolve on ill-shaven faces, surrounded us and plied us with questions while Vlasenko handed out leaflets. They tried to find out our assessment of the events in Baku, whether or not it was true that thousands of people had perished during the commitment of troops there, and did the Catholicos of all Armenians really call on his countrymen to seize new territories. On learning that I was a journalist, they invited me to go into the headquarters. After carefully studying my editorial identification, A. Sadykhov, one of the heads of the local People's Front of Azerbaijan section, agreed to say a few words:

Good relations have developed for us with the servicemen who are in the city, and we treat officers' families normally, but after commitment of troops to Baku we have few hopes for the Army. We thought that it was our defender, but there soldiers fired on peaceful citizens. Frankly speaking, this shook confidence in the Russian people. We are for no shooting. Previously we all lived as brothers and everyone was satisfied. Here in Gyandzha no one offended a single soldier. Just who will answer for the thousands who died in Baku?

We respect generals Sorokin and Korobko and Lieutenant Colonel Lopukha. We told them more than once what we are trying to attain and what the People's Front wishes—freedom for the people and justice. But what kind of justice is it if an Azerbaijani with a shotgun is called a "boyevik" in the newspapers and an Armenian with an assault rifle is called a militiaman?

Yes, any inaccuracy, ambiguity, or shift of accents in central press publications and in television and radio broadcasts are instantaneously noted by People's Front of Azerbaijan leaders and are used to confirm the version about "pro-Armenian" sentiments which allegedly reign in the center. With respect to Sadykhov's statement regarding "weak hopes for the Army," let us turn to the facts.

In the last few months just those units and subunits where I managed to spend time during the TDY (and they numbered over ten) conducted around 30 operations to lift the blockade both of Azerbaijani and Armenian settlements besieged by the "boyeviks" and suffering because of the absence of the most necessary food products and medical care. Almost all reliefs of blockades were conducted in a bloodless manner without use of arms.

The story told by a young officer, Lieutenant V. Pugachev, about one relief of a blockade is engraved in my memory:

In the morning I was summoned by the regimental commander, who ordered me to take a squad, load food in vehicles and deliver it to the village of Bashkislak, Shaumyanovskiy Rayon. It had been cut off from the entire world for several months. Armenian "boyeviks" and residents of Armenian villages situated around it were not letting anyone out and they would detain any transport heading in that direction. I selected eight soldiers and explained the mission. We loaded two GAZ-66 vehicles with food products issued by order of the gorispolkom, clarified the route in the People's Front and headed off. We arrived in the village without special adventures—we went at high speed. The residents surrounded us, crying, giving thanks, and carrying fruit. They themselves were pale and emaciated. Their elders told me later that they had flour left for one day.

We picked up 16 sick persons, basically women and children, in the village. We decided to travel back putting the trucks with evacuees in front and our armored reconnaissance vehicle following them. The calculation proved correct. We stumbled on a blocking force near the village of Manashid, but the GAZ-66's managed to slip through while we stopped and engaged in talks. I feared most that they might organize pursuit of the trucks, for those who stopped us were armed. True, we also had a machinegun and eight assault rifles, but to fire at civilians, even if armed? No, we would have done this only if our wards had been threatened by immediate danger.

On meeting with Azerbaijanis in settlements bordering on Armenia, I heard from them more than once that they felt safe only when military units were nearby. "Give us soldiers," residents of the village of Barkhudarli, Kazakhskiy Rayon, demanded of generals A. Murylev and S. Korobko, "Otherwise the bearded ones' will not leave us in peace." They were even ready to assume responsibility for supplying the military subunits with food. Send us a platoon or a squad on an APC... Commanders of units

and subunits that are now scattered essentially throughout all foothill areas hear such requests from the local leadership and kolkhoz members so often that they would have to increase the number of personnel tens of times in order to fulfill them. This can be understood: both Armenian and Azerbaijani "boyeviks" now fear only an open clash with the Army. They feel themselves to be full proprietors in rayons and populated points where there are no military subunits.

I will return to the episode with which I began. It stands to reason that Transcaucasus Military District Deputy Commander Major General A. Murylev and Major General S. Korobko were not in Kazakhskiy Rayon by chance. The CPSU raykom first secretary contacted them the day before and announced that a large group of armed "bearded ones" (that is what members of Armenian paramilitary elements, who in fact grow beards, are called here) had appeared near the city. By the moment of our arrival in Kazakh, several local Armenian residents headed by Garnik Matinyan had cut the Kazakh-Yerevan highway. They gave the following reason: trains again are not being admitted into Armenia and the road blockade, they said, was a retaliatory step.

Matinyan is a rather interesting figure. He is a Yerevan schoolteacher, an intellectual, and carries himself with a sense of his own dignity. It was apparent at first glance that his word was law both for Arsen (the lad whom the soldiers caught in the vineyard) and for other local Armenian residents. The Idzhevskiy Raykom secretary cast fearful glances at Matinyan. By the way, can he be condemned for this? There is real force behind Matinyan. We had occasion to be convinced of this when we were heading back after spending time in Barkhudarli, where a company of soldiers headed by battalion political officer Captain O. Grinkevich was on duty at a railroad crossing. A large group of young men in semi-military uniform and with heavy beards awaited us beyond the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate post. These were not the local peasants whom "leaders" from Yerevan bewildered. These people conducted themselves confidently and in an accentuated independent manner. Yes, Colonel E. Gasanov, chief of the Kazakhskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department, obviously was right: the true power in Idzhevskiy Rayon was with them, and not at all with party and soviet entities. And one could hardly get at these "boyeviks" by the most sincere conversations. They reckoned only with force.

But no matter what they say there, the military make a special attempt not to give a show of force. To the contrary, officers (and not just political officers) often assume the mission of agitators, of diplomats, and of courts of arbitration. On the tensest days, maintaining close contacts with leaders of the informals, Major General V. Sorokin and Major General S. Korobko did everything in their power to prevent bloodshed. Political department officials fussed about the rayons day and night. For example, Lieutenant Colonel S. Marzoyev traveled to remote rayons several times, met with People's Front of Azerbaijan leaders and spoke to village

residents. They acted on their own responsibility and at their own risk, not having time to coordinate their trips with the leadership of Azerbaijan, as was proper, since it was impossible to delay.

The political department personnel put out around half a hundred leaflets with a printing of several thousand. This is no small amount, considering the limited capabilities of the soldiers' large-circulation newspaper printing plant. Each of the leaflets pursues one objective: to explain the true state of affairs in the republic to a populace bewildered by rumors and ethnic propaganda.

It is impossible not to pay due respect to the determination and efficiency of political entities in conducting counterpropaganda work, but at the same time the question arises: Should the Army really be doing this as well? Unfortunately it is forced to do this by the inaction of local party and soviet entities. Lieutenant Colonel A. Lopukha, deputy chief of the airborne formation political department, a person who has thoroughly studied the situation in the region and who has his own view on many things, which at times differs from the official view, believes:

After the plan to carry out a state coup in Baku failed, leaders of the People's Front of Azerbaijan, including Gyandzha leaders R. Musalov, V. Gumbatov, A. Sadykhov and E. Aliyev, rejected illegal methods of struggle and manifest resistance to authority. Now their tactics are built on the concept of a "peaceful" transition of power in the republic into the hands of the informals. The People's Front of Azerbaijan is not breaking ties with local party and soviet entities; to the contrary, it tries to extend its influence to them in every way. I have to say frankly that they already have succeeded in doing a great deal. In the city of Mingechaur alone almost 3,500 of the 5,500 party members turned in their party cards, including all city leaders—the CPSU gorkom first secretary, gorispolkom chairman, chief of the city KGB department, chief of the rayon internal affairs department, and almost all enterprise directors. Public burning of documents on central squares of cities and villages was a commonplace matter not very long ago. On 21 January of this year a session of the Gyandzha Soviet of People's Deputies adopted an extremely nationalistic resolution which contained a poorly camouflaged call to boycott measures for stabilizing the situation. And the People's Front of Azerbaijan and the party and soviet entities practically have joined in a number of rayons, so that it is difficult to expect countermeasures to the extremists' ideological subversion from them.

Two assault rifles were stolen from one of our subunits. I traveled twice to Khanlar to the People's Front of Azerbaijan headquarters, which was operating in the rayon military department facility. During my second trip I was invited to see some deputy, who assured me that the weapons were in "reliable hands" and would be returned as soon as the situation stabilized. Later I learned that I had been speaking with Yusifov, the republic's deputy minister of internal affairs.

Under these conditions it is also dangerous for us to underestimate the anti-Army propaganda being conducted by the informals. Only we ourselves can counteract it.

In fact, after the events in Baku anti-Army propaganda assumed a particularly aggressive and refined character, even crowding out nationalist and antisoviet propaganda. Many republic and local newspapers (such as the VESTNIK GYANDZHI) regularly publish materials containing attacks against the Armed Forces. Leaflets, video films, posters and photomontages are used for these same purposes. People's Front of Azerbaijan agitator-activists hold talks and mass rallies at places of residence and at enterprises. Doubters are intimidated.

And so the following paradoxical situation is taking shape: in case of danger the local leadership and residents of cities and villages run to the Army for help, but hardly is the danger past when the servicemen immediately become "occupiers stifling the people of Azerbaijan and spilling the blood of innocent people." The thought automatically came: it would not hurt for those USSR people's deputies who steadily harp on the Army's "punitive functions" in inter-ethnic conflicts to delve into all this.

Provocations against servicemen and members of their families are growing in a geometric progression. During January alone there were around a hundred registered in Gyandzha. Here are some of them.

Groups of unidentified persons attempted to break into the apartments of officers Tokmakov, Gorile and Tarakanov, where women and young children were located at the time. The appearance of neighbors frightened them away.

Threats and insults addressed to the children of officers and warrant officers rang out in secondary schools of general education Nos 29 and 30.

Calls to take hostages from among the Russian population and drive Russians out of apartments sounded during the relay of a Shushinskiy Rayon television broadcast.

A group of Azerbaijanis in a bus tried to provoke Senior WO Suvorov to a fight by calling him an "occupier."

Is it necessary to continue? And then how does all this tie in with Sadykhov's words about "good relations" with members of servicemen's families? By the way, Sadykhov is a former criminal who served eight years in places that are not that remote, and now he is a "big-wig in the People's Front of Azerbaijan."

I will sin against the truth if I begin to assert that unanimity and optimism reign among the officers and warrant officers serving in Gyandzha and adjoining rayons. The people are tired of constant nervous and physical tension. Many of them were forced to send their families to neutral areas of the country. Some believe that had the Army not intervened, "Azerbaijan and Armenia would be overflowing with blood," and others

assert with no less conviction that the troops "are doing what is not their job." But it is clear to everyone that the troops' participation in measures aimed at stabilizing the situation in the region is doing considerable damage to the combat readiness of units and subunits and is disorganizing the training and education process. Lieutenant Colonel A. Shevchuk, with whom I talked on these subjects in one of the units, did not conceal his concern:

The morale of officers and men basically is high, but to go into the city streets again with weapons in hand... No one wants this. We hope that all the painful problems of Azerbaijan and Armenia will be resolved by peaceful means.

Honestly speaking, the last two years have entirely knocked us out of our accustomed rut. A strange situation has formed. On the one hand, the higher command authority understands full well that the unit simply is incapable now of qualitatively fulfilling the combat training plan. For example, how can we prepare for exercises if one battalion is constantly on duty at the airfield and another is engaged in patrolling the city? And for now we have not held a single practice with artillerymen—there is no time for this. In general only half of the planned firings and driver training sessions have been carried out. On the other hand, in inspections they ask questions as if the unit is living as before. In the final account it is not a matter of inspections. Officers are losing their professional qualities. The combat equipment is wearing out and the enlisted men are being nagged—that is what is troubling.

Our young officers were not living that well even before all these events. An entire day on duty and so-so everyday living conditions. Food for the family basically comes from the market. Prices are crazy there. And today when we are sitting literally on a volcano, some simply are exhausted. Promising commanders and political officers and knowledgeable specialists are leaving the Armed Forces. I will say frankly that I very much regretted parting with Senior Lieutenant A. Bondar, who only recently assumed command of the company. And Senior Lieutenant Yelagin... But how can you hold them when all our concern for the Army basically is in words?

It would appear that Andrey Igorevich Shevchuk's comment is fully just. No benefits are provided for officers and warrant officers performing duty in the country's "hot spots," as regions where ethnic passions are raging are customarily called now, but the situation in which they function sometimes differs little from a real combat situation. Do our supreme military leadership and state figures who are so zealously taking care of a reduction of defense expenditures really not ponder this? It was disappointing to learn that personnel in subunits of internal security forces who are operating literally side by side with Army subunits have such benefits.

I heard more than once from many officers: well fine, we understand the fact that it is necessary to use the Army in crisis situations, but why is practically nothing being

done to protect its honor and authority and to improve the social-everyday conditions of servicemen who are risking their lives every day? I recalled with indignation television reports about refugees from servicemen's families. "Do we really not deserve to have our wives and children accommodated in some Moscow hotel and not in soldiers' barracks?" they asked. Alas, Moscow hotels now are on cost-accounting and they are filled with respectable cooperative members and fruit merchants from the south.

Officers and warrant officers have become accustomed to bearing hardships and deprivations staunchly as our regulations demand it, but there is an end to any patience. Where is the guarantee that a "Baku" or "Dushanbe" syndrome will not come to replace the "Tbilisi syndrome"? Those who simply dream of seeing the Armed Forces disintegrated and disorganized already are raising their heads not just in the Baltic, Transcaucasus and Moldavia. Pamphlets which call us "an Army of murderers" and a "tool of imperial ambitions" are making the rounds of Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev.

Before departing Gyandzha I succeeded in having a chat with USSR People's Deputy S. Mamedov, the present party gorkom first secretary. After describing the situation in the city in detail, Suleyman Farkhadovich frankly said: "The Army now is the basic guarantor of stabilization for us, but it is constantly necessary to explain to the people that the military are performing their duty. It is difficult."

Yes, officers, warrant officers, NCO's and privates are performing their duty in the Transcaucasus. They are coming to the help of the local populace, often risking their lives or health. But just who will help the Army?

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Civil, Military Initiative Needed to Prevent Army's 'Collapse'

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[Article, published under the heading "Viewpoint," by Aleksandr Prokhanov: "A Sufficient Defense"]

[Text] Several years ago the reading public viewed the prose of Aleksandr Prokhanov as a romantic singer of civilization and the technological sphere, and an emotional supporter of the state and army idea. Now both friends and opponents—probably with equal interest—are recognizing him as a political thinker, and a very rational one who is not subject to fashionable whims and infatuations. As a political scientist A. Prokhanov certainly has evoked the most diverse feelings from indignation to a desire to continue the discussion.

We also are unable to agree fully with certain ideas in his new article and in particular with his view of the current

state of the CPSU in the system of power and the role of the army in transforming society. But we still have decided to offer this article to the attention of our readers, hoping that a broad public discussion of the problems touched upon by A. Prokhanov will help all of us in our search for the truth.

The phenomena which at present seize our attention such as the universal torture, the convulsions, meetings, strikes, the disturbances of public order and social fear are the external manifestations of a fundamental process of the transfer of power. The nation is shedding its skin. Fatigued, semidestroyed and having lost their will for power, the central structures are ceding it without a struggle to other, new capable ones formed over the last 20 years of our illusory well-being.

We have suddenly discovered in the economy, sociology and social awareness that there is a powerful, satiated stratum which has conditionally been called the "criminal bourgeoisie" or the "bourgeois element" and which has acquired enormous vital forces, financial resources, the experience of managing these resources and has formed its own structure, ideology and methods for emerging "on the surface." And it is precisely this dynamic, aggressive group which knows its goals and which is now taking over power from the decrepit apparatus and which until recently claimed to express the common popular, general state interests.

The central economic structures virtually do not exist. Social justice has been lost. The economy is antipopular. The state sector is melting before our very eyes, like the spring break-up of the ice. Only the bourgeois sector is active and developing. It illuminates ads on the squares of large cities, it is buying up the TV channels and is promulgating laws and codes. The prosperity and success of the bourgeoisie is growing and the people are being impoverished.

The soviet bodies, as before ephemeral and escheated, make themselves felt only at the congresses of people's deputies and which after all expectations have ended up an enormous palaver palace and morass of poorly digested ideas and a model of poorly conceived and frequently useless laws.

The fate of the party is amazing and tragic. Over the years of its existence the party, having lost its intellect and theory and in losing sight of the future, has been repeatedly reborn, changing purpose and essence and at present, at the will of its own leaders, is reaching a dramatic finale. At present, the party is reminiscent of the power transmission lines which march smartly across the entire territory of the country and are supported on well-designed steel supports, however this entire grandiose, widely developed network has been switched off at the power source, at the power plants and is not connected to the engines, motors, and light sources. The strategic initiative of the center no longer flows through this empty network. There is no current, energy of ideas, orders or plans in these wires. This is a dead network,

black birds sit cackling on the wires without fear, pecking it to pieces from the supports to the wires dangling toward the ground.

The Communist Party, as I see it, is splitting into three different fragments. A strong social democratic phalanx is breaking out and leaving its ranks. The bourgeois circles which have emerged on the surface prefer not to establish their own political structures but rather use a portion of the already existing ones with their own property, personnel and organizational experience. This party will live and flourish and possess the plants, land and culture.

The second, doomed fragment of the party is corrupt, on the decline and thinks in selfish and caste terms and is necessary to no one. It will blow away like the light bone dust of a disappeared skeleton.

The last, third fragment is that portion of the party which sees itself as centralist and is still waiting for initiative from the center, it is ready to be the party of like-thinkers and assume the burden of power in the collapsing, lost nation. It is ready to sacrifice, it is carefully seeking out leaders sympathetic to it and is tragically aware of its plight. It, while still strong, believing in socialism, will be offered up to be torn to pieces by social conscience, the excited people's front and the disenfranchised public, when the communists will be made to answer not only for Lenin's experiment at the beginning of the century, not only for the blood of Stalinism, not only for the stagnation of Brezhnev, not only for the dilettantism and catastrophe in the first years of perestroika, but also for the fact that it, the party, in leading the nation into a severe crisis, is abandoning the helm of control, it is disbanding spontaneously, leaving the scene, having betrayed the people who at one time believed in it. This terrible and just rebuke will be leveled against the last party members, it will inevitably remove them from power, it will doom them to the role of social outcasts and force them to taste the bitter dregs of political persecution.

The army is the only and last of all the central structures which has maintained its common national ideal and acts on behalf of the entire nation and all the people. It, the army, because of these properties at present has also come under intense pressure and attacks. It is being destroyed as the last bulwark of centralism, the last repository of the people's rule.

At present, in these days of paralysis and the degradation of power, the army, like ten years ago, remains the only force capable of carrying out the terrible, extreme functions entrusted to it by the tragic times. In the "years of stagnation," when the bourgeoisie was stealing its capital, the unchecked apparatus was consuming national income, when the intelligentsia was quietly whimpering and the workers and peasants were silently wrecking things, only the army was carrying out the historic duty assigned to it. By the mid-1970s, it was finally ready to establish military-strategic parity with the enemies and

had reached that balance of defensive forces which the leaders had dreamed of in founding the state and the army. The army, having established parity, put an end to the period of confrontation and opened up the path to disarmament which can be seen within the outlines of parity.

Later the army was to fight in Afghanistan, suffering bloody sacrifices for ten years, filling the holes in our awkward Eastern policy with the bodies of the Afghan veterans and assuming responsibility for the erroneous ideas of our orientalists and American specialists, the current proponents of perestroika.

It, the army, in compensating for the irresponsibility of the power engineers and technicians and the impotence of the emergency and rescue services, rushed to the exploded Chernobyl reactor and with their bare hands removed carbonized graphite and uranium from the explosion area. It alone, taking over for the civilian forces, rushed to the Armenian epicenter, and pulled the crushed bodies of Armenians from underneath the smoking ruins of Spitak.

Recently, in covering over the flaws of nationality policy and placing bloody patches on the riddled garb of democratic changes, the army has shown up in all zones of interethnic conflicts. It has been able to suppress, although not for long, the raging centers of civil war.

And this last support of the state is being destroyed before our very eyes and we are being made the witnesses of the destruction of the army.

Who would be interested in destroying the nation's defense and why?

On the one hand, the existence in the world of the military superpower of the Soviets and armed with the mighty weapons of the age and the constant unpredictable threat from the USSR were a discomfort for the rapidly developing civilizations of the West. On the other hand, the bourgeois development potential which has been building up within the nation is endeavoring to merge with the world currencies, with the world metropolitan area and the only obstacle has been the military membrane, the wall of confrontation.

We are the witnesses of how the second largest military formation of the world is being destroyed and disappearing like smoke, as if evaporating in some monstrous kettle, in repeating the fate of its predecessor, the army of the Russian empire.

Here are the directions of the blows and cuts aimed at the Soviet Army.

First Direction

The army is being burdened with the responsibility for the nuclear apocalypse and it is asserted that its terrible weapons threaten the final hour of the world. Its morose militarism would lead to the end of the world. Under this slogan rapid disarmament has started and this has led to

the destruction almost unilaterally of entire classes of modern weapons and secured by the people at a price of enormous investment, hardship, the giving up of creature comforts and embodying the intellectual might of the engineers.

It took only a few months to expel our formations from the Eastern European countries. Entire groupings of our troops, including tanks, aircraft and infantry, were expelled from Europe by the blows of the bare fists of the newly appeared Eastern European politicians. The buffer zones have been destroyed, parity has been shattered, frontiers shifted and we in our opposition have been thrown back to prewar times when the might of the West was concentrated against our now exposed frontiers.

Second Direction

The army is being held accountable for the devastation of the national economy. This is being asserted in all ways: the defense industry, like a vampire, has sucked out the vital juices of industry, it has emptied the shelves and bled the national economy white. The pacifistically inclined economists have begun on an unprecedented scale to remove entire types of production and scientific-technical developments from the defense complex. Impetuous, irresponsible conversion leads not merely to a degrading of the weapons but also to the disappearance of the prospects of scientific and technical development. Not only are the plants being closed down but also the collectives of workers, scientists and developers are being let go and the nation spent decades of organizational efforts on creating these. It will be impossible to recreate such collectives. In destroying these unique centers of development in our country, we once and for all are dooming ourselves to a third-class role and to a complete dropping out of the creative approaches to technical development.

Third Direction

By employing the myth of the degradation of the individual in the army, of the violence and sadism which reign everywhere in it, by the problem of "improper relations," and indeed a serious one, the public mind is instilled with the terror of the prospects of military service. Propaganda has instilled a mass antiarmy psychosis. Even how the soldiers in the units are little controllable, they are ready to desert and refuse to carry out orders. Mothers and families see the army as a source of misfortune for their sons and husbands. The army is being divorced from the people. It is being cut off from its genetic root. It hovers alone in an atmosphere of suspicion and dislike.

Fourth Direction

The junior and middle-level officers have become a special object of psychological work. When the young lieutenants abandoned on the ranges and passes of the North at the radar and missile sites are put under inhuman conditions, in barrack-type houses with ice chandeliers hanging from the ceiling and beneath which

their young wives and nursing children get cold, they are no longer capable of carrying out either a combat task or simply remaining in a normal moral-mental state. The dissatisfaction of the officers housed in bad and at times terrible social and domestic conditions and the growing tension in the officers are used by clever politicians to separate the officer group from the remaining army structure, they set the junior officers against the superior military leaders and snare them in the informal antiarmy organizations.

Fifth Direction

The generals and the General Staff have come under truly heavy shelling. The generals are depicted as a cluster of conceited, incompetent persons unable to manage the military machine and unable to establish contact with the army and the people. The image of the laughing-stock general has become a favorite theme for the youth publications and TV broadcasts.

Sixth Direction

The fate of the Afghan veterans has been particularly dramatic. This invaluable fermenting agent of the army, in possessing real combat experience and having shown its ability to fight and shed its blood for the state, the last contingent of "state workers" who perished for the sake of the state idea in the ravines and deserts of Asia—this contingent, having returned to the motherland, was repudiated by the state. The state did not protect it, it was frightened of it and abandoned it to the social and national forces. The state betrayed these persons, having bought them off with empty benefits and forsaken the ideals which it itself preached. The Afghan movement which at first endeavored to consolidate itself and form into an "Afghan fraternity," today is a contradictory, scattered and mutually hostile contingent. In the Transcaucasus an Afghan veteran from Baku is directing the training of Azerbaijani fighters, while at the same time a former Afghan veteran from Yerevan and possibly the other's fellow servicemen and comrade is instructing Armenian militia detachments. They meet on the passes of Karabakh and shoot at one another. And a third Afghan veteran, a Russian officer, a helicopter pilot or a tank driver, puts his armor between them and they fire at him and he at them. The bullets which missed their mark in the Hindukush find it here in Stepanakert and Dushanbe.

Seventh Direction

The constant involving of the army in the nationality conflicts with the subsequent presenting of moral and legal scores to be settled is one of the most refined and immoral methods of destroying the army. Having been labeled "butchers" and "looters" the troops have been virtually paralyzed and refuse to carry out the orders of the generals and officers. It is no wonder that the command is finding it evermore difficult to involve the army in the running interethnic wounds. The army

refuses to believe its command personnel and the national political leadership.

All these methods and procedures employed successively and simultaneously are a well organized service to break down the enemy army, they use the recommendations of the military propaganda media of foreign military intelligence and the analysts invisible to us can congratulate themselves on the success of their subversive operations.

The result of this skillful setting of some military against the other, the army against the people and the people against the army in the near future can be the phenomenon of an army on strike. An army which goes out on strike with its combat weapons, its tanks, aircraft and antiaircraft missiles, this terrible fact will become a reality, returning us to the legendary times of the Battleship "Potemkin." Striking carrier cruisers and strategic squadrons would be the response of the army to the persecution.

It is essential immediately, having recognized these terrible processes, to draw up a program for defending the defensive ideas of the people, a program for protecting the army against collapse and maintain this structure which, regardless of all else, is capable of claiming to express the ideals and goals of all the people.

It is time to take another look at the army command, the strategists and the "defense supporters." Utopian myths of eternal peace in the 21st Century or of the dawning of a universal flourishing are doomed to gloomy confrontation. The 21st Century approaches as a century of growing crises and worldwide instability. The collapse of the USSR, the dropping of it out of world development and the gloomy slipping into the Third World or the departure of the USSR from the scene of military confrontation will lead to a world imbalance capable of shattering the fragile structures of all civilization, as the Western political scientists are already talking about now. The destruction of the existing financial, economic and geopolitical ties leads to instability and the nations will respond to this by all possible means, including military. Confronted with possible military activeness and the growing exotic types of weapons we will be without weapons, without ideas, without a defensive awareness and without geopolitical military zones.

The army needs protection at present like no one else. It is fettered by its subordination, by its inner centralism, by its oath and loyalty to state power. It is unable itself to state its problems and defend itself by nonmilitary, humanitarian means. It naively believes in the state and power. For this reason, in our social movement it is essential to have a separate direction, a civil initiative or possibly a military party which would assume the defense of the nation's defense might. Like any social group, like any corporation, the army should have a civilian channel for expressing strictly army interests. The army is not a clan, it is not an estate. Our army is a form of the life of the people, an ideology and mentality of the people.

The military patriotic initiative should carry out a number of immediate tasks. It is essential to inform the people of the truth on the collapsing army, on the true political aims of its destruction. The army, in presently feeling isolated, should know that the people see its problems, its torture and suffering and that the people are not isolated from it but ready to defend it. Deprived of an ideology and involved like a puppet in the national strife and having lost its values and ideas, the army must recover its ideological content, the ideology of national salvation and national rebirth.

The approaching and possibly inevitable chaos will give the army a special function not inherent to it, not a punitive one, as the totalitarians endeavor to frighten us, and not a police one, as the liberals endeavor to deceive us, but a rescuing one aimed at preserving those centers of development which possibly will not be touched by the chaos. In essence, the army must carry out the mission which at one time the monasteries performed in times of invasions and expansions. The barracks would provide shelter against death and slaughter, against ruin and hunger. Here will come both the Meskhetian Turks and the refugees from Baku and Stepanakert, here will arrive people of culture, engineers and scientists. Under the conditions of civil chaos, only the army will be capable of protecting them, of preserving the grains of future development, of defending values and sacred relics in order later on, when the calamity is past, they can be returned to life. The army should be ready for this role, recognize it, it should cease being concerned solely with military matters, it should sharply be involved in the sociopolitical process and state to the people that it is ready to carry out a rescuing, common-national mission. The army is not a blind function of power, rather it is an instrument for expressing the will of the people.

The church has also emerged on the public scene. The church no more is hiding behind its ambos or behind the fence of the churchyards and cemeteries. In addition to actions of charity, the preaching of good and mercy, one of the missions of the church is to turn to the army with a passionate and clear appeal to protect the people against assaults and inner troubles. This will be that long awaited merging of the church ideal with army reality and with its depleted spirituality.

At present, the struggle to save the army is the last struggle for statehood and the idea of the people. The disintegration and annihilation of the army will make us unprotected when confronted with the predators endeavoring to split the USSR into tasty, easily digested chunks and to break the resistance of Russia which does not want—to its last gasp—to become the base of the economic and cultural hierarchy of cruel, pseudohumane civilizations of the world.

History has come to judge the viability and resistance of the people from their current attitude toward the army. It has come to judge today's generals from their ability to lead the army out of the cruel encirclement, from the second pocket in the 20th Century where the military

might of Russia was to be broken. It, history, is rendering its judgment of the Red officers who today tragically are taking the place of the White officers. History will name the names of those who betrayed the army and who led it to slaughter.

The danger is so great and its contours are being so carefully camouflaged that it is the duty of the intellectuals and analysts to take a maximum risk and show the public the ultimate goals of the merciless antinational program to destroy the army.

The ideology of national salvation is profoundly close to any citizen and any soldier, be he a gray-haired general or a smooth-skinned new recruit. In place of the morose, dogmatic obsolete propaganda within the army, where the red corners are strewn with cheap paper and poorly painted plywood, let the ideology of national rebirth arise. We, under our bitter conditions, do not need an army which will conquer the world or be ready to invade the burning European capitals in tanks. We need an army for self-preservation and self-defense. We need that sufficient defense without which the general idea of the state is presently about to perish and disappear once and for all from the earth.

No, the army is not preparing a "big barracks" for society, in arguing in favor of the support of valor, sovereignty and courage in the people, and preaching a worthy life in the future while not disregarding the greatness in the past. The ideal of the cooperative member, the disk jockey and the political opportunist can not drive out from the mind of the people the ideal of the fighter, the champion, the martyr for the people and the fatherland.

The army will share with industry its own experience in grandiose achievements. It will share with culture the experience of sacrifice and stoicism.

The future of Russia is not a barracks, not a concentration camp, not a concession, not an appendage of the oligarchic empires of the world, but rather an integral, stable society with a common ideal of truth, justice and the good.

Soviet Military Viewed Under 'State of Siege' in Lithuania

90UM0564A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Yermolin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Army Under 'Siege' Status"]

[Text] The morning of a workday. In the flow of the Vilnius inhabitants I am rushing to the Supreme Soviet to the next session. And all of a sudden those in front of me stop. What has happened? It turns out that a garrison patrol had come out from the side street onto the avenue.

There was a warrant officer ["praporshchik"] and two soldiers. An ordinary patrol that one would meet in any city having a garrison.

On some faces there was fear and on others confusion. The attention to the three servicemen was clearly high. Having introduced myself, I asked an elderly man standing nearby to explain what had so surprised him. And he quickly replied: "What it is is your much-praised democracy! They are already beginning to patrol the streets." To my rejoinder that most likely this was an ordinary patrol, his reply was: "Yesterday, possibly, it was an ordinary patrol, but today it is a demonstration of strength and intimidation."

It must be said that the day before the republic Supreme Soviet had published a document in the press which stated that "the presence on Lithuanian territory...of units of the Armed Forces had not had and at present does not have legal basis...and the troops on the republic territory should not conduct maneuvers, redispotion or increase the number of the existing contingent..." In other words, they should sit silently and unnoticed in their military camps. Only in this instance "will the republic government show concern for the security of the servicemen and their families in Lithuania." And after such a serious statement there was the patrol on Gedemino Prospect!

Of course, the three servicemen on the main street of the republic did not cause a stunned response in each passerby. For some time I walked behind the patrol and watched the polite smiles and friendly glances. But here something else is of interest: how easily the people believed that one morning they would wake up under the sight of a tank weapon.

However, for any person who has carefully followed the Lithuanian press over the last two years, this street scene would not cause surprise. If one considers that even the formally non-Sajudis party publications, television and radio never seriously repudiated the thesis of "occupation," and did not make even timid attempts to oppose the defamation of the Soviet Armed Forces, then one can imagine what an abrupt change in an assessment of values has occurred in the mind of an unsuspecting citizen.

At one time, I was amazed how the persons I was speaking with and who were absolutely not acquainted with one another nevertheless repeated each other even in stylistic nuances, as if repeating a single text.

If you touch on the "military question," then you will be told about NKVD troops who had been re clothed in Nazi uniforms and who in the summer of 1940 massacred the families of the Lithuanian intelligentsia, on the atrocities of the Soviet soldiers in the postwar years, the cruelty and perfidiousness of the State Security troops in the 1950s, the tank ranges which destroyed the plowed lands, the forests ruined by the army, the ruined rivers

and lakes, and the most flagrant instances of banditry and barbarity by persons wearing the shoulder boards of the Soviet Army.

Judging from everything, it is not the thing to speak or write in the republic now about fascism or generally about the years of occupation which was real and not imaginary. On the other hand the theme of resistance is on the upswing, for instance the "partisan war of the Lithuanian patriots against the Soviet invaders." The march, 11th issue of SOGLASIYE, the organ of the "Lithuanian Movement for Perestroyka," published the article by a certain E. Tervidite entitled "Resistance." The main purpose of the article is to show that now is the time to give a proper place in Lithuanian history to the heroes of the resistance (in our understanding to the "forest brothers"). Inadvertently, in truth, the author admits that the "heroes" did go to extremes, but there they killed the peasants, their wives and children, but then comes the dramatic question: "but who made them, the 'partisan' the bandit?" The answer is standard: "the occupation legitimized injustice and violence in Lithuania."

But in order for the "heroes" and "war criminals" to change places through the efforts of Sajudis, the attitude toward the war veterans and the Armed Forces must assume a new character. Let me say directly that it is difficult now to look the old soldiers in the eyes who turn out to be all of a sudden "occupiers," "the guard dogs of Stalinism" and so forth. I recall a meeting with Mikhail Nikolayevich Kachanov, a member of the Kaunas Veterans Council. He described how in January a session of the city soviet adopted a decision to revise the benefits for the war veterans. And they were revised...in the direction of abolishing them. I was told by a veteran how 19 old men who had finally received their well-equipped apartments and had even received orders were prevented even from entering the new building and their apartments were given over to the "needy" of Sajudis. And the session of the city soviet "legitimized" this illegality by an appropriate decree. Unfortunately, at present in the republic one will find many examples of such an attitude toward the veterans of the war and labor and the Armed Forces.

In parallel with the "debunking" of the USSR Armed Forces, the army of bourgeois Lithuania is extolled in every possible way as a model of true piety and military valor. Here our Armed Forces are not permitted to be concerned with the strength of their ranks or to thwart infractions of the military oath. Even on the governmental level, desertion is encouraged. By the efforts of the republic Supreme Soviet, the next call-up for the Army and Navy has been countermanded. And for all there is the standard reply: "For Lithuanians this is a foreign army." And one does not need to stand on ceremony with "foreigners."

As for "their own army," here Sajudis has long since moved from word to deed. The detachments of Green Bands which were organized as certain volunteer militia

to protect order during meetings and parades now have a completely rigid organization with its own hierarchy and regulations. At its head is a security council. The security detachments are divided into ordinary (up to a thousand men) and rapid deployment (up to 200). They have their own command personnel and their own warning system. The organization is completely militarized. Supposedly for now it does not have weapons. This, in any event, is what the Green Bands themselves assert. Incidentally, precisely from these detachments a subunit has been assigned to secure the Supreme Soviet as well as groups which are endeavoring to put under parallel control (together with the MVD and the Interior Troops) certain important installations in Vilnius and other cities of the republic.

Z. Vayshvila, a 30-year-old deputy responsible for military questions in the parliament and, incidentally, has never served in the army, assured me firmly that Lithuania had still not taken any practical steps to establish its own army. But what about the hundreds of volunteers for the regional security detachments and who filled out questionnaires at the Sajudis headquarters? An innocent registration? A local initiative? But then it is completely reasonable to ask: Is the Lithuanian government monitoring the formation of the various militarized organizations in the republic or has the question assumed a spontaneous nature? For example, such a rightist radical organization as Young Lithuania has in no way curtailed its activities. Its leader E. Krishyunas at one time led me to understand that the patriots of Young Lithuania are fully capable of defending both themselves and Lithuania. The League of Lithuanian Freedom also has its fighters and this league in no way has disbanded itself, as certain local newspapers have endeavored to assert. It is important that at present everyone, both the "right" and the "left" march under one banner, the banner of anti-Sovietism. In this sense, it can be said that a national army in Lithuania is "growing up" in the sports sections, the various social clubs, the staffs of the Green Bands and other youth associations under "patriotic" catch phrases.

And while the army is "maturing," in the mind of the Philistine the new state leaders of Lithuania are "sculpting" the image of the "foreign army," as "a harsh, fierce, perfidious force under the heel of which the small Lithuanian people have suffered now for a half century." Here is a specific example of how this is done.

The morning session. Landsbergis goes up to the rostrum. Not without tragic overtones, he states that arrests have commenced in the city. The military commandant office is picking up Lithuanian citizens and putting them behind bars. Thus, he has learned that an innocent Lithuanian youth is languishing in the walls of the commandant office. Landsbergis personally phoned the commandant and demanded that the illegally apprehended be released. He did not obtain an answer.

With a group of Soviet journalists I drive off to the commandant office. The commandant, Col G. Belous,

takes us to the guardhouse. Yes, there are actually prisoners there. All three are servicemen who have gone AWOL. As for the telephone call to the commandant which Landsbergis mentioned, Col Belous had not spoken with any of the representatives of the Lithuanian authorities about prisoners.

It must be said that the journalists from among those who "swallow" everything unquestionably, have repeatedly led their readers astray. This was the case, for example, with the "tank assault" on the building of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and which has already become a world-scale textbook "canard."

That night I, like many of my colleagues, was in the hall of the Supreme Soviet (the cabinet of ministers was feverishly being organized and the debates had run beyond midnight). I saw the worried rush of the deputies and heard some exclamation about "Russian tanks." On the upper floors—and this was told to me on the following day by a worker of the Supreme Soviet—they were preparing to quickly destroy certain documents. And so an ordinary night march by a regiment (and not on tanks but on infantry fighting vehicles) returning to its own barracks caused unusual confusion—I will not say in all—but in many "peoples representatives" along with the most impressionable representatives of the Western press.

What can be said about the response of the deputies to the actions of the servicemen in resolving the "property problem," when buildings which were the property of the CPSU were taken under control. Yes, the Second Secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee (CPSU) V. Shved admitted that the participation of the army in resolving this question was not the best way out of the situation. But under conditions where all the law enforcement bodies of the republic have been paralyzed by the anticonstitutional orders of the Supreme Soviet, the military (and I have in mind primarily the Interior Troops) remain the sole force which guarantees socialist legality on the territory of Lithuania. I repeat that this can be regretted but one cannot help but consider the reality.

The republic Supreme Soviet, in adopting one anticonstitutional decision after another, thereby creates constantly new fields of tension, in provoking situations in which the military are forced to act as the protectors of the law. Under these conditions, any slandering of the army, any absurdity is accepted by many Lithuanians without any critical analysis. And not simply hostility is cultivated in the people but the most real hate.

We will not exaggerate in saying that at present the servicemen in Lithuania are in a state of siege. A government policy of "expelling the army" from Lithuania has replaced the spontaneous assaults of the informal groups. The press of moral terror is gaining strength day by day. A person in Army or Navy uniform will find it difficult in the republic. But one would err in thus hoping to undermine the combat readiness of the

troops or weaken the strength of the state frontiers. One thing can be said firmly and that is that the antiarmy propaganda and the "occupation mania" are advantageous to those who are least of all concerned with the idea of Lithuanian independence. They are much more interested in another independence and this is independence of the law, from the will of hundreds of thousands of people and from moral standards. For such persons the army is truly a "bone in the throat." Seemingly, these are obvious things but how difficult it is to recognize them in an atmosphere of nationalistic agitation.

Gen. K. A. Kochetov Speaks at Kiev MD Party Conference

90UM0686A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
1 June 1990 p 1

[UKRINFORM report: "Army Communists Conference"]

[Text] The central theme of the talks which took place on 29 May at the 33rd Party Conference of the Red Banner Kiev Military District is the work of the Political Directorate to intensify the process of perestroika and the immediate tasks to consolidate party forces.

In the reports of Military Council member and District Political Directorate Chief Lieutenant-General V. A. Sharygin and Party Commission Secretary for the Political Directorate Colonel V. I. Ilnitskiy and in the delegates' speeches it was noted that in light of the complex, strained social-political and ideological situation in the country and the Party, the District's Communists and personnel firmly support the course of the Party in perestroika, and show steadfastness in realizing the implementation of primarily qualitative parameters in military construction.

Preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress, discussed at the conference, has been accompanied by an active discussion of the Party's Platform and Rules. The district's Communists introduced a lot of proposals to the conference. Among the problems raised, in particular, is one like the interrelationship of Armed Forces party organization with local party organs.

It was stated that the concept of perestroika in party-political work developed in the district permitted the elimination of deficiencies in the activity of the Political Directorate, political organs, and party organizations. But its realization has been carried out without an adequate clarity of purpose. In an environment of sharp criticism of the CPSU and army political organs, a portion of the party organization has shut itself up into its own shell, and has not been able to overcome the stereotype of "expecting instructions from above", and has lost its political initiative. Political leadership methods to improve military preparedness and troop training have been assimilated slowly in correlation with the new political thinking and the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine.

There are substantial deficiencies in the organization of ideological and mass political work. The revived social activeness among replacements coming into the army and the social-political situation in regions of the district where troops are deployed are not always considered. Work to strengthen ties between the army and the people need qualitatively new approaches and forms.

The facts of the evasion of military service, the breaching of troop discipline, *dedovshchina*, and other incidents are cause for serious concern. Attention was paid to the necessity of strengthening international education in troop collectives and improving work with cadres. There was also the question of improving the activity of the labor unions and the formation of new structures in the Komsomol—councils of Komsomol organizations.

Politburo member, Secretary and Ukrainian CP Central Committee member Yu. N. Yelchenko, and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and General of the Army K. A. Kochetov participated in the conference.

In the resolution adopted, the conference called upon district communists to concentrate the basic forces to further strengthen the unity of ideas and organization of the party ranks, and ensure the leading role of CPSU members in fulfilling official and party duty. It elected delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukraine Communist Party Congress.

Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee Politburo member, First Secretary of the Kiev Party City Committee, A. I. Korniyenko, and the first secretaries of a number of Ukrainian Communist Party oblast committees participated in the work of the conference.

Col L. Smertin Comments on Maj Lopatin's Proposed Reform

90UM07C2A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 25, 18-24 Jun pp 10-11

[Article by Justice Colonel Leonid Smertin, Office of the Chief Military Procurator: "Behind the Threshold of Military Secrets"]

[Text] At present, all of us are seriously concerned about the condition of discipline, the insufficient social and legal protection of the servicemen, and other problems which are present in the army.

Previously, the absence of glasnost made it impossible to openly discuss these and other sore subjects of military life. However, in official documents, at least the ones issued by the Office of the Chief Military Procurator, the issues of the army were covered continuously. Possible ways to resolve these issues were also proposed. However, this always called for certain financial expenditures. By the time the necessary funds were finally freed up it was too late. The measures taken turned out to be inadequate. This is why I believe that no serviceman is going to deny that a profound military reform is needed.

I have read very attentively an interview with USSR People's Deputy Major V. Lopatin ("To Serve the People Rather Than Parties," NEDELYA, No. 22, 1990) who, as it was reported, is engaged in developing a draft army reform. I will say right away that I am a proponent of the most radical reform, including a transition to the principle of voluntary recruitment to the Armed Forces, and creating a so-called professional army. However, the military reform includes more than just changing the principle of recruitment to the Armed Forces, as it is frequently portrayed in some publications. This is an entire set of long-term tasks accomplishing which is tied into a tight knot with economic, social and legal issues.

It is hard to disagree with many statements made by V. Lopatin, for example, about crime. Indeed, it is mounting in the army, but this is not surprising. After all, the crime rate is up in the country as well. The people and the army are one not only in terms of propaganda slogans but in life itself. In our country, the crime rate went up by more than one-third last year, whereas in the army the rate of growth was successfully held down through the efforts of commanders, political officers, and military jurists as well. The crime rate increased by only nine percent.

However, this is a temporary success. The rate of crime among minors increased by 21 percent in 1989. In our country, almost one criminal in seven is under 18, and this is why we can imagine the wave of violence, theft, and other crimes which will sweep our army in the few years to come. If we really want to resolve these issues we should first of all have a realistic idea of them. Incidentally, it is not necessary to keep data on crime in the army secret, first, because such data for the country as a whole have already been divulged. Second, because the strength of the Armed Forces which could be calculated on the basis of crime data, has also been released to the public. Third, because the people would stop using various fabrications on this issue, having made sure that frequently altogether fantastic numbers are cited which describe this aspect of army life. To be sure, for now I cannot give the statistics either, but the Office of the Chief Military Procurator has long been raising the issue of lifting all classifications of these data.

V. Lopatin also does not use very precise data when he refers, in particular, to those evading military service. Judging by the statistics given by him, at issue are 6,000 military draft evaders in the Baltic republics, Transcaucasia, Moldavia, and other regions. However, contrary to the assertions of the deputy, they have not been held accountable under the law because in most cases territorial law-enforcement organs do not comply with the requirements of the law. Perhaps, it would be more proper to ask the legislators of these republics why these organs do not do this.

V. Lopatin is right in that it does happen that the people in military service even commit suicides. However, they also die outside of the army; on the roads of our country alone 60,000 people died last year, and 35,000 drowned.

Many thousands, including children, have taken their own lives. To be sure, this gives little solace to a mother who has lost her son in the army; she is sure that nothing would have happened had he been at home.

Among other things, this is where the issue arises of state insurance for the servicemen and financial compensation for those who die or are left handicapped in the military service, of exactly compensation—20,000, 50,000, or 100,000 rubles rather than a benefit for the loss of the breadwinner... Injuries and the death of any person in the army have always been treated as full-fledged emergencies. Such cases are thoroughly investigated by the military procurator's office, and those guilty are held responsible under the law.

The deaths of people have been on the decline year after year. Indeed, there are many possibilities to avert such cases, and quite a few of them have not yet been taken advantage of. However, the 300,000 draftees who are registered as having mental anomalies, the 12,000 substance addicts, and the 8,000 drug addicts (these are only those registered) who are about to embark on military service indeed cause very serious concern.

It appears to be clear that a professional army is the way out. Unfortunately, it is not all that easy.

Many people who are sick and have had charges filed against them end up in the army. However, the fact that they exist is a problem for our entire society, and I believe that we cannot conclude on this basis that a transition to volunteer recruitment is necessary. Problems need to be solved on the scale of the entire state rather than only in the army. We will not resolve a single burning question associated with discipline and legal order in the army without improving the standard of overall culture and morality and improving the health of the people, primarily the young people.

A professional army, i.e., an army fully recruited on a voluntary basis, which V. Lopatin favors, is not at all a panacea. It will select the healthiest ones, but not necessarily those burdened with high culture and morality. It will indeed make it possible to improve combat readiness and discipline and to reduce the crime rate and the number of deaths of the people, though there is no eliminating them altogether. Life is such as it is. Besides, we will run the risk of creating a caste of highly professional military men who have no notion of civic attitude, humanity, honor, and conscience. To my mind, this is frightening.

However, I think that it will not come to this. At present, we cannot afford a fully voluntary system of recruitment for the army. This is too expensive. At present, only the United States, Great Britain, and Canada can afford such luxury. A certain unavoidable reduction of the strength of the Armed Forces, greater professionalism of the servicemen, and, consequently, reduced expenditures for renewing and repairing materiel—all of this will result in a certain economy of funds which is, perhaps, sufficient in order to increase pay grades. Something else

is at issue. We will have to resolve the issues of the social, cultural, and housing sphere very rapidly and with tremendous financial outlays. A volunteer professional will not live and serve in the environment specified in the manuals in which our soldiers do at present. Service and living conditions will need to be changed for the officers as well. Such changes are necessary right now, as soon as possible. However, this is still not going to be as expensive as the process of switching to voluntary recruitment.

There is one more reason which they are, for some reason, reluctant to discuss outloud. This is the participation of the army in the national economy, in eliminating the consequences of various emergencies. The virgin lands, Chernobyl, Armenia—there were people in military uniforms everywhere. More than 300,000 military construction workers work at the enterprises and construction projects of 20 union and republic ministries and departments. Many thousands of servicemen and military reservists called up for active-duty stints take part in transporting the crop harvested every year. Plus, there is the BAM [Baykal-Amur Main Line] and the roads of the Non-Chernozem Zone...

Throughout the country, the Ministry of Defense builds housing for officers using military construction workers: For the 13th five-year plan, 19 million square meters have been planned, and for the 14th plan, still more. In Moscow alone, there are 10,500 families of servicemen without apartments, and the housing arrears of the Moscow Soviet keep growing. Military construction workers build more than just housing for the needs of the city. For example, the Moscow Transportation Agency is demanding that the Ministry of Defense build a new container pad with its own resources and at its own expense, threatening to discontinue the acceptance of the effects of servicemen for shipment otherwise.

It so happens that the ideas of Trotskiy on the labor army are still alive, and the national economy has so far been unable to do without cheap labor in the uniforms of soldiers. Therefore, the most realistic way out is found in a mixed principle, such as at present, but with increasing the number of volunteers over that of draftees. Given our social condition when one young man in ten has some disease and, therefore, will not become a professional military man, even this approach is going to be too expensive for us. However, it is still more acceptable.

What are we to do about those with a [criminal] record? Or those who have restrictions due to diseases? If we are not to draft them at all, the principle of social justice will be violated—if the military service duty still remains. Deputy V. Lopatin proposes alternative service. Perhaps, this is the way out. However, "hazing," evasion of service, and crime in general will move there and prosper even more. Meanwhile, what we need is to eradicate them. We are coming once again to the fact that the ills of the army are the ills of our society, and the entire organism should be cured rather than some part of it.

The very proposal about alternative service, if it is going to be implemented through military commissariats, gives rise to doubts. An alternative to military service is found in the national economy, and it should be implemented by the appropriate state organs which have nothing to do with the army. Otherwise it is no alternative.

One may agree with many statements of V. Lopatin; they give food for thought. However, some of his discourse on the legal aspects of military reform causes objections.

Our general military regulations are confirmed by a ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Differences in the procedure of adoption do not belittle the significance of regulations as legislative acts compared to laws. It is hardly expedient for military regulations to be adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet—they are a very narrow issue. There is no other legal foundation for the activities of servicemen, nor is it required.

The regulations concentrate enormous military experience. Of course, they should be cleansed of various added political features. However, they will remain unchanged as the regulator of the entire everyday life and activities of the troops. However, the attitude toward orders is surprising. An order by a superior is mandatory for execution by his subordinates, whether it is going to be called a law or not. Incidentally, the Office of the Chief Military Procurator comes out in favor of changing this terminology. However, this does not change the essence. The entire army is based on subordination and obedience, and not only in our state. The unity of command exists in all armies. A subordinate who fails to carry out an order will be held responsible under the law, as well as a superior who gives an order which turns out to be unlawful. The task is to rule out unlawful orders rather than compel the subordinate to doubt and think.

It is hardly expedient to replace military tribunals by some courts, as V. Lopatin proposes. After all, the tribunals are guided by the same law as all courts in existence in the USSR. Moreover, in a number of locations they consider civil cases as well, due to the absence of people's courts. The suggestion to invite professional attorneys for the defense is altogether incomprehensible, though it sounds spectacular. The law indicates clearly who can be allowed to appear as a defense attorney. As far as attorneys are concerned, all of them are professionals, and they work for a fee. Every defendant is entitled to select his attorney himself.

There is no argument, the servicemen should know their rights, and not only rights, but should in general have extensive legal knowledge. To this end, comprehensive legal training has now been introduced in the army. It is not important whether these rights are going to be explained by independent legal services or some other organs. Rights as well as responsibilities are set forth in the Constitution and other laws. Anyone can study them on his own. The point is for everyone to comply with

these laws precisely. In this case, the rights will be observed, and the responsibilities will be discharged.

Lt Gen V. Sharygin on Political 'Reorganization' in Armed Forces

90UM0700A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Jun 90 p 1

[Interview with Lt Gen V. Sharygin, Political Directorate chief, Kiev Military District, on the occasion of the 28th CPSU Congress: "Congress Delegates Speak Up: 'I Reject the Idea of Depoliticization of the Army'"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Lieutenant General V. Sharygin, Military Council member and district Political Directorate chief, is an elected delegate to the 28th Congress of the CPSU. Following is his conversation with our correspondent.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Vladimir Aleksandrovich, what are your sentiments as you prepare to attend the forum of the country's communists?

[Sharygin] A group of delegates from our Kiev Military District, a small force of communists, will be attending. I can say in all truth that we all stand for unity in the ranks relative to the CPSU Central Committee's platform. The program documents will be examined and worked on further at the congress, of course. My major concern? How the party is to consolidate its ranks and prevent a split.

My hope is that the Army communists will make a positive contribution. Contrasting views carried over from society are being reflected in the activity of military collectives. I believe that it would be very useful for the military delegates to present a united front. At the congress they should make their judgments known on the issue of military reform and other problems of the present and future of the Armed Forces. Much was made clear by the RSFSR Communist Party Constituent Congress.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Military reform is mentioned in the Central Committee platform.

[Sharygin] Unfortunately, the time has already passed to discuss the need for reform as an issue. Reform is already under way, in the form of Armed Forces reductions and adoption of the new defensive military doctrine. The Warsaw Pact Organization is undergoing a qualitative change.

It is my feeling that the 28th Congress should deal loudly and clearly with the military problem, possibly by even adopting a special resolution.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What is your opinion on the forthcoming reorganization of political organs and party organizations?

[Sharygin] Let me make myself clear: I reject completely the idea of depoliticization and deideologization of the

Army. In my opinion, it is absurd to push aside any burning question of the times, especially in this difficult perestroika period the country is experiencing. Nevertheless, there are people who would like to see Army communists surrender their party card, turn off the television, stop reading newspapers and listening to the radio.

I will take up other aspects of reform. The Ministry of Defense is often accused of inertia and slowness to react, and of antagonism on the part of its general officers toward renewal in the Armed Forces. Does anyone really believe that military reform should be approached in the manner of a cavalry charge? Many people in the country still remember when structures were dismantled, aircraft and ships cut up, and millions of men released from the Army, with many discharged against their wishes. In effect, it was a time when thousands of officers were thrown out of the Armed Forces. Subsequently, when changes occurred in the international situation, the same haste was exhibited in drawing up programs and increasing military spending.

Today's military reform is the result of the new political thinking. A person cannot fail to see the favorable conditions for qualitative changes in the Armed Forces. As far as specifics of political organ work are concerned, let me tell you the main idea. Newly formed political sections will apparently assume the function of political, military, ethical, and legal nurturing as their major activity. The mission of party committees will be party work proper. I believe that this is the optimum variant in an environment of separation of functions.

Without detracting from the value of the various aspects in the activity of political sections, I would like to stress the importance of new services: sociological research and data analysis. It will be necessary to obtain as large a sociological sampling as possible.

However, there is virtually no data analysis service in the Army. We are often treated unfairly, and this feeling is justified on our part, by some civilian journalists who act superficially in their attempts to describe events as they are in the Army, in doing so concentrating on the negative. The truth is that this distortion is largely due to the dearth of information on the Army, as caused by insufficient contact between Army structures and the press.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What can you say about the work of party committees?

[Sharygin] I believe that in each large unit there should be at least two party committee members that are free to act. In superior party committees there should be one or two more, not counting technical workers. The main area of activity of party committees should be the primary organization. The authority of primary organizations has been expanded; the 28th Congress will most likely confirm this. However, I would say that we can see some irregularities in their work. Many persons have made a

habit of helping themselves to monies; there are differences of opinion on the number of party meetings that should be held.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Is it possible that political sections and party committees will duplicate each other's efforts?

[Sharygin] This is still not clear. Let us wait and see what happens at the congress. However, about one thing there is no doubt: They are supposed to operate on the basis of mutual understanding and coordination. At no time are they to resort to a basis of subordination or duplication of efforts.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Is there a history of coordination between political organs and "informal organizations"?

[Sharygin] A multiparty system is becoming a reality in our country. We encourage our political workers to become familiar with the programs of new parties, see the positive and negative sides, and make the necessary contacts.

Yes, we have nothing against contacts of a positive nature. There have been cases when representatives of various organizations visited military units only to see the Army in a new light.

There are abundant possibilities to improve contacts with soviet and party organs in areas and oblasts that supply us with recruits. A good experience was enjoyed in the large unit in which political worker officer M. Semikin serves. It was recently visited by a delegation from Namangan Oblast of the Uzbek SSR. The delegation included journalists. Incidentally, the oblast newspaper devote nearly an entire issue to fellow countrymen serving in our district. This is also a great help for us. This kind of work should stand us in good stead in the future.

Draft State Program on Afghanistan Veterans' Benefits Discussed

90UM0700B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col A. Oliynik: "At the Center of National Concern"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] An expanded collegium of the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems] has discussed a program intended to resolve problems associated with resettling former servicemen and other persons who were a part of the military contingent in Afghanistan, including families of men killed in action. Participating in the discussion were members of the USSR Supreme Soviet; representatives of ministries, departments, socio-political and unofficial organizations; and workers from the field of religion.

There were 14,454 men killed in action and dead as a result of wounds; 309 missing in action; about 50,000 wounded; 11,600 maimed and invalided. This is the rundown on victims of the war in Afghanistan. These tragic figures are cited in the introductory part of the state program. To my mind, the drafters did this to emphasize the high price paid by men who served in Afghanistan by order of the Motherland. Now, society must discharge its debt to the young war veterans by compensating mothers, widows, and families of men that were killed in action, died of wounds, or are missing in action as a result of activities in Afghanistan.

USSR Goskomtrud Chairman V. I. Shcherbakov, in opening the collegium's session, stressed that the state program has been drawn up in accordance with a resolution passed by the 2nd Congress of USSR People's Deputies. It can be made a reality only if we arrive at a general solution of a set of problems pertaining to "Afghans," primarily those of meaningful employment, improved provision of everyday necessities, better medical care, and greater social protection.

Now briefly about the program. Six sections deal with the entire spectrum of problems, as noted by the collegium, that plague "Afghans" and the families of men that lost their lives. I will cite only those that I feel are the most important.

The program calls for drafting a USSR law that would offer benefits to internationalist soldiers, families of men that lost their lives, and civilian specialists who were wounded or maimed, with provision for issuing a universal certificate attesting to their entitlement to these benefits. The entitlement is to include the following: granting to former "Afghans" and children of men killed in action the right of admission to secondary specialized schools and higher educational institutions with waiver of the entrance test requirement; placing former internationalist soldiers and family members of men killed in action in a priority status for rental of agricultural and industrial enterprises, and preferential assignment of plots of land and long-term credit; lump-sum payment of 10,000 rubles to families of dead servicemen; 5,000 rubles to group I and group II disabled veterans; 3,000 rubles to group III disabled veterans. In 1991-1995 it is planned to erect a monument as a memorial to men who died in Afghanistan.

The draft program has been written to cover a 5-year period, with annual financing in the amount of 100 million rubles. The program received general approval on the part of collegium participants.

Appeal on Formation of Military Trade Union

90UM0706A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Jul 90 p 1

[Article by the Organizing Committee for the Preparation and Conduct of a Congress of Trade Union Organizations of Workers and Servicemen of the Soviet Army and Navy, entitled: "Appeal to the Members of Trade

Unions, Workers in Military Units, Organizations and at Enterprises of the Soviet Army and Navy."]

[Text]

Dear Comrades!

The breakup of Army trade-union organizations into 18 unions prohibits them from effectively resolving problems related to the protection of the rights and interests of the workers. This has a particularly negative impact on the trade-union organizations within the Ground Forces, who, unlike other services within the Armed Forces, do not have their own organizational structures.

The union movement in both the Army and the Navy does not have a unified central organ that would speak out on behalf of all the workers and civil servants, represent and defend their rights and interests at the highest levels of the government and its administration, or before the military leadership. Neither would they be represented in interaction with other social organizations nor in direct participation with the USSR Ministry of Defense in working out plans for socio-economic development and in creating the documents which establish the norms for governing the most important issues concerning production, labor, salary, quality of life and cultural development.

In this regard many trade-union organizations made proposals concerning the establishment within the Army and the Navy of a unified, independent trade-union organization under the auspices of the national trade-union movement, including the establishment of its own electoral organs beginning at the lowest echelons and ranging to the highest. These proposals will contribute to enhancing the defense of the economic, social, and human rights of workers and civil servants, to strengthening their unity and solidarity, and to increasing our national defense capabilities.

The VTsSPS [All-Union Central Council for Trade Unions] in supporting these proposals, formed an organizational committee to plan and conduct a congress of trade-union organizations within the Army and Navy, which could be convened during the first half of October of this year [1990].

In preparing for the congress it will be necessary to conduct trade-union conferences within the branches of the Armed Forces in order to elect delegates to the congress. Within the Ground Forces it will be necessary in addition to resolve the issue of consolidating the trade-union organizations in each Military District and within the Ground Forces as a whole, having planned in advance the formation of the relevant electoral organs, keeping in mind how this is being accomplished in the other services of the Armed Forces.

The consolidation of Army and Navy trade-union organizations, while preserving the existing trade-union structures based on service and branch, will enable them to realize in full the rights granted by the USSR Trade

Union. Of course, each front-line organization retains the right to decide whether to join the unified trade-union movement in the Army and Navy, or to retain their current trade-union affiliation.

The VTsSPS Secretariat suggested to the trade-union councils and committees to offer their assistance during the period of the structuring and development of the consolidated Army and Navy union organization to the workers and civil servants of the union organizations within the Ground Forces that are currently under their trade-union administration. This assistance will take the form of aid in securing permits for stays in state rest and recreation facilities, children health spa camps, institutions for preschool children, as well as assistance related to resolving other issues involving social welfare.

The organizational committee appeals to you to support the proposal to consolidate the trade-union organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy in order to combine forces in a joint search to find the most expedient and carefully weighed decision concerning the long-term fate of the trade union movement in the Army and the Navy and the principles of the formation of its electoral organs. The organizational committee requests that you discuss this appeal among the rank and file union members.

Marshal Ogarkov Speech Defends Veterans' Rights

90UM0746A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 29,
16-22 Jul 90 p 3

[Speech by Marshal of the Soviet Union N. Ogarkov, chairman of the All-Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor, and the Armed Forces, at the 28th CPSU Congress, date not given: "Party, Soviets, Sociopolitical Organizations and Movements"]

[Text] Dear comrades!

I am the same age as the October Revolution. I have had occasion to be a witness and participant in the formation and development of our Soviet state at all its stages. And today as a veteran of war, labor, the party, and the Armed Forces I cannot help but note that never since the civil war have the ideas of the October Revolution and the ideas of Leninism, our social and state system, and its state organs been subjected to such attacks and such trials of its strength. And never has the authority of the party and the authority of the state fallen so low as it has in our day.

This, of course, cannot but trouble all of us. It is especially painful for those veterans who have gone through many difficult experiences together with the party and the country and have fallen on hard times. With rifle in hand and under the most difficult conditions they defended the country from enemies and over many years selflessly turned a formerly tired, utterly demolished country in bast shoes into a great Soviet

power. The majority of us deeply understand the necessity of renewing our society and genuinely making our best contribution to perestroika. And today, often finding themselves even at the poverty line, the majority of them maintain a firm, steady front and defend the CPSU Platform, straightforward and honest like fighters, not after the fashion of those who at the first difficulties and at the first change of direction of our party's ship jump from it in a panic and are now trying from the other shore to depict the veterans who have remained aboard the ship as a conservative force supposedly unable to understand the process taking place in the party and in society. I understand: It is not prestigious, but I have to say something about it today because the lack of objectivity and the sometimes even openly insulting tone with regard to veterans in various OGONEK's, NOVOSTI's, KOLESO's, VZGLYAD's, and SEKUNDA's inflict not just insult but a mortal wound. Many people consider this a betrayal by the older generation and a deliberate attempt to drive a wedge between the generations and to smash healthy forces and not allow them to consolidate themselves on a renewed CPSU Platform.

Moreover today, in my opinion, it is impossible not to see that there is in the country a purposeful, efficiently coordinated, and, I would say, coordinated campaign for the total pursuit and disparagement of everything for which our older generations fought. The October Revolution has already become something entirely different from the October Revolution, and it is as if the enthusiasm of the pre-war five-year plans never happened. Stalin's repressions and distortions are insistently associated with the essence of socialism, and some even defile the heroism of our people in the Great Patriotic War and its victory as though all of that was achieved only by penal companies and soldiers of the Chonkin type. In turn, intentionally exaggerated figures of our losses are deliberately published by someone, our sacred objects are profaned, and some pygmies have blasphemously gone after our national heroes, even the great Lenin himself. And all this is often done with sarcasm, spite, and mockery, and the ideological conviction of our people, especially of the youth, is deliberately being destroyed. One asks why this is being tolerated, because the perniciousness of this is apparent and empty souls are even worse than empty shelves. There is a continuous stream of resentment on that score, and not only from veterans. In recent years there has not been, perhaps, a single Central Committee plenum where this question has not been raised. But however strange it may be, the situation has not changed.

It is perfectly apparent that the leadership in the sphere of ideology on the part of the party's Central Committee has been dissatisfied in recent years. As a result, it is necessary in the first place to sharply raise the accountability of the party's Central Committee and the mass media with regard to the objectivity and reasoning of publications concerning the history of the party, the Army, and the country and concerning analyses of processes taking place in society. Second, it is necessary to

unite the best forces of scholars of the social sciences to develop thoroughly a theory of democratic socialism so that the people can clearly and intelligibly see specifically what kind of society the party plans to build.

The second issue concerns the situation in the country. As we all know, it is becoming worse or, in any event, is not improving. Can we really endure what has been happening up to now in Nagorno-Karabakh and around it and in Sumgait, Tbilisi, Baku, Kirgiziya, and Fergana? Hundreds of innocent people have already died. But no one has carried out a thorough investigation of these events along with punishment of the criminals and establishment of their ties with the foreign world. Can we really be calm today while Lithuania has in essence committed a coup d'etat and is creating its own army? Or while in the Baltic regions they jeer at veterans and at our Soviet people, insolently glorify former members of the SS and the Politzei, terrorize and persecute communists, break off conscription into the Army, and insult Soviet servicemen? Or while in Moldavia they scoff at people's deputies just because they support the positions of socialism and they kill the youth Dmitriy Matyushin just because he is Russian? The staffs of two ethnic armies and tens of thousands of fighters already exist in Armenia. Similar detachments, including those made up of conscripts, are being created openly in Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Moldavia, and Georgia with their own commanders and staffs and with their own weapons.

We in the All-Union Council of Veterans have been receiving a stream of letters and inquiries as well as delegations of veterans in connection with this. And many of them ask the same alarmed questions: What is happening? What are we waiting for? Why does the president remain silent and the government do nothing? Why do they not disarm such illegal units? Why do they not take criminal action against those violators of Soviet laws and presidential edicts? However in answer we often hear that these are the temporary, natural costs of perestroika, that everything is being reported to the leadership, that there is no need to panic, and that it is better to mind one's own business. One thinks of the following analogy in connection with all this. We were reminded of this analogy by one of our comrades

speaking from Lithuania. In 1941 the country's leadership also received many reports about the possibility of sudden attack on the USSR by Nazi Germany. And the reaction to these reports was the same: There is no need to panic, no need to provoke things, mind your own business. And as far as we know, they ignored all the reports. But we are very familiar with the results of such actions at that time. Are not today's actions by the leadership reminiscent of the situation 50 years ago? I propose that the party cannot remain a sideline observer in the situation which has arisen. Order must be brought to the country. It is time for all those who should do so, beginning with the president, to define themselves clearly and finally begin to act.

In conclusion I want to affirm the thought expressed in a report by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to the effect that the CPSU retains a solid position among the veterans. The veterans of war, labor, and the Armed Forces are a genuinely important social support of the party. It is appropriate to remind you that one-sixth of the communists in the party are veterans. They can render the party great help in these difficult days if the party committees will enlist them into the sociopolitical life of the party more actively. The veterans also support perestroika by their [sentence incomplete].

But the veterans still have many problems. Fulfilling their commission, and I stress that it is the commission of veterans that I am fulfilling, I earnestly request that delegates, especially party and soviet workers, and economic leaders use every opportunity to improve the standard of living of the older generation. Many, very many veterans are in the greatest need. And we have good examples of this. Today I would like to note from this tribunal the well-conceived actions of the leaderships of the Union republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belorussia, and Azerbaijan and the Ministry of the Radio Industry which, in the year of the 45th anniversary of the Victory, have implemented important measures to improve the life of combat veterans and rear services workers of the war years. We hope that this initiative will find universal support. Because the way we care for the aged, especially the defenders of the homeland, influences the moral climate and the well-being of our whole society and most importantly of the rising generation and its moral health.

Adm Khovrin Interviewed on 35th Anniversary of Pact

90UM0589A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian 13 May 90 p 3

[Interview of Admiral N. Khovrin by V. Shchedrin, *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* correspondent: "The Guarantor of Stability",]

[Text] Admiral N. Khovrin, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Forces of the Participating Nations of the Warsaw Pact, responds to questions from the "RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA" newspaper correspondent.

[Khovrin] I will say straight away that we are not spoiled by the attention of the press and that the reason for this is not that we are closed mouthed. Rather, it is the lack of initiative on the part of you journalists.

[Shchedrin] But, Nikolay Ivanovich, you will agree that literally just a few years ago everything that was written about the Warsaw Pact was just a ceremonial report about the monolithic nature of the Warsaw Pact and the indestructibility of its armed forces. Will the current leaders of the Warsaw Pact be sufficiently frank with representatives of the press now that such significant changes have taken place in the political and social lives of the East European nations, which, obviously, will influence the future of the Warsaw Pact as well?

[Khovrin] And why not? If you are addressing this question to me, I am responding. The processes taking place within the nations of Eastern Europe simply must influence the fate of the Warsaw Pact. For example, the task of "de-ideologizing" the Warsaw Pact is obvious. Until recently, it was felt that the unity of the combined nations is based upon a shared ideology. Is this the case? Take a look at the text of the Pact. Nowhere is there any mention of the need for Warsaw Pact nations to belong to any ideological-political and social-economic system. This means that the Warsaw Pact was dictated primarily by the national interests of its participants, which to this time remains the unifying force. For this reason, in spite of the changes taking place in the nations of Eastern Europe, the objective community of the Warsaw Pact member-nations is preserved.

[Shchedrin] We are witnesses to significant positive shifts in European and world politics on the whole. Does this have anything to do with the fact that the goals and tasks of the Warsaw Pact at the present stage need to be reexamined in a new context?

[Khovrin] To a certain degree, yes. For 35 years the unified governments have consistently and actively pursued a policy of peace, as a result of which a tragic cycle, which has prevailed over the European continent over a period of centuries, has been broken. This cycle brought war—a brief respite of peace—and war. However, the danger of both nuclear and conventional war still has not been completely eliminated. For this reason, one of the main tasks of the Warsaw Pact in present day conditions

is to pursue a policy in the interests of maintaining peace in Europe, creating a system of collective security, and making it possible to build a "common European home."

There is another important task for the Warsaw Pact. So that the nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union do not remain the stepsons of a rich and prospering 21st century Europe, they need to join together to solve their internal problems and to raise their economy to a modern, world standard.

And, of course, the task of ensuring their own national security and the preparedness of the combined armed forces to repel any aggression from without still remains very important. The situation in the center of Europe in connection with the impending unification of the two German states is not sufficiently thought out. Truthfully, our government, being governed primarily by common sense, is not demanding that the FRG abandon NATO if the GDR leaves the Warsaw Pact. But no one is saying that we would welcome the move of a unified Germany into the formerly hostile North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

As is known, there are two aspects to the unification of the German states: the internal governmental and the external aspects. The external aspect has to do with the level of military arms, security and borders. In resolving these matters one must come up with a formula, which would totally eliminate the threat to Germany's neighbors.

[Shchedrin] Since this task is so critical, will the unilateral steps of the Warsaw Pact nations, which were taken in recent years for the staged reduction of their military hardware, not have a negative influence upon its solution? The figures of the reductions have been reported in the press more than once. They are sufficiently imposing. And after all NATO has not followed through with a response to these reductions. What is going on?

[Khovrin] I am acquainted with pronouncements such as these. They are totally confined to the fabrication of points of view, which our political expert alone has generalized along these lines: they say that the bridge has been built wider than the river itself. Let us be realists! Any government which has reduced its army by a half million men and has gotten rid of thousands of tanks and artillery and mortar systems undoubtedly will become weaker. But we have taken these steps because the world situation permitted it. And the initial point of departure was not superiority, about which the respected Academician Arbatov writes, but strategic military parity.

In addition, at the present time on the basis of the military build-up of the armed forces of the participating Warsaw Pact governments we have come up with the principle of defensive sufficiency. And this makes it possible to carry out significant unilateral reductions of military forces and military expenditures, without permitting, which is very important, a reduction in the combat potential of the combined armed forces.

And the fact that NATO has not followed our example is a pity. Such a position does not strengthen confidence between peoples.

[Shchedrin] Nikolay Ivanovich, at the present time are there any contacts between the leaders of NATO and the Warsaw Pact?

[Khovrin] At the very least, it would be strange not to take advantage of such a possibility. Last year, for example, the first, though unofficial meeting of the commanders in chief of the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO was held. The Chief of the General Staff of the Warsaw Pact has spoken at a session of the North Atlantic Assembly. In addition, some government representatives of the Warsaw Pact nations visited NATO headquarters in Brussels, where they met with NATO General Secretary Werner who, by the way, is expected to visit the USSR in the near future.

However, there is still no basis to speak of the regularity and results of these contacts; although, undoubtedly, these first, and we believe, significant steps in this direction have been taken. We will hope that such meetings will become the rule. But the usefulness of this

is not in question: it is better to explain your positions at the negotiating table than on the battlefield. And there must be more openness between the military leaders of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The honest clarification of intentions of the two sides will speed up the process of negotiating arms reductions and decrease the lack of trust between them, which, unfortunately, has accumulated more than sufficiently during the years of the cold war.

[Shchedrin] And the final question, Comrade Admiral. While celebrating the 35th anniversary of its formation, the Warsaw Pact, figuratively speaking, is entering an age of maturity. Is it possible that some sort of evolution and new qualitative changes of all of its structures will follow? Could you make a prediction on the development of these processes?

[Khovrin] You know, in general I am not an advocate of long-term political predictions. But rather than avoid answering your question, I will say straight out: at the present time there is no other alternative mechanism which could more effectively influence the stability of the situation on the European continent than the Warsaw Pact. Beyond that, reach your own conclusion.

**'Ultraconservative' View of Military Reform,
Pro-American Subversion**

90UM0587A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in
Russian No 17, 27 Apr 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Col (Ret) Yuriy Katasonov, candidate of economic sciences: "The Army and Demagog—On the Question of 'Reasonable Sufficiency'"]

[Text] Today the question of the subsequent fate of our army is being posed unusually sharply in the Soviet press. We decided to grant the opportunity to express himself to the author, who defends perhaps the "ultraconservative" concept of the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is for the readers to judge how convincing his view is on what is taking place. The question is so complex and contradictory that any firm and frank conviction is valuable.

A politically very active group of figures of pro-Western orientation, united by selfish interests, is serving as the ideologues and organizers of the destruction of the army and defense. These are our home-grown compradores who have seized key positions in international political science, official "social" organizations engaged in international affairs, and most of the mass information media. These figures are closely associated with—and in a number of cases grew directly out of—a number of political figures and highest-level functionaries in party and state organs, through whom a fatal influence is also being exerted on military policy and on the position and activity of the army. In parallel, public opinion is being influenced in the spirit of forming a negative impression of the army, through the mass information media and by other methods. All of this is leading to a decline in its authority among the people, a drop in the prestige of military service, a demoralization of soldiers and officers, and in the end to a decline in the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces.

This is causing great satisfaction in political circles in the U. S. and the other NATO countries, who have always viewed Soviet military might as the main limiter to their "freedom" of actions; i.e., exertion of their will in the international arena.

An arbitrary interpretation of the new political thinking is being used most of all as the "ideological" base for the attack on the army. It is presented as an already begun era of universal equal international cooperation, and rejection of reliance on military force by all the main states. People are being inculcated with the thought that, as a result of the reduction of international tension and improvement of USSR relations with the U. S. and other countries of the West, the army is becoming not all that necessary, and from the standpoint of domestic problems, even harmful: as a heavy economic burden, and as a threat to the development of democracy. Moreover, attempts, either directly or in veiled form, are being made to shift the blame onto the army for past and recent political errors (participation of the USSR in the Afghan war, and in the events in Hungary in 1956,

Czechoslovakia in 1968, Tbilisi in April 1989, and even in the military confrontation and arms race with the U. S. and NATO).

The strongest blow on the army is being made by the fact that USSR foreign policy in recent years has been structured on entirely different foundations than before, and than the majority of the world's states are structuring it even today: not on strengthening one's own military and political positions, but on the consistent, unilateral, renunciation of them. A dangerous situation has arisen, when Soviet foreign policy decisions have begun to be based at times not so much on a calculation of realities, especially those unpleasant for us, as on a "idealistic" concept, the practical implementation of which is at the least problematic; i.e., on a utopia. This situation is similar to the one that arose after October 1917, when for many years Soviet policy was based on the utopian idea of world revolution. The fatal consequences of this for the country and people are well known.

Many important foreign policy actions of the USSR in recent years are associated with a unilateral reduction of its military activity. Among them are moratoriums on nuclear testing, a reduction of the armed forces and weapons, the military budget and the production of military equipment, a reduction of Soviet troops on the territory of the Warsaw Treaty Organization member countries and the removal of nuclear warheads from their territory, the adoption of a defensive military doctrine, which foresees a reduction in the numerical strength, functions and combat training of the Armed Forces, etc.

The USSR is implementing a number of measures to reduce military activity on the basis of inter-state treaties and agreements. However, these are treaties, the conclusion of which quite recently was senseless for us, since they do not meet the requirements of observing equality and equal security. Such a treaty is the treaty on RSMD [Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles], according to which the USSR must destroy over twice as many missiles, and 3.5 times more nuclear warheads than the U. S., as a result of which the correlation of military forces in Europe will change seriously in favor of the U. S. and NATO.

Negotiations on reducing armed forces and weapons, in which the USSR is participating today, are fraught with the appearance of new treaties that are unequal for us, with a further change in the military balance not in our favor, and with a reduction of the level of our defense capability. In striving to achieve agreements at any cost, the USSR is giving up its fundamental positions.

Thus, one of the cornerstones of our approach to negotiations with the U. S. on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons has always been that such a reduction must be linked inseparably with a cessation (later with a slowing) of work on the American "star wars" program—SDI ("strategic defense initiative"). Why?

Because SDI, which is presented by Washington as a "defensive system," is a most important component of the American "first strike" arsenal, intended to "disarm" and "decapitate" our country and its armed forces by knocking out retaliatory strike strategic forces and state and military command and control centers. If there is a reduction of strategic offensive forces, but SDI is retained, the relative importance and potential effectiveness of the latter, naturally, would sharply increase, and the strategic balance would be disrupted in favor of the U. S. Giving up the requirement for such linkage is, in fact, capitulation to Washington.

The talks that the USSR, along with the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries, is holding with the U. S. and its NATO allies on reducing armed forces and weapons in Europe have been based from the very outset on an unequal principle: Their object is only part of the elements of the military balance, especially those elements where the position of the Soviet Union is strong, and, therefore, the other side is interested in reducing them. This includes especially Soviet ground forces. In several types of military power where the U. S. has clear superiority, it categorically refuses to enter into negotiations, since it wants to retain its superiority. This concerns especially naval forces. But, as observer V. Ovchinnikov noted fairly, "the more actively reduction on land is accomplished, the more dangerous the destabilizing role of sea-based combat resources becomes." Therefore, he concludes, "it is senseless to talk about shifting to a defensive doctrine, while ignoring the capabilities of naval forces." But we, ignoring good sense nonetheless, have shifted to such a doctrine!

The U. S. also refuses to conduct talks about reducing tactical nuclear weapons, since it plans through their modernization to compensate for the nuclear missile capability being eliminated in accordance with the treaty on RSMD; i.e., thereby to circumvent this treaty.

Implementation of the new military doctrine approved by our country and the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1987 became one of the main directions in the attack on the army and on defense capability. A unique feature is characteristic of this doctrine. It is based not on realities, but on good wishes. Thus, a fundamental premise of the doctrine is the assertion that under modern conditions war and military force have supposedly ceased to be a means of policy.

In other words, our military doctrine (and this means also our military policy) is based on a dangerous ostrich-like position. We are trying to make our desire for peace, based on a rejection of military force, pass for the fact that such a peace supposedly already exists. The leaders of the U. S. and NATO do not plan even to state their recognition of the necessity and possibility to create a world without military force, not to mention make a corresponding change in their military doctrines and policies.

The principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense, approved in current Soviet military doctrine, is highly doubtful. It is even more so if one considers that this "principle" was invented in the U. S., and exported to us with the aid of CIA figures. In accordance with this, the army is not only reduced, but is adapted and trained solely or primarily for defensive-combat operations. And this in a military respect is equivalent to dooming itself to defeat.

The U. S. and NATO military doctrines continue to anticipate the possibility of conducting all types of combat operations, including offensive, as well as first use of nuclear weapons, which the Soviet Union long ago rejected.

It is characteristic that all of the innovations set down in law in the 1987 military doctrine were first advanced by representatives of an exclusive group of civilian "military theoreticians," were intensively propagandized by them, and were foisted upon the country's political and military leadership behind the scenes, in secret from the people and their elected organs of government.

In accordance with official interpretations (and there are virtually no other appraisals of the foreign policy activity of the government on the pages of our press), all of the above-mentioned and similar measures have an unambiguous positive importance—they supposedly reduce significantly the military threat to the USSR and strengthen its security.

Thus, the most dangerous political illusion of our day is being affirmed in society. This may result in great harm to the country, possibly a new 1941, but now in the nuclear space era; i.e., immeasurable with the past in its consequences. Or it may result in complete political capitulation and the loss of national independence. Such conclusions stem from the following harsh realities.

First, the good will of official Western circles displayed toward our country in connection with perestroika is so far limited primarily to rhetoric, and approval of those processes that suit them, but far from always please us. The West is making possible practical measures in the field of economic and scientific and technical cooperation with the USSR strictly dependent on further economic and political changes in the USSR, in the direction needed by them.

Second, the countries of the West themselves in no way plan to be guided in their policies by the principles of the new thinking, and the ideas of the priority of general human values, but act in accordance with their own national and class interests, the achievement of which is ensured by all means, including military force (the U. S. intervention in Panama in December 1989, aggression against Lebanon in 1986, etc.).

Third, they are exploiting our difficulties to strengthen their superiority over the USSR in all spheres, especially the military sphere, and are continuing at unreduced

tempos to develop and build up their own military-technical potential, to create an insurmountable gap from the USSR, and bring her down to a position of a second-rate power. Already now the U. S., while declaring verbally its sympathies toward the USSR, in fact frequently allows itself to ignore the Soviet Union, and to carry out actions that affect her interests and worth, while not encountering the required reaction from her side (unfriendly statements by officials, the interference of Congress in the internal affairs of the USSR, ignoring agreements signed with the Soviet Union, violations of sea and air borders of the USSR by American warships and aircraft, etc.).

Fourth, the U. S. and NATO continue officially to consider the Soviet Union their main enemy. All of their activity to create new weapons systems, deploy and train armed forces, and conduct strategic and operational planning, is oriented on waging war most of all against the USSR.

The questions arise: Can the changed rhetoric, the words of Western figures (even they frequently are made in the former spirit of unfriendliness toward us), outweigh real military matters, on which hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars are being spent, and which are clearly being directed against our country? And can we be sure that at some moment, when our behavior is not very pleasing to Washington, they will not organize a "Panama" against us—only corresponding to the size of our country and the degree of hostility of the world's "guardians of democracy" toward her? After all, for example, already today there are those who are not pleased with the processes associated with the start of renewal in Russia and of the Russians. Thus, in a letter to young people in Russia, the primate of the Russian Orthodox Church abroad, Metropolitan Vitaliy, warns: "All the forces, and billions in gold will be thrown in, simply to extinguish the flame of Russian renewal. This is what is facing Russia now. It is worse than Napoleon and Hitler."

Only the people have the right to answer these questions. However, they are still kept out of deciding questions that concern defense and the security of the country, the fate of the army and disarmament.

Thus, one of the most important of such decisions—about the unilateral reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces by 500,000 men, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 aircraft—was announced in December 1988 by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev, at a session of the UN General Assembly in New York. The Soviet people learned about it after it became known in all the capitals of the world. Representatives of foreign states, and not the Soviet people, were also first to be informed about the reduction of the USSR military budget by 14.8 percent, and of the production of military equipment and weapons in the country by 19.5 percent.

One wonders whether these and other such decisions, which are weakening the defense of our country and

destroying the army, will in time be recognized as just as fatal—or more likely even more fatal—errors, as the entry of our troops into Afghanistan, or Stalin's mistakes on the eve of 1941, are recognized today?

The Soviet people must know: Why was the treaty on RSMD concluded under such unequal conditions (already by 1 November 1989 the Soviet Union was to eliminate 1,444 missiles, while the U. S. was to eliminate only 385)? How did it really affect the security of our country? What is resulting from the U. S. actions directed at circumventing the treaty on RSMD, and what retaliatory measures are being undertaken in connection with this? Finally, who specifically is the creator of this treaty and bears personal responsibility for it?

The answers to these questions are all the more necessary for the country, for which the prospect is looming that there will be new unequal treaties about reducing arms and armed forces, and for which there are those who are preparing a new direct bloodletting of the army—its next unilateral reduction.

The main ideologue and apologist for unilateral disarmament today is G. A. Arbatov, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, USSR Academy of Sciences—a Brezhnev protege and "Kremlin advisor" of many years, as he is called in the West. Speaking at the second USSR Congress of People's Deputies, G. Arbatov depicted American politicians as peacelovers and peacemakers (and in those days they were preparing the invasion of Panama), and our military personnel as advocates of the arms race; i.e., he shifted all the blame. On this basis he demanded further unilateral reduction of the Soviet military budget, armed forces and weapons, and even attempted to prove that the USSR supposedly spends more than the U. S. for military purposes. Other deputies immediately rebuffed Arbatov's irresponsible demagoguery, catching him juggling facts and figures. Thus, Deputy A. I. Ovchinnikov recalled that the Soviet military budget is 71 billion rubles, while the American is \$305.5 billion. It is not necessary to be an academician to understand the difference between these figures; today everyone knows that one pays six rubles for a dollar, and not the other way around. However, neither the fact that he was caught lying, nor the U. S. armed invasion of Panama, changed the mind of the "principled" academician, who with unremitting energy continues his campaign for a unilateral reduction of our army, with the aid of television, the journal OGONEK, and other similar mass information resources that are favorably inclined toward him, but not toward his opponents.

What is behind this? Perhaps the American Studies scholar learned from a source that other deputies are unaware of (for example, from former deputy CIA director A. Cox [translation], with whom Arbatov heads a "joint enterprise" on the basis of parity—a Soviet-American research project on problems of stability) that the Pentagon has entered the "path of peace?" No, he knows better than many that this is not so. After all, already in the mid-1980s Arbatov authoritatively reported

that the Pentagon had received the assignment to develop "plans for defeating the Soviet Union at any level of armed conflict, from insurgency operations to nuclear war."

Recently an official declaration was made in the U. S. that again in 1991 the American military budget will grow, and that all the main military programs in it will be retained. Expenditures for the SDI program will increase immediately by 30 percent! And, as that same academician Arbatov fairly warned us, "with the development of SDI efforts the nuclear threat will not disappear, but intensify." Moreover, four years ago he reported a remarkable forecast: "For the next eight or more years the U. S. does not even plan to seriously hold negotiations, but views them rather as a propaganda technique, as an instrument... of general trickery... but do they really think that the Soviet Union will also take part in these unworthy and dangerous games?" In confirmation of the fact that this will never happen, Arbatov referred to one of the statements by M. S. Gorbachev. Nevertheless, from that time we seemed to have entered into these dangerous "games", which are destructive to our national worth. And the "Kremlin advisor," who quite recently angrily exposed the trickery, became the main ideologue and lobbyist of this trickery.

Arbatov is one of the authors and main initiators of our introduction of the concept of "reasonable sufficiency." He and his group borrowed it from CIA and Pentagon figures, and possibly it was palmed off intentionally by the Americans. It is stated in recommendations of the above mentioned Soviet-American research project on problems of stability, formed in 1985, that "the U. S. and USSR should accept the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" in their military planning. In accordance with this concept they should reduce their armed forces to much lower levels, while preserving a stable balance at each level." Today this recommendation has been accepted only by ourselves, and our military doctrine represents, paradoxical as it is, the embodiment of Arbatov's and the American recommendation. Among the American authors of the latter, besides the above mentioned A. Cox, are also former CIA director W. Colby, former deputy Secretary of the Air Force T. Hoops [transliteration], former deputy Secretary of State G. Ball and others, and among the Soviets, besides G. Arbatov, are V. V. Zhurkin, F. M. Burlatskiy, V. M. Falin, and others. These are the grimaces of perestroika and the new thinking.

At the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, Arbatov expressed from the rostrum, "righteous indignation" about the opinion expressed that he regularly makes irresponsible statements, and even threatened to take USSR people's deputy V. I. Matyukin to court "for slander," if the latter did not present appropriate evidence. But, what can be a more convincing proof of Arbatov's irresponsibility, than his openly vacillating statements on vitally important questions of security?

This trait of Arbatov has already been noted in the press. Thus, candidate of legal sciences N. P. Koldayeva emphasizes that the reduction of our army, judging from its discussion on the pages of our press and on television, is being carried out at an insufficiently professional level. This is manifested in the fact that in this field, especially on negotiations with the U. S., the views of G. Arbatov, who answered these important questions without being competent in them, are too extensively represented. The main thing for him, writes Koldayeva, is "to get in the stream," for the sake of which he is constantly "restructuring on the march," adapting to the competition, depending on which he may "with equal success justify both the need for reducing arms, and for their buildup."

The spiritual and blood "children of Arbatov" operate in the same spirit. These are his former deputies V. V. Zhurkin (today director, European Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences) and R. G. Bogdanov (today first deputy chairman, Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace); current director A. A. Kokoshin, former scientific secretary of the Institute of the USA and Canada; I. Ye. Malashenko (today employee of the International Department, CPSU Central Committee); the son of the academician, A. G. Arbatov, a department chief at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences, and others. Some of them in their "investigations" agreed to recommend that we reduce our strategic forces unilaterally by 95 percent! And this proposal has been discussed seriously in several issues of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, mainly by employees, current and former, of this same Institute of the USA and Canada.

But this is not merely a matter of their incompetence, and not only of their time-serving. Today Arbatov and his associates for the first time are openly doing what they have actually been involved in for many years already: serving as conduits of Western interests in our country. Even American sovietologist J. Hough indicated this. He believes that Arbatov deserves the Nobel Peace Prize for the fact that he destroyed Soviet military doctrine and restrained the growth of the military potential of the USSR.

Yes, the army today has numerous sore points and problems. The majority of them are problems with which our entire society is sick, or the roots of which go into it.

For a long time the society knew too little about how its fellow citizens in military uniform carry out their difficult service, frequently at the ends of the earth, and about how their families live. It is in great debt to the army.

Maj Gen Bay on Benefits For WW II Veterans

90UM0575A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 May 90 First Edition p 4

[Interview of Maj Gen N. Bay by Maj I. Ivanyuk:
"Surround With Attention and Concern"]

[Text] As has already been reported, on 14 April the USSR Council of Ministers adopted the decree "On measures in connection with the celebration of the 45th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War."

The editors have asked the deputy chief of the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Maj Gen N. Bay, to comment on the provisions regarding benefits to war participants and disabled contained in this decree, and answer questions posed by our readers.

[Ivanyuk] "Where is attention, concern, and sensitivity toward veterans?" veteran of the defense of Leningrad, Pavel Galaktionovich Protsenko asked our editors. "Just recently some sort of changes for the better were planned, but it appears there is no funding."

"As for the pensions, the issue should now not be one of charity, but of social justice toward those who defended the Motherland with weapons in hand," insists the war veteran Ye. Arinov in his letter. What do you think?

[Bay] These are very true words. You see, many of those questions that we have to answer today, in particular pensions, have long been urgent.

For the war veterans, they simply cannot wait any longer. The restoration of social justice was confirmed in the Law on Pensions for Service Members passed two weeks after publication of the decree. With respect to war participants and disabled this goes into effect on 1 October 1990. Suffice to say that most of the funds necessary for realization of this Law will go precisely toward these goals.

As for the size of the pensions, as the Law stipulates, it will be raised for war participants by 25 percent of the minimal old-age pension. As you know, this is now 70 rubles a month. That is, to speak in specific terms, each war participant will receive a monthly increase of 17 rubles 50 kopecks, regardless of the size and type of the pension he receives.

Disability pensions paid to individuals disabled in the Great Patriotic War, as well as increments for their care, have been substantially raised. For example, for compulsory service enlisted personnel receiving a group-I disability pension, the minimum amount of this pension is 175 rubles.

I would especially like to note that at long last we have abolished the notorious "ceiling," which, incidentally, was the subject of many letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. From now on all war participants, if they continue to work, will receive their full pension, with no subtraction of their earnings.

[Ivanyuk] In the opinion of V. Mazurin of Moscow, those who survived the blockade of besieged Leningrad in the war have been ignored.

[Bay] Probably he has simply not studied the text of the government decree carefully; it devotes an entire paragraph to this question. Or perhaps he misunderstood it.

Remember, on 14 May 1985, decree No 461 of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers was adopted: "On the application of benefits established for participants of the Great Patriotic War to civilians working during the Leningrad blockade at enterprises, institutions, and organizations of the city and awarded the medal 'For the Defense of Leningrad.'" It applied to those who worked in the besieged city from 8 September 1941 to 18 January 1943. Now, with allowance for the harsh realities of wartime, and for public opinion, this time period has been extended to 27 January 1944. The benefits will take effect on 1 July.

[Ivanyuk] Veterans of the Great Patriotic War I. Voloshin, M. Korobov, V. Yefimenko, and many others argue that a somewhat mechanical approach has developed in our legislation on benefits. There are all sorts of limitations of the "ceiling" type for working pensioners, and levelling regardless of services to the Motherland...

[Bay] As I already mentioned, the "ceiling" has now been abolished, and this is absolutely correct. And overall, with respect to the last decree of the government, I would say this: the veterans now have much greater "degrees of freedom," i.e. there is now a right to choose.

For instance, it was decided that starting on 1 July 1990 individuals disabled in the Great Patriotic War, if they so desire, may receive monetary compensation once or twice a year instead of travel vouchers to spas or rest homes. And they can receive this even for 1989-1990.

Or take another example. For reasons of health, not all war veterans can take advantage of their right to free travel. And whereas before a 50 percent discount for a round trip on intercity transport only applied for one year, now it is possible to use this benefit once every two years, with round-trip fare paid.

In accordance with the decree, participants of the war have been granted the right to travel free on municipal rail and water transport and on municipal bus lines.

[Ivanyuk] Many of our readers are also concerned by the problem of personal transportation. Thus the chairman of the war and labor veterans council of the production association "Saratovneftegeofizika," I. Murakhovskiy, asks: how many cars will be set aside this year for war veterans? The press reported that it would not be 50 thousand, but twice as many.

[Bay] In making this decree, the government proceeded from existing real possibilities. And they proved to be such that this year 50 thousand passenger cars will be earmarked for participants of the Great Patriotic War, of them 32 thousand for those disabled in the war, who have the right to receive a "Zaporozhets" automobile

free of charge. This right now applies to group-I war disabled suffering from vision impairment or loss of both arms.

I would like to note that the USSR Defense Ministry has put forward the initiative to pay for the 32 thousand vehicles from the reduction in military expenditures.

I understand that there are not enough allocated automobiles. But you see, this same decree proposed to the Councils of Ministers of the allied and autonomous republics, and the executive committees of local Councils of Peoples' Deputies, that with the participation of the councils of war and labor veterans, and the councils of labor collectives of enterprises and organizations, they take additional steps to improve the living conditions of war participants and the families of fallen service members and rear workers. I believe that this may mean additional cars, along with other benefits: increments to pensions, material assistance in payment of rent, communal services, and fuel. There are such opportunities at the local level.

[Ivanyuk] Incidentally, much experience has been accumulated in this work. Although perhaps this word is not appropriate, for we are talking here mainly of spiritual generosity and sympathy.

[Bay] Indeed, there are very many examples of local organs of authority and labor collectives showing concern for veterans of war and labor. Here are just a few of the latter. On the eve of the 45th anniversary of the Victory in Belorussia, at the recommendation of the Council of Ministers of the republic the executive committees of the oblast Councils of Peoples' Deputies adopted the decision to present anniversary gifts worth up to 30 rubles (in the Gomel oblast up to 40 rubles, and in the Mogilev oblast up to 50 rubles) to all participants of the war, rear workers, and widows of fallen service members and soldier internationalists. And by decision of the Minsk Municipal Council of Peoples' Deputies, a free meal was arranged for needy single pensioners in municipal cafeterias, at the expense of the charitable fund.

Perhaps the sums spent on these measures are not all that impressive, but for those in need they are of some help. Although they can in no way take the place of the attention, respect, and reverence that the defenders of the Motherland have earned. We are eternally in their debt.

New Appointment: Lt Gen G.M. Donskoy

90UM0697A Moscow *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 11, Jun 90
(Signed to press 31 May 90) p 67

[Article under the rubric "Appointments"]

[Text] Lt Gen Genadiy Mikhailovich Donskoy has been appointed a member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of sector troops.

He was born into a peasant family on 23 April 1931 in the village of Privolnoye in Krasnogvardeyskiy (Molotovskiy) Rayon, Stavropol Kray. After completing the Saratov Infantry School in 1952, he began his officer career as a commander: of a rifle platoon and then machine-gun and rifle companies. After taking the year-long Political Staff Courses imeni F. Engels, he switched to party-political work. He served as chief of a regimental school and as deputy commander for political affairs of a motorized rifle battalion, a reconnaissance battalion and a motorized rifle regiment.

He subsequently served in the Transbaykal Military District: as deputy chief of the political section of a tank division, inspector for the political directorate, deputy chief of the staff political section and directorates, secretary of a party commission under the political directorate, chief of the section for party organizational work and deputy chief of the district political directorate. After that he served as deputy chief and then first deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Western Group of Forces. His latest position: member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the North Caucasus Military District.

He has also served in the Belorussian, Moscow and Volga military districts. He completed the Higher Party School of the CPSU CC in 1966.

He is a Russian. He became a member of the CPSU at the age of 24. He was elected a member of the bureau of the republic CPSU committee, a delegate to the 19th All-Union Party Conference and a deputy in the city soviet of people's deputies.

He was awarded the orders of the Red Star and For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR, 3rd degree (1975) and 2nd degree (1986), and many medals.

The rank of general was conferred upon him in November 1983, lieutenant general in 1987.

He is married. His wife, Eleonora Innokentyevna, a Russian, was born in 1935 and is a teacher by education. His daughter is a secondary school graduate.

Answers to Some Questions Posed by KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL

[Question] Can there be a multiparty system in the army?

[Donskoy] No. That would result in the splitting up of the servicemen according to objectives and tasks of various public movements and parties. I believe that in the current situation the Communist Party is the only political force capable of leading our nation to humane and democratic socialism. The army CPSU organizations have a great deal of experience in uniting the military collectives.

[Question] What do you think of the statements of certain leaders of informal organizations about the depoliticization of the army?

[Donskoy] I do not rule out the possibility that this will be possible in time. In the current situation, however, such a change would seriously harm troop morale and the combat readiness of the units and formations.

[Question] How can the quality of relations among the servicemen be improved?

[Donskoy] Every general, officer, seagoing and shore-based warrant officer must begin with himself, by setting a personal example! The guarantee of successfully influencing the attitude of the personnel, their behavior and relations lies in making a sharp turn in all forms of political indoctrinational work away from general problems to the specific individual.

[Question] What troubles you most today?

[Donskoy] The situation in the nation and how to restrain with political methods attempts by certain forces to break up the Union and to avoid ethnic conflicts.

[Question] What steps can be taken to raise the prestige of the military service?

[Donskoy] First of all, we need to change the society's attitude toward the army, because the undisguised and systematic attempts by many of the mass media to drive a wedge between the officers and enlisted men and to separate the army from the people can have irreparable consequences. I link to this not only the army's prestige but also its ability to perform its duty to defend the homeland.

[Question] What would you wish for yourself?

[Donskoy] That my work in my new position would appear intelligent, expedient and useful to my subordinates.

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Rising Number of Deserters. 1. Lithuania

90UM0708A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jul 90 p 4

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Gromak, under the rubric "Direct Telephone Line, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondents Reported Yesterday from Vilnius": "Why Do We Remain Silent?"]

[Text] A month ago in Lithuania, youths who had deserted from military service numbered 556. Today there are already 630 deserters.

After citing this figure, officials at the republic's military commissariat showed me some unusual photographs. In one of them—in a thicket, near a large fir tree, the

trapdoor to a hideout yawns like a dark mouth. It is an underground shelter. MVD officials, who were searching for the criminals that robbed a store in Ionava, discovered the shelter under Kavarskas, in a remote area of Lithuania. They found two sleeping lads there—Kyastutis Pyachulis from Anikshchyay and Valdas Delis from Kavarskas. They turned out not to be implicated in the robbery; they were merely hiding there, having bid farewell to the army.

Old mattresses and bedding were scattered all over the underground shelter and a radio antenna was thrown into a tree... For the time being these lads did not have weapons. But what if someone's obliging hand were to give them weapons? What could have caused matters to come to this for yesterday's soldiers, who have broken the military oath of allegiance and the law, for their relatives and friends, and for the Lithuanian nation?..

Since the beginning of time, people in all countries have held in contempt those who escaped soldiering in the forests and fields. They were not considered real men and were declared cowards. But either the world has turned upside down or something is happening to our morals today—we look calmly at the deserters and remain silent. Why?

Arms Thefts from Military Units

90UM0741A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Jul 90 p 2

[Interview with Lt Gen V. Yerminev, chief of USSR Armed Forces General Staff Directorate of Troop Regime and Service, by Ye. Zhirnov, date and place not specified; and commentary by Col Justice A. Korotkov, chief of Main Military Procurement Investigations Directorate: "Defenseless Arsenal"]

[Text] *Instances of the loss of weapons from military units already has ceased to surprise us. Can this "iron flow" be dammed? A conversation with Lieutenant General V. Yerminev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Directorate of Troop Regime and Service, is about this.*

[Zhirnov] Vyacheslav Germanovich, the increase in numbers of stolen weapons is no secret. What did 1990 bring in this sense?

[Yerminev] The intensity of thefts grew as never before. There is an especially terrifying picture in the Transcaucasus. In a half-year 251 weapons were lost here, basically as a result of attacks...

January. Armenia. Sixteen assault rifles, four pistols, 40 grenades and over 3,000 cartridges were stolen as a result of an attack on a separate company.

[Yerminev] There were another 113 for the rest of Union territory.

Paramilitary security force guards are attacked especially often.

[Zhironov] That is to say the paramilitary security forces themselves need to be guarded by someone?

[Yermin] This is partially true. We are replacing paramilitary security forces with troop guards on the territory of the Baltic and Transcaucasus and in some areas of Central Asia. This year, with consideration of the overall criminogenic situation in the country, we began to introduce technical equipment on an accelerated basis to increase reliability of security.

This is producing the necessary effect...

21 May. Krasnoyarsk Kray. A former weapons depot official diverted a paramilitary security force rifleman by conversation and disabled the security signaling. His two 12-year-old assistants penetrated the depot grounds and stole 20 kg of powder.

[Yermin] ...We were forced to shift to guarding installations according to the border principle: signaling, patrols, alert teams.

[Zhironov] But there are no locks against our own thieves?

[Yermin] Yes, this is a very sore issue. Crime is growing among the youth, and young lads come into the Army with firm criminal ties. You can't win everyone's trust!

15 May. Novosibirsk Oblast. An attack was made on an armament depot at a military training ground. The criminals stole two assault rifles, 36 pistols, and cartridges. They offered resistance when the guard arrived, wounded a sentry and an officer, and disappeared. Four servicemen—a sergeant and privates—were detained as a result of a search.

[Yermin] But as a rule, such crimes are solved rather quickly and the weapons are returned...

30 March. Kurile Islands. A hole was discovered in the wall of a depot and a check revealed a shortage of eight assault rifles. The stolen goods were found in the apartment of Senior Lieutenant A. Kochergin.

[Yermin] ...Basically thanks to aggressive actions of unit search teams and the military procuracy.

[Zhironov] And the militia?

[Yermin] From an analysis of specific situations and in traveling out to the sites I became convinced that as a result of uncoordinated actions the militia ring around an installation usually appears with a delay of two hours...

14 May. Sevastopol. Assistant Guard Commander G. Droyenko left the unit with an assault rifle. After riding to Simferopol with a "private taxi," he shot the driver, who died from the wound.

[Yermin] ...It is understandable that promptness in taking steps is more valuable than departmental prestige.

We worked out a joint document of the General Staff, MVD and Main Military Procuracy which governs all details of coordination.

[Zhironov] And the total stolen this year, counting weapons taken off by deserters?

[Yermin] As of 1 July 620 weapons, and around half already have been found. The Main Missile and Artillery Directorate transmits the numbers of stolen weapons to the MVD Main Information Center. What is not found immediately is sought by the militia.

[Zhironov] Vyacheslav Germanovich, in addition to weapons, military units more and more often are becoming a source of practice ammunition, which "helps" criminals no worse than live ammunition. Is there a campaign against this sort of thefts?

[Yermin] Yes, there are instances where officers at the tactical level do not turn in unexpended ammunition promptly...

23 May. Voronezh Oblast. Children swiped ammunition from a barn belonging to the deputy chief of staff of a unit. In the barn the militia discovered a training grenade, four mine simulators and 170 hand grenade fuze assemblies.

[Yermin] ...Lately, with consideration of the existing situation, the demand and responsibility for this has become stricter. It is necessary to check the personnel's weapons, magazines, and sometimes also pockets. This is the result of crying irresponsibility!

[Zhironov] Yes, and if there have been no dangerous consequences, no one is criminally liable, as in the case of the lost artillery depot in Baku?

[Yermin] An unpleasant story!

26 May. Baku. An unguarded artillery depot in which there were 300 (!) 130-mm antiaircraft guns in serviceable condition was found during acceptance-turnover of the position of area commandant.

[Yermin] ...The problem is that it was in August of last year that the administrative headquarters of this depot was restationed and it was guarded by the notorious paramilitary security forces made up of local residents. Apparently the guard detail fled with the beginning of the January events. Now the installation is guarded by servicemen, but I must say that the informals still would not have been able to take advantage of the guns, each of which weighs around 40 tons. They are really czar-cannons!

They were written off long ago. Now a commission of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate and National Air Defense is working there and is exploring the possibility of cutting up the guns for scrap metal.

[Zhironov] Can it be hoped that weapon thefts and "losses" will cease in the near future?

[Yermin] This is the ideal. It is essentially unattainable, although we are doing everything to reduce weapon thefts to a minimum...

FROM THE EDITORS

We were also told about the campaign against weapon thefts by Colonel of Justice A. Korotkov, chief of the Main Military Procuracy Investigations Directorate:

An analysis of paths of the loss of weapons shows that a third of them are stolen in subunits and 19 percent at depots. The main reasons for thefts are the storage of a large number of weapons and ammunition in decrepit, unadapted spaces not equipped with serviceable signaling, reliable locks and external barriers; the absence of standard security facilities and equipment at these installations; and the carelessness of a number of persons.

Strict measures of disciplinary pressure are taken toward those guilty of creating preconditions for crimes, right up to removal from a position and even discharge from the Armed Forces. Last year alone over 150 servicemen were removed from the positions they held based on results of an inspection.

Criminal cases were instituted or procurator inspections are being held based on all facts presented in the interview.

INCIDENTALLY: The USSR MVD Main Information Center informed us that 1985 of the 11,455 lost rifled weapons being sought as of 1 June of this year (since the record began to be kept) fall to the share of the Ministry of Defense.

Main Military Censor on New Press Law

90UM0744A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jul 90 p 4

[Letter by Capt Yu. Varlamov, large-circulation newspaper editor, and response by Maj Gen S. Filimonov, Main Military Censor: "Will Censors Become Unemployed?"]

[Text] *It is common knowledge that with adoption of the USSR Law "On the Press and Other Mass Media"*

censorship of mass information is not allowed as of 1 August of this year. In this case just who will be responsible for keeping secrets in the press?

*Captain Yu. Varlamov,
Editor of large-circulation newspaper.*

Preliminary censor supervision of all open publications, including military, is in fact abolished in accordance with the adopted Law on the Press. Meanwhile, Article 5 of the Law emphasizes the inadmissibility of using the mass media for divulging information comprising state or other secrets. Article 35 states: "Responsibility for violating legislation on the press and other media is borne by officials of state and public organizations as well as by the editorial board and editor or chief editor of the mass medium, and by authors of reports and materials being disseminated who are guilty of this."

It is fully understandable that specific information concerning defense, security, economic and other national interests is secret and must be protected against divulgence. In my opinion, based on this there also must be corresponding entities to ensure such protection, including in the Armed Forces.

Naturally, the forms of work by these entities will become different. They will perform preventive work with editorial boards and publishing houses to prevent divulgence of classified information, and if necessary to provide consultation on materials prepared by authors and editorial boards. One important function will be to monitor already published materials and, if secret information is discovered to have been divulged in them, to provide information to editorial boards, publishers, the command authority and if necessary also law-protection agencies. I think that a task such as drawing up legislative documents in the sphere of protecting secrets in the mass media also will be preserved.

It stands to reason that I am speaking about my own views and impressions in this case, but the Law on Protecting Secrets, which governs questions of protecting secret information and responsibility for divulging it should introduce ultimate clarity. The need for most rapid drafting of such a law is obvious inasmuch as these questions were not reflected in the Law on the Press.

Radar to Be Moved Due to Civilian Health Concerns

90UM0728A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jun 90 p 2

[Article, published under the rubric "Permanent Correspondent's Column," by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt 2nd Rank V. Pasyakin: "Radiophobia or Negligence?"]

[Text] Capt L. Ionov sounded the alarm, and not without grounds, in a letter to the editors. On their base several radar facilities are operating in proximity to dwellings. Even the non-specialist will say that radar sites are not entirely harmless installations. Special monitoring is needed here in order not to do injury to the health of people working and living close by.

The officer writes: "For some time my legs have been covered with open sores, and I have been having headaches. I am sure that it is caused by the radars. But the point is not me! I am fearful for the health of our wives and children."

I must admit that my first thought was that the letter's author was patently exaggerating the hazard.

Unfortunately, however, a visit to the installation soon made me feel otherwise. I shall state at the outset that they have neither specialist personnel nor equipment to measure emissions. The concern of the author of the letter and other people living on the base therefore had solid grounds.

Incidentally, I shall not claim that the people living and working alongside the radar installation have been totally ignored. People recall that testing was done here in the summer of 1988, with the participation of specialist personnel from the armament service of higher-echelon subunits. But here is the problem: they were unable to find documents containing the results of the emission measurements taken during that testing. I should comment that these results are supposed to be kept for a period of five years, while measurements should be taken no less frequently than once a year. Long-time residents recall talk to the effect that one of the radars, the one which is operated by the Navy and is located practically right in the center of the base, had raised the background electromagnetic field strength to a new value. But just what is this new background level? To what extent does it exceed the normal background, and what is the strength of the electromagnetic fields generated by the facility's antennas? Nobody was able to give this correspondent a meaningful answer to these questions. Neither the naval personnel nor the people at the Air Defense Forces radar facility. What we were facing here was lack of unified administrative responsibility and disregard of elementary rules and procedures of radar facility operation.

Nevertheless radiotechnical unit deputy commander Col V. Simonenko maintains that people's complaints are due to radiophobia [excessive or unfounded fear of

radio-frequency emissions or radioactivity]. He did acknowledge, however, that the matter is not entirely clear-cut and has not been thoroughly studied.

Radiotechnical company commander Maj Yu. Ablov, who is responsible for the most powerful of the radars, was unable to introduce any clarity to the matter, for he was stationed elsewhere when the testing was performed and therefore is unacquainted with the results. Sr WO A. Verpeta, whose radar operates in the frequency band which presents the greatest hazard to people's health, was also unable to present any documents on intensity of emissions.

Thus events proceeded according to that well-known pattern where everybody passes the buck—the Navy people to the Air Defense Forces people, the latter back to the former, and so on. Confusion in such a serious matter as this is incomprehensible! It seems that living quarters and working quarters are not shielded, that is, are not protected at all. Even though there occur on the base induced stray currents from the radars. They did concern themselves, however, with the building in which sensitive equipment is housed. It was shielded.

Perhaps radars operating separately do not present a health hazard. But as an aggregate, where the fields generated by the different radars may be superimposing on one another, they may be doing irreparable damage to people's health. For this reason the base's residents are justified in feeling that a thorough and comprehensive investigation should be made. Measurements must be taken of the combined electromagnetic energy flux. But this requires forming a board of inquiry with authority, independent of the agencies to which the facilities belong.

I recently contacted Air Defense Forces corps chief of staff Col S. Dymov. He stated that the facility in question has reached its service life limit and will be dismantled. A new site will be set up further from base facilities. No measurements had been taken at the radar site. The reason for this? No test instruments available. The facility was to be dismantled in a couple of months....

Several questions arise following this reply. Why is it that an air defense combined unit does not have at its disposal the proper equipment to measure electromagnetic fields? How are they planning to site the facility—once again by rule of thumb, without instrument monitoring or testing? And, finally, is there a guarantee that this will actually take place in a couple of months and that people will be set at ease?

In short, this incident demands special attention and a specific solution. An attitude of secrecy and hushing up the true situation are intolerable, just as is close-mouthed confidentiality in the activities of boards of inquiry of this kind.

New Information Management System for PVO Subunits

90UM0742A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Jul 90 p 2

[Article by VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY correspondent N. Poroskov: "Requiem for a Plotting Board: Will It Soon Be Heard in All Air Defense Subunits?"]

[Text] Until recently it was hard to imagine an air defense subunit command post without plotting boards—plexiglass boards extending from floor to ceiling, containing overlay lines indicating our national borders and filled with air situation data. They helped commanders follow the dynamics of air defense combat and the movement of targets.

Today the situation has changed. In some radiotechnical companies and battalions the plotting boards stand idle. They have been replaced by an alert-duty automated information system (SDR). Just what is this system?

This new system, proposed by a group of officers at the Kiev Higher Air Defense Radio Engineering School, led by Col L. Sidorov and P. Savisko, is based on one of today's widely-used computers with interactive keyboard and printer.

Another important element is the fact that from the very outset standardized commercially-built computer modules were used in the SDR, which made the innovators' task easier. But they did not rest on their laurels. They also designed and built an adapter for linking the new device with radar, vertical measuring equipment, and communications channels. It would seem that this could only be considered a welcome development. But the ordeal, which became an obstacle to the manufacture of all this equipment, which is so needed by the line units, began with this essentially secondary and simple component. To state things frankly, what were revealed were chronic problems pertaining to relations between military innovators and industry.

"Let us say that a technician with great natural talent has invented a needed device or piece of equipment," explained Lt Col Yu. Rodin-Sova at the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Armament Directorate. "In order to put it into regular production it is necessary first of all to prepare technical documentation in accordance with GOST [State Standards]. As a rule our inventor is unable to do this. Why? Documentation sometimes costs more than an experimental prototype, not to mention that the latter must be tested and approved by an acceptance board....

"Wanting to support the inventor, the Main Armament Directorate usually 'connects him up' to one of the scientific research institutes, having given the preliminary specifications to the latter. This inevitably results in co-authors....

"There is also another problem: 'Squeezing' the new project into the plan and obtaining the necessary funds to carry out the idea. It is true that the innovators in question were allocated several thousand rubles, which is an exception to the rule."

But problems do not end with this. After a prototype is fabricated it turns out that there is no room available in the production schedule. Industry declines to go ahead with the project, although it realizes the value of the new innovation. For a system of rule by administrative fiat, value is sometimes directly embodied in price. It is in large measure precisely for this reason that ideas which are of value but do not represent large amounts of money are frequently not carried through.

I think at this point it would be appropriate to make a slight digression. In my opinion the cumbersome, awkward system of incorporation of new ideas has always cost the Armed Forces dearly and has adversely affected combat effectiveness. And today, in connection with cutting back on capital investment, there is an additional impediment in the path of new innovations.

Relations with defense enterprises are also changing. I was told at the Main Armament Directorate, with the introduction of contractual prices. Now they no longer will receive a single ruble more than the agreed-upon amount. On the one hand this is a disciplining factor, while on the other hand it provides an incentive. It is financially advantageous for an enterprise to have a single major ongoing project and to earn additional revenues on small projects.

The SDR with adapter was one such source of additional earnings. It seemed that the industry people would get it into production fast. But it turned out to be no easy matter to speed up production on an order which was secondary for the enterprise.

Col V. Martys suggested that the adapter be manufactured at Air Defense Forces maintenance depots or that some production cooperatives even be brought in. The problem was whether the specialists at these enterprises could guarantee a given equipment service life, that the equipment would stand up to shaking and jarring, that it would be capable of operating in various climatic conditions and under the effect of electromagnetic pulse. I do not think so.

Out on the range I have observed time and again how the commander of a given radiotechnical subunit begs a colleague from another combined unit, practically with tears in his eyes, to let him use his SDR analog for the practice shoot. This means that the line units need this equipment and are aware of its superiority in combat operations. What can you say? There are considerable benefits to be derived from incorporating the automated system. It reduces the number of specialist personnel on the command post team. It is no longer necessary constantly to use bulky, power-hungry operating vans and, finally, there is simplicity of operation. Capt Yu. Valetskiy, for example, taught me how to operate the

keyboard in 10 minutes. In brief, the benefits are legion, and for that reason it is particularly puzzling: can it be that those persons on whom adoption of the system in the line units depends fail to see these benefits?

"The line units need the SDR," agreed Maj Gen V. Sakhno, first deputy chief of Air Defense Radiotechnical Troops. "The military innovators have done their job. Now it is up to industry. But at present it is responding to our needs in a very bizarre manner...."

It would seem that there are indeed those who have failed to grasp the fact that the old method of passing on information and target tracking is obsolete. It should be replaced by new technology.

A new innovation could also apparently make its way more quickly into the line units if a special group to select suggestions, proposals, and comments from the units were established in the Air Defense Forces Main Staff. At the present time they are piling up on the desk of one of the officers in the Main Armament Directorate. Consequently it will not be easy to separate the wheat from the chaff. And this means that it will not be easy rapidly to adopt an optimal solution.

Response to Readers on New Flight Schools

90UM0766A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jul 90 p 5

[Article, published under the heading "From Yeysk," by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "An Air Force Specialized School Does Exist!"]

[Text] *As reported earlier by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, pursuant to a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, a decision was made to open in 1990, in eight Soviet cities, specialized boarding schools offering primary flight training. The time has been drawing near for enrolling*

students in these specialized schools. As we have been informed from the localities, however, for a number of reasons implementation of this decree was in jeopardy. This newspaper has been receiving a stream of letters, containing the following questions: will Air Force specialized schools be opened this year or not? An article dealing with this problem appeared in the 14 June 1990 issue of this newspaper, entitled "Air Force Specialized Schools... On Paper." And here is the first news to arrive: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has been informed that a specialized boarding school offering primary flight training has in fact opened in the city of Yeysk.

Our correspondent asked Col L. Pakhnin, section chief in the Air Force Military Educational Institutions Directorate, to comment on this report. Here is his reply: "It is true that classes will commence on 1 September 1990 at a specialized boarding school offering primary flight training. The school is accepting boys 15 and 16 years of age who have successfully completed nine grades of the 11-year school. Applications are to be submitted by 30 June. 150 students will be enrolled this year. As of today more than 90 applications have been received.

"Students at these specialized schools will receive free tuition, board and room. They will wear the same type of uniform as students at Suvorov schools, except that the shoulderboards will bear the letters SSh (Specialized School) in place of SVU and their cap visor, shoulderboards and seam stripes on the trousers will be light blue. The address of the specialized school is: 353660, Yeysk, Krasnodar Kray, ulitsa Plekhanova, 15."

We were told at the Air Force Military Educational Institutions Directorate that within a few days they will be settling the matter of opening a specialized boarding school with primary flight training in the city of Barnaul. A subsequent article will contain information on this school.

New Appointment: Vice-Admiral G. N. Gurinov

90UM0695A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11 Jun 90
(Signed to press 31 May 90) p 66

[Unattributed article: "Vice-Admiral Georgiy Nikolayevich Gurinov Appointed Chief of Staff of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet"]

[Text] He was born on August 27, 1939 in the city of Minsk in a military family. Along with his parents he lived in various garrisons, finishing the tenth year [of education] in Leningrad Oblast. From there he went to Baku to enroll in the Caspian Higher Naval Academy imeni S. M. Kirov. In 1960 he completed school with honors (artillery department). He served four years in the Strategic Missile Forces as deputy chief, launcher crew chief, detachment chief, deputy battery commander for equipment. Then came a transfer to the Baltic Fleet.

He served on the destroyers "Pravedlivyy", "Neustrashimyy", "Surovyy", and "Speshnyy". He was commander of an anti-aircraft battery, Department-2 guidance group, Department-2 commander, senior aide and ship commander.

After completing the Naval Academy with honors, he again returned to the Baltic Fleet. He was chief of staff and later commander of a brigade of ships. From the post of naval formation chief of staff he enrolled in the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy. He completed his studies in 1984 and was appointed flotilla chief of staff, and then its commander.

He took part in visits and business calls of Soviet naval vessels in ports in Denmark, the Netherlands, Morocco, and Finland.

He is Russian. He was accepted into the ranks of the CPSU at a graduate course in the Academy.

He was awarded the order "For Service of the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces", Third Class (1977), and numerous medals.

He received the title Captain First Class ahead of schedule in January 1981. He became Rear-Admiral at age forty six, and Vice-Admiral in April 1988.

He is married. His wife, Nadezhda Ivanovna, a Ukrainian, was born in Lebedina in Suma Oblast. A teacher by profession. A year ago their son completed the Kalinigrad Higher Military Engineering Academy of the Engineer Troops. He serves in the Pacific Fleet.

**Among the Responses to the *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL Questionnaire**

From your experience in serving in the Strategic Missile Forces, what do you find useful in the Navy?

Being organized, a feeling of extreme responsibility for the safety of the homeland. In these years of aggravated

conditions in the world situation, our unit was one of the first to stand alert status and to have to be able to solve an enormous array of tasks in an extremely compressed time frame.

What, in your view, is the most difficult position in the Navy?

For me a difficult and at the same time favorite position is that of destroyer commander. Here one assumes upon oneself an enormous responsibility as both commander and sailor. The responsibility is not only for oneself but for the whole collective, and for managing it. You experience pride and inspiration when the crew subordinated under your command operates harmoniously, with precision, as a single fighting family, and you get what you want and are able to do.

How do you stand regarding the principle of paid [professional] manning of the Navy?

Ambiguous. I understand that sometime we will reach that point, but at the same time I feel that no hasty decisions should be made in this matter. It should occur in a balanced manner, taking under account situations happening in our country and in the world.

How to you respond to naval dynasties?

A lot of servicemen fear talking about this, especially if they have achieved some appreciable rank in their service career. I am for dynasties, as a distinguished tradition in any arena, including the Navy. Servicemen's children do not build up any illusions about naval service. All the burdens of an officer's family life they know not from hearsay but have experienced themselves and are more able to overcome them. I am convinced: naval dynasties are like the cement binding the Naval officer ranks. Protectionism is another matter. I am against it when sons are awarded laurels, decorations, and positions undeservingly on account of their fathers. The evaluation of their effort should be entirely objective.

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**Discussion of Soviet-Dutch Agreement to Raise
Komsomolets Sub**

90UM0724A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
7 Jul 90 p 4

[Article by Colonel V. Streltsev and Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko: "Will the Dutch Raise the Komsomolets"]

[Text] Readers' letters are coming in to *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* with the question: Will the nuclear submarine Komsomolets that was sunk in the Norwegian Sea be raised?

Recently USSR Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry I. Koksanov approved the "Conclusion on Possible Variations of Raising the Submarine Komsomolets" which was the concluding document of the Joint Commission

of Experts of Scientific and Planning Collectives of the Navy, Minsudprom [USSR Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry], and other departments. It gives preference to a Dutch ship-raising firm consortium proposal. Several days ago, Rubin TsKB [Central Design Office] MT General Designer Academician I. Spasskiy and Dutch Firm Consortium Director K. Reinhardt signed a Soviet-Dutch contract to raise the Komsomolets. Our Correspondents Colonel V. Streltsev and Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko met with Academician I. Spasskiy and experts who participated in the committee of experts.

Captain 1st Rank A. Pivak, NII VMF [Scientific Research Institute of the Navy] chief:

"The committee of experts were exposed to numerous proposals and scientific-technical ideas that were submitted by Soviet institutions, scientific collectives, and individual citizens, and also by foreign firms. There were quite a few interesting proposals among them. However, the Dutch consortium proposal won the competition of ideas."

Captain 2nd Rank G. Panov, NII [Scientific Research Institute] deputy section head:

"Higher Naval Engineering School imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy experts participated in the competition with a quite original proposal. It provides for development of a ship-raising structure that is capable of being loaded under water, carrying out a search for the object, seizing its hull using special devices and carrying out the ship-raising using a process of liquid nitrogen gasification. But right now we lack experience in working with liquid nitrogen at great depths. This means that implementation of this proposal will require lengthy scientific-technical research. Or take the Gidropribor TsNII [Central Scientific Research Institute] proposal. It is based on the idea of using powder or other chemical gas generators that are capable of feeding gas into inflatable plastic reservoirs under water. But once again we do not yet even have the systems engineering for such gas generators that are designed for a counterpressure of up to 200 kilograms per square centimeter and are capable of creating a lifting force of nearly six thousand tons.

"And what is the essence of Dutch proposal? It is simple in principle. They propose raising the Komsomolets using a special floating crane equipped with powerful winches. They provide for the use of a cable made of aramide fiber (tvarona [Transliterated]) on the tackle systems that weighs five times less than steel and has eight to ten times more relative strength. We do not produce this fiber in our country. The firm maintains this technology in secrecy."

Captain 2nd Rank G. Dyakonov, Scientific Research Institute scientific associate:

"It certainly was unpleasant for me to admit that we are once again appealing to the West for assistance in this situation. Enormous material assets will be directed not toward development of native equipment but for Dutch

equipment. And it is as if this variant was planned from the beginning. For the USSR Council of Ministers specifically tasked Rubin TsKB MT, which had never had any direct relationship with ship-raising to be involved with this. Naturally we anticipated that this organization would never decide on a native project...."

Academician I. Spasskiy, Rubin TsKB MT general designer, USSR People's Deputy, and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security Issues:

"We also conducted negotiations with certain other foreign firms before the contract was signed with the Dutch consortium. Their proposals did not satisfy either the time period or the cost of the project. The Dutch are bound to raise the Komsomolets by the summer of 1992. Yes and at a price we considered to be acceptable for our side (I cannot name a specific price, it is a commercial secret). I must say that in this case our partners are interested in not so much profit as publicity. Really the project of raising the Komsomolets from a more than 1.5 kilometer depth is unique in its magnitude. Rubin will receive the identical amounts of currency and credit from the state. The fact is that, according to the conditions of the contract, work on raising the submarine ends with the creation of a joint venture: Rubin is becoming the co-owner of a unique ship-raising structure. It will be utilized in the future for ship-raising operations in accordance with orders from various states. We have analyzed consumer demand on the world market for such services. It is quite great.

"As for fears about 'freezing' the development of native ship-raising—and such fears are also being expressed—I share them. Therefore, we are undertaking appropriate steps. Recently, an All-Union competition was announced for device design ideas to raise ships from great depths. We will immediately begin to develop the best ones (we will also pay attention to those that participated in the committee of experts proposals to raise the Komsomolets). Incidentally, we are also hoping to subsidize the development using profits from the previously mentioned joint venture. I stress that we decided on the Dutch project due to the rapidity of its implementation."

Thus the contract has been signed. What else is there! Right now they are beginning to preequip Dutch ship-raising equipment with unique devices that meet the demands of this immense operation. Operations will begin directly with the Komsomolets during the summer of next year; installation and super-precise guidance of the gigantic floating crane over the submarine, its seizure by a special deepwater device, raising it to the surface, and complete hermetical sealing with rapid hardening foam. According to the contract, the floating crane will deliver the submarine to any location indicated by the Soviet side (It has not yet been selected). Then a special commission will study the causes of the loss of the Komsomolets. The reactor compartment will be cut out and buried in a special shaft. These are the plans....

Western Experience with Conversion of Defense Industry

90UM0598C Moscow PROBLEMY TEORII I PRAKTIKI UPRAVLENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 90 pp 76-80

[Survey of materials of the U.S. and UK press prepared by Aleksandr Lisov, scientific associate of USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, covering the topics: conversion of the military-industrial complex is a demand of the times; objectives of perestroika of the economies of developed capitalist countries; SDI, Eureka, Human Goals projects; and legal aspects of conversion: "The Phenomenon of Conversion of Military Production"]

[Text] The need for widescale conversion of military production in industrially developed countries is obvious today. That viewpoint is held by many foreign experts, but realizing this idea involves very complicated problems.

The U.S. military-industrial complex, the largest military machine permanently operating in peacetime, takes in 40,000 enterprises of a varying scale from General Motors with 766,000 workers to enterprises numbering 10 persons. Approximately 26 million Americans as well as a growing number of foreigners live directly or indirectly on the Pentagon budget, which consists of \$300 billion annually. Sixty-five percent of military expenditures are placed at the disposal of 100 of the largest contracting firms, five of which handle around one-fifth of Pentagon orders. Western economists believe that the effect of the military-industrial complex, which swallows up enormous resources, is the reason for the decline of U.S. industry and a reduction in labor productivity growth rates. Therefore they assume that no matter how much the balance of payments and employment in the military sector suffer, over the long term U.S. industry is more likely to win if it concentrates to a greater extent on producing goods for peaceful purposes. Such sentiments also are maturing in the U.S. parliament.

Democrat S. Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee from the state of Georgia, where military enterprises predominate, worked out a five-year plan which lists the possibilities of saving \$325 billion, which exceeds the amount of funds allocated annually for arms.

The SDI program, entire series of combat aircraft (the F-15 along with the F-14), rail-based MX missiles, DDG-51 destroyers and the V-22 vertical take-off fighter produced by the Boeing and Bell Helicopter companies are subject to reductions; along with this, realization of long-term programs for creating the B-1 strategic bomber and C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft is ending.

Even now congressmen in a resolute mood forced businessmen to fire 6,000 workers of Hughes Aircraft, a daughter firm of motor vehicle giant General Motors, 7,500 workers of the McDonnell-Douglas company will

be excess in 1991, and 2,500 workers of the Bell Helicopter companies will become unemployed if production of the V-22 fighter stops.

In the opinion of L. J. Dumas, conversion on a national scale requires a carefully drawn-up strategy which would take account of the sum total of macroeconomic factors of modern development of industrially developed countries. He believes that in case of a significant reduction of military expenditures it is not only workers of military sectors who will suffer: the drop in employment will cause a general drop in demand and a growth of unemployment in sectors producing consumer goods and producer goods. State stimulation of the economy can substantially ease conversion if the state will restrain discount rates at a relatively low level, thereby creating the most favorable conditions for expanding capital investments in the civilian sector, or if it prevents a drop of demand in markets in which companies which have carried out conversion are dealing.

In the scientist's opinion, there are enormously fewer problems connected with small-scale conversion. In this case only political will and quality planning are required. For example, a report of the U.S. Defense Department devoted to the conversion of 94 military bases during 1961-1981 indicates that as a result of the steps taken 123,777 new jobs were created in place of the 87,703 lost from base closings.

Another U.S. scientist, L. R. Peattie, sounds a call to shift from an idea of conversion as primarily a technical phenomenon to a broader concept which would take account of the nature of international relations and the domestic policy of states. Analyzing the modern movement for conversion, Peattie identifies three directions. The first is oriented toward the sphere of the economy. Based on alternative planning of production, its representatives try to determine ways of converting specific enterprises and scientific-technical laboratories. The second direction, abstracting from specific technical-economic problems, favors a reduction in the national military budget, perceiving this as the essence of the problem. Uniting goals of the first two, the third direction is devoid of their radicalism. Its representatives place main reliance on a scientific study of all aspects of the problem and lengthy propaganda of conversion ideas in society, assuming that in time mankind will reject models of a militarized economy. The author believes those directions to be insufficiently substantiated and ineffective. In his opinion, the conversion movement can become a serious force only if it develops into a broader political movement that unites all antiwar forces and integrates their strategies into a single whole.

U.S. scientist M. Pianta gives special attention to consideration of basic directions of military-technical studies in the leading industrially developed countries and attempts to substantiate a strategy of reorientation of these programs for the needs of the civilian economy. Pianta singles out the Strategic Defense Initiative, which diverts a growing share of RDT&E expenditures in the

United States to itself. It is presumed that in the near future it will comprise 30 percent of the latest military-technical RDT&E, 10 percent of all military RDT&E and 5 percent of private and state expenditures for RDT&E as well as 20 percent of venture capital for the latest technology. Pianta believes that, being very dubious from the standpoint of usefulness for national technical strategy, SDI can provide real results in the international arena.

The Eureka program enabled leading West European firms to carry out important research and development in the sphere of automated and computerized production systems. Although the initial objective was development of commodities for the marketplace, only one out of eight projects falls under this category; no more than 10 percent of the projects involve "public programs" and almost 80 percent are oriented on innovations in production processes and on products for intermediate use. Moreover, many Eureka projects have a clear military direction.

The Japanese Human Goals program fundamentally differs both from SDI and from Eureka. Its fundamental scientific-technological problem is the study of man's biological functions from the standpoint of possibilities of their artificial reproduction and use. The program is intended for international cooperation and is being carried out under the direction of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Science and Technology Agency. In 1987 the Japanese government allocated \$1.4 million for preliminary research under the program, undertaking to finance it for 20 years in an amount of \$250 million per year.

Basic scientific-technical programs are acquiring growing significance for governments' economic strategy and for structural perestroika of national economies. At the same time, the objectives of scientific-technical programs also can differ. In Pianta's opinion, the sharpest contradictions between military and economic objectives are contained in SDI, as a result of which this program is unattractive for many major corporations. For example, after analyzing 350 contracts concluded during 1983-1984, experts of the very large IBM firm concluded that they are of no value for civilian industry. Pianta believes that it is advisable to view high-technology programs not as an unequivocally determined path of scientific progress, but as one of its directions having various alternatives.

Such projects already are being implemented in many countries. Take the "strategic health initiative" advanced in Great Britain. The program provides extensive medical use of artificial intelligence systems and development of expert systems as applied to such problems as infectious diseases, glaucoma, and diseases of internal organs. A wide sphere of application of the new technology is the education and professional training of cadres, a study of capabilities for employing powerful computers, technical systems for mastering language and

translation, the technology of creating computer programs, management automation, computer simulation of financial operations and so on.

In Pianta's opinion, over the long term the problem of conversion involves fundamental questions concerning directions and criteria of scientific-technical progress. Modern society requires a social-technical strategy which would ensure the growth of labor productivity, creation of additional jobs, decentralization of social and political control, and mutually profitable international cooperation. This presumes the development and realization of scientific-technical projects oriented more toward "soft" and not "hard" technology and to a greater extent toward labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive technology. A considerable role in implementing such strategy could be played by small firms and research groups with the most innovative potential. Pianta assumes that priority must be given to such spheres as education, public health, use of nature, housing construction and transportation.

"Results of first attempts in the sphere of conversion in the United States are ambiguous," notes Democratic Congressman T. Weiss. After Congress made the decision to close 86 old military bases in the country, the creation of industrial centers and the construction of airports and university compounds is going on successfully on their territory. At the same time private firms living on Defense Department orders are trying to preserve ties with the Pentagon no matter what. But there also are exceptions among them. For example, Grumman is trying to obtain subcontracts from the program for building airbuses, and Lockheed "loaned" its competitor Boeing 670 specialists who are assembling the enormous Boeing 747-400 jet passenger aircraft at its enterprises. Boeing itself is vigorously expanding the production of civilian products. Engine manufacturers such as General Electric and United Technology, which are among the ten largest military enterprises, also are entering into civilian production.

The basic problem reduces to creating additional jobs and retraining the work force. A number of studies performed by prominent U.S. economists are devoted to these aspects. For example, analyzing the status of key sectors of the economy, T. Weber concluded that additional annual investments of \$14.3 billion in these sectors will permit creating up to 777,000 new jobs annually.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency surveyed two military firms located in California (Aerojet General and Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.) on the question of economic conversion and retraining workers. According to results of the survey, in case of the reorientation of these companies toward production of civilian kinds of products, 60 percent of the personnel will not need retraining and 5 percent of those employed will be forced to take a retraining course lasting over 3 months. (Over the last 20 years in connection with the closure of a number of military enterprises and with mass layoffs, 1.5

times more jobs were created than were lost through efforts of the Pentagon's economic adjustment department.)

In the opinion of British scientists T. Woodhouse, S. Schofield and P. Southwood, the idea of transferring military production to a civilian economy footing was ignored in Great Britain until recently. A critical period came in 1986, when the Labour Party executive committee declared its support for the idea of conversion and came out with a program of activity in this sphere. The program provides for establishing a National Agency for Conversion and Economic Revival under the Ministry of Trade and Industry with the objective of aiding the conversion not only of enterprises, but also of regions which are dependent on military contracts to a great extent. Establishment of special "conversion funds" from which projects for diversifying production would be financed is presumed. Today this program is the only document of its kind adopted by a political party.

Among conversion projects British scientists single out the "Barrow Project" (named for the place where "Trident" submarines are produced) as the most significant of initiatives of this sort. It has been established that implementation of the "Trident" program sharply reduced orders for the production of conventional arms (as a result of the redistribution of funds in favor of new military programs, with an overall reduction of the military budget. There was no substantial increase in employment within the scope of the program itself, since a considerable portion of funds was expended for purchasing nuclear missile technology.

The Committee for Alternative Employment established by local trade unions of the city of Barrow drew up a report about an expansion of nonmilitary research, development and production. Based on a comparative analysis of shipbuilding programs in different countries, it was established that alternative directions of RDT&E and of production can be realized in research for creating renewable energy sources and developing maritime transportation. Although the Vickers company which is carrying out the "Trident" program is the largest firm in Europe, combining shipbuilding and engineering activity, conversion is possible in this case.

The conversion movement in Great Britain has assumed a considerable scale in recent years. A coordination center has been established—an arms conversion group under the School of Peace Studies (University of Bradford), which unites organizations, individual specialists, and research groups working on related problems. The group organizes conferences and publishes reports on various aspects of the problem.

A sociological survey of workers employed in Barrow enterprises showed that only 4 percent of those surveyed prefer to work in military production and 25 percent prefer the civilian sector. Sixty-four percent believe that the "Trident" program is important for achieving the

necessary level of employment. To the question of whether or not the level of employment is ensured more by the Vickers company itself than the "Trident" program, 83 percent of respondents answered in the affirmative. The majority favors alternative production, but few have an idea of specific ways of shifting to civilian production. Among those who gave a specific response, only 10 percent favored conversion, 21 percent were for moving equipment to another enterprise and 25 percent were for diversification of production.

Conversion of military production has been accomplished in Sweden with the assistance of trade unions and other public organizations at one of the largest state shipbuilding firms, Landekrona. Fifty companies for producing hearing aids, aluminum window frames, food industry equipment and so on are being organized at the site of the former yard. Of the 2,322 workers subject to layoff, 1,650 received work in the companies which were established.

Special attention in scientific developments is given to the legal aspects of conversion. For example, U.S. scientist S. Melman believes that legislation on conversion must include the following basic provisions:

Mandatory establishment of committees for alternative production. As a necessary condition for work under a military contract, any military production employing over 100 persons must form a committee for alternative use of equipment and adopt a production plan in case of cessation of a military contract. Bringing together representatives of management and the workers, the committee must have access to necessary information and equipment. Alternative plans must be updated periodically;

Advance planning of conversion. Not only requirements for alternative production, but also necessary changes in the skill structure of persons employed in production, in technology, in the provision of raw materials and so on are determined in the course of such planning;

Advance notification of discontinuation of contracts. Associates of government establishments responsible for distributing military orders must inform enterprises, laboratories and bases about the discontinuation of contract relations with them at least a year in advance, which will permit the organizations to shift to new production on an orderly basis;

Mandatory professional retraining. Advance retraining must become an inalienable element of conversion;

Local planning of economic changes. Inasmuch as military production most often is concentrated in small cities and villages, conversion in the region is fraught with socioeconomic destabilization, which must be considered in drawing up its plans;

Decentralization of alternative production planning in view of the absence of standard conversion formulas;

Financial support of workers in the conversion period;

Consideration of the migration of labor resources and offering financial assistance to workers forced to change their place of residence; establishment of a national job placement system;

Government planning of capital investments.

Militarization of the economy was accompanied by a reduction of capital investments in the social infrastructure for 40 years. The new approach to the economy presumes considerable investments specifically in this sphere, which will require precise planning on the part of central and local governments. An improvement in the infrastructure would open up an enormous market for labor and commodities which would serve as a reference point for firms which have joined in conversion.

In order for disarmament not to engender deep economic and social crises connected with mass unemployment, it must be carried out on the basis of a planned reprofiling of military enterprises. Conversion in turn depends on a consciously directed disarmament, inasmuch as only in this case can it be determined with greater probability what resources are being freed up in the military sector for their subsequent use in the civilian economy.

Roundtable on Conversion Problems in Perm Oblast

90UM0598B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
19 May 90 p 2

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN roundtable discussion recorded in Perm by SELSKAYA ZHIZN Correspondent V. Tatarenkov: "Conversion"]

[Text] *The Urals are called the country's enormous industrial armory and Perm Oblast is one of its sectors. As is happening everywhere, many defense plants here now are being shifted to the production of consumer goods. Today it already accounts for over half of the overall production volume.*

Included in the product list of articles is equipment for the food and processing industry. It is the defense industry that is to reoutfit a very important sector of the national economy. Frankly speaking, however, it is performing this task for now without special enthusiasm: conversion is going extremely slowly and there are many difficulties in its path.

How can they be overcome? Officials of Perm enterprises, scientific establishments, and economic and party entities talked about this in a roundtable discussion.

The Ice Has Been Broken

[A. P. Bychkov, chief of the CPSU Obkom Defense Industry Department] Conversion... This unquestionably is an enormous blessing from any standpoint, but it also means great problems. We are seeking a way to solve them. A special working group has been set up under the party obkom and it coordinates efforts in this direction.

A block diagram of the conversion process has been drawn up. We are trying to improve its efficiency, such as by expanding cooperative ties and developing new science-intensive products for civilian purposes. Our enterprises now are producing around a hundred kinds of articles for the agro-industrial complex based on orders from ministries and from the oblast soviet ispolkom.

[V. A. Novikov, chief of a department of the Oblispolkom Planning-Economic Administration] I would not say that the number is indicative, although production volume based just on oblispolkom orders now is growing to almost three million rubles, which is twice that of last year.

[Bychkov] I am far from thinking that defense enterprises have been successful here. Figuratively speaking, they have just stepped onto this field and are only planning how to plow it. Potential opportunities are great, but clearly are not being used. Why?

Let's say the stereotype that products for the agro-industrial complex allegedly are so-so, trifles, hampered us until recently. But the person who already has come to grips with it has realized that it largely can correspond to the level of defense enterprises in technology and complexity.

[R. M. Mukharyamov, director of Perm Milk Combine] We recently purchased an OKL-25 refrigeration-pasteurization unit made by the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant. This unit is no worse in characteristics than import analogues.

[B. I. Budnik, chief engineer of the Motorostroitel Plant] Defense enterprises can fabricate competitive products. One only has to undertake it, as they say. For example, together with related plants we put out lines under West German license for producing the highest grades of caramel. On seeing how it was done, those same Germans now are asking us to sell these lines to them.

[I. L. Oleynik, deputy chairman of the Oblast Agro-Industrial Committee] Of course, that which was produced by the former Ministry of Machine Building for the Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances has no comparison in quality with machines manufactured, for example, by the Plant imeni Dzerzhinskiy. But the trouble is that this plant and other defense enterprises are unwilling to replicate equipment for various sectors of the agro-industrial complex. For example, had our plants accelerated the output of a batchmeter, sifter, moulding machine and roasting cabinets, even now it would have been possible to organize small-capacity confectioner's shops in many rayons and on many farms, but for now only the first units of such equipment have been received.

True, just three years ago we could not even dream of this. Nevertheless, the ice has been broken, but in my opinion we are still far from the real thing.

Here are typical data. According to a resolution of the oblast soviet ispolkom and a decree of the party obkom bureau, it was planned to manufacture 174 pieces of equipment for the oblast meat, dairy and food industry as well as 1,305 units of various spare parts. For now only 24 pieces of equipment and a very insignificant number of spare parts have been made. The oblast is doing little with the enormous industrial potential and with the adjusted production of equipment unique both in complexity and in accuracy class in order to move the retooling of the agro-industrial industry forward in a planned manner.

And if we take the country as a whole? According to my understanding, it would have been possible long ago to make large quantities of various equipment so that there would be enough of it for the processors and food industry workers.

[Bychkov] I am troubled by the fact that many are beginning to build some kind of illusions that, having unfolded conversion, we immediately will resolve numerous burning questions—we will saturate the consumer market with goods and move development of civilian sectors of production forward. As I already said, conversion today is above all a large tangle of problems—economic, social and psychological—that have arisen in all their magnitude for the defense enterprises. It must be remembered that not one of them is being subjected to complete conversion, but the enormous reduction of military orders places them in a difficult, oftentimes dead-end, situation.

[V. I. Krasnov, deputy director of the Mashinostroitel Plant] In comparison with last year, our output volume of the basic product now is decreasing by 18.5 percent, and profit is being cut in half.

[Budnik] You can't immediately make up for such a reduction. We doubled the output of consumer goods over the last four years, and subsequently we have been maintaining a high pace—within limits of 30-40 percent annually. Manufacture of civilian products also is increasing.

[Krasnov] Under conditions of self-financing, to which the plant shifted last year, the drop in profit above all affected the economic incentive fund and social development fund. They were reduced by approximately the very same proportion. To ensure planned construction of housing and cultural and everyday service facilities we are forced to take R3.6 million from the production development fund. And we stripped it bare! In other words, we are cutting off the limb on which we are sitting: we are sharply narrowing opportunities for retooling and renovation of production. A closed circle results.

Unquestionably a portion of those funds freed up as a result of reduced expenses for defense should be left in the defense industry for reprofiling production.

In All Its Magnitude

[Bychkov] An understanding that conversion is a costly matter clearly is not seen, although it would appear that it should be understandable that despite a sharp decrease in output of military products, the equipment, outfitting and attendant personnel remain the very same. But where, how, and on what areas new production is to be organized are questions demanding not only solutions, but also capital expenditures.

[B. N. Vetrov, deputy chief engineer of the Scientific Production Association imeni Kirov] For the second year now we have been putting out a rotary table for packaging fruit. And what do you think? They spread out through the tool, repair, and other shops which work on nonstandard products. Many questions would not have arisen if there had been a special flow line for this, and things would have been simpler with requalification of cadres.

[Bychkov] Here is yet another problem. There are superb cadres in the defense industry. People know their jobs thoroughly, but often have a very vague idea of just what consumer goods are or what equipment for the agro-industrial industry is.

[Vetrov] Yes, we all are retraining, from worker to director. At our enterprise the proportion of civilian products and consumer goods in the overall production volume now should grow to 50 percent. Even now we are providing some 30 items to the counter. But just what are consumer goods, for example? They are demand and market conditions. But we are not accustomed to this; we have become accustomed to a guarantee that the client will take the product without fail. Now, however, we must see to it that the purchaser takes our goods on a guaranteed basis, but often there is no confidence in this, for we are only just gaining experience in accounting for consumer market conditions.

There is also no confidence in stability of the sale of civilian products. The demand is poorly studied and the genuine requirement and market capacity have not been identified. As a result it is difficult to imagine whether or not it makes any sense at all to create those same specialized flow lines of which we spoke earlier. And so it is necessary to manufacture products on all-purpose precision equipment, which in turn is reflected in its production cost and sales prices.

[Mukharyamov] Frankly speaking, the defense industry workers' prices are too high. Here is a typical feature. We once agreed with one of the plants on manufacturing a hundred pinions of a type in short supply. The state price for such a spare part is 7 rubles and a few kopecks. That is why I could not believe my eyes when the estimate was sent from the plant. How much do you think they asked of us for each pinion? R341 each!

[Budnik] That is nothing surprising. Such are the conditions: either you yourself remain the loser or fleece the consumer. For example, our plant was assigned to

master production of a flour sifter in great demand in the baking industry, but an inexpensive one, only R500 each. We mastered it and over the past year we suffered a loss of R300,000 on this.

[Novikov] And the cooperative deliveries also do their bit. Here is how things stand in the defense sector: a ministry as a whole puts out a particular line, and not some individual plant. The production of set-completing parts is scattered throughout the country. It is clear that this increases overhead and affects prices.

[Oleynik] Wasn't it better to single out a certain number of plants from the defense sector and reorient them for producing equipment and technology for the agro-industrial complex?

[Bychkov] But the fact is that even with the existing incomplete nature of conversion, the enterprises' established vertical and horizontal connections in material and technical supply and in engineer developments are being severed. And what awaits them if they are singled out? The problems, as we see, are intertwined in a tight knot.

[Krasnov] Here is another problem. The products are becoming more costly inasmuch as amortization and expenses for upkeep of management services and staff are remaining at the previous level. Therefore we now are forced to examine the question of reducing the collective, otherwise we will not be able even to pay the people. The shortage of the wage fund for the existing table of organization is approaching one and a half million rubles. Capabilities have decreased for giving bonuses, providing financial assistance and fulfilling social programs.

[Vetrov] Questions of social protection of labor collectives in the process of conversion were not taken into account.

[Oleynik] I can confirm that. In meeting with electors I often visit the Plant imeni Lenin, for example. I hear what they are saying there. Workers and specialists have to engage in unskilled labor. Earnings have dropped. People are dissatisfied and are being dismissed.

[Krasnov] That is the same with us as well. In two years around 1,000 persons overall have been dismissed. They leave for the sphere of services, for cooperatives...

[Budnik] We of course are incapable of taking pay up to a thousand rubles a month as in some cooperatives. We cannot hold onto cadres, and the necessary highly skilled ones above all, without assistance. We need at least a small compensation for the losses suffered in the course of conversion, but for now we are being refused and the consequences are difficult even to presume. It will be inexcusable if we lose a collective that is close-knit, that works well and that has mastered the most sophisticated technologies. This is what is important.

[V. N. Zadorozhnyy, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Ural Department Institute of Economics, doctor of economic sciences] Of course there must be some kind of stages in this matter. If we abruptly removed the customary products on unprepared soil, then we also should have thought in advance about what will be substituted for them, how, and at the expense of what, at least for a temporary variant while more substantiated and thoughtful decisions are being worked out and made. And then place really modern civilian products into production, but this time with a good study. You will not do this at the moment.

Financial support also is necessary, that is clear, but in what form?

Late last year we were working at one of the Minatomen-ergoprom [Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry] enterprises. There, too, profits dropped and all funds including the wage fund fell proportionately. But enterprise heads made several trips to the ministry and in the final account got the money after a lot of trouble. The planned level of wages was ensured and they even paid a 13th with a reduced output of the main product and quite an insignificant substitution of civilian products for it.

How are we to treat this? Probably it was done correctly, but in this case I am troubled by the possibility of the collective's demobilization, because if a director can make a trip to the ministry and bring back half a million of wage fund, then why stubbornly hold out? Well, make another trip, and another, and he will bring it back. If he doesn't, well then why do we need such a director? It seems to me that this is what has to be feared.

With Naked Sword

[Bychkov] Conversion problems reflect the country's problems, but the approach to it is insufficiently thought out. Again there is the desire to take it at a sloop, without a precise determination of strategy.

[Zadorozhnyy] The probability of some kind of muddle or chance happening, especially at first, is considerable and real. The fact is that the defense sector received all these assignments unexpectedly while fulfilling five-year plans imposed long ago. Of course, out of fright everyone rushed to look for something they could get their hands on.

[Budnik] And they fell into another extreme. The Congress of People's Deputies also spoke about this. They force the giants of industry producing the most sophisticated products to deal with some kind of coffeegrinders like a provincial workshop. What a paradox! In the final account, if one put good thought into it one could have suggested somehow using much of what is produced by the defense industry for peaceful purposes in civilian enterprises. But as always, no one thinks about this, we live from day to day.

[Vetrov] In fact the list of articles, including for the agro-industrial complex, largely was determined spontaneously. Take those same fruit packaging lines. They said that it seems no one is making them yet, so go ahead and do it!

[Ye. S. Sapiro, chief of USSR Academy of Sciences Ural Department Institute of Economics Perm Department, doctor of economic sciences] Pressure results, and we don't know by what principle. By the way, it is not difficult to give it a name: it is the principle of the campaign, the fashion. There was an assignment, it was scattered through the ministries and the ministries scattered it through the enterprises. Purely an administrative scheme, but consideration for the consumer's interests and his interaction with the manufacturer are absent. What also strikes the eye is the relapse of megalomania: there is not even a hint of satisfying the needs of lessees and farmers. This is another disadvantage of product-list policy in the course of conversion.

[Zadorozhnyy] Production of equipment for the agro-industrial industry is being organized in that Minatomenergoprom enterprise which we were dealing with. As I understood it, they are guided there not only by the assignment sent down by the department under a state order, but they themselves are studying the market's capacity for the product they are manufacturing. They determined, for example, that with sights set on appropriations allocated to the non-Chernozem area it is possible to count on the sale of 200-250 feed grinders a year. Considering the prospects for development of leased and private farms, they concluded that the production of a feed grinder of smaller size was advisable.

[Mukharyamov] We also are showing initiative for our part, for example. We concluded cooperation contracts with defense enterprises and organizations and we are figuring on mechanizing and automating a number of technological processes.

[Sapiro] Such approaches are more the exception than the rule. For now there is no specific overall policy either in questions of identifying agro-industrial market conditions or in questions of stimulating economic incentive of defense enterprises for retooling the agro-industrial complex.

[Novikov] One can say more. Conversion, especially locally, including in Perm Oblast, is characterized by an uncontrollable nature. The GlavPEU [Planning and Economic Main Administration] and the oblispolkom of course give assignments, but all this is difficult and encounters resistance. Defense industry workers often fear to reveal their capabilities just so they aren't forced to do something extra.

[Oleynik] We are still being forced to enter into some kind of mutually profitable economic ties with industrial partners, but the agro-industrial complex even so sacredly performs its duty, supplying the city each day with various food products. And industry must give the

agro-industrial complex everything without any deals so that we can increase the output of these products.

[Sapiro] It seems to me that many conversion troubles and the lack of understanding of its problems stem from the psychology of relations between the defense sector and agro-industrial complex. For now this is a psychology of our customary sponsorial, almost uncompensated assistance, like pulling carrots or cutting cabbage.

But there should be some kind of middle-man structure between them that reacts sensitively to needs of the agrosector. What do I mean by this? The agro-industrial complex has its own S&T structures and the sectors being converted have their own. On their basis it would be possible to set up a planning-technological symbiosis, let's say a competitive institute which would operate on direct orders and would be both a middle-man and an expert on agro-industrial market conditions, i.e., quite a different principle of relationships than now.

[A. S. Malafeyev, director of Perm Scientific Research and Technological Institute, candidate of technical sciences] Our ministry raised the question of taking one of the agro-industrial institutes under its wing, which really would make it possible to improve work. But for now the consumer's needs are not being determined by anyone—there is no echelon coordinating our actions. It has to be set up as quickly as possible so that the agro-industrial complex comes closer to us and we master what it needs. How is it done now? They gave us an assignment to design some one assembly, but the entire technological line that was conceived is not being looked at because its other assemblies are scattered through other institutes and design bureaus. The quality of developments suffers from this and we may not obtain the expected result.

[Zadorozhnyy] I would add that conditions for mutual interest have not been created, for today you will not find representatives of the agro-industrial complex thronging at the defense enterprises. As a rule, complex equipment is designed, equipment to which the agro-industrial complex is not yet accustomed. But perhaps this is a chance to take a serious leap forward.

[Malafeyev] Here is an example. Today at canneries cans essentially are filled manually. We designed and are creating an automatic machine which will "shoot out" 180 cans a minute. The step from the ladle to such a rotor is unquestionably a leap for which it is necessary to prepare.

[Zadorozhnyy] But there also has to be an incentive for such a leap. On the other hand, you will not say that particular desire to work for the agro-industrial complex has appeared in the sectors being converted. They are simply being forced by the fact that this is being entered in the state order.

Of course some kind of mechanism of mutual interest is necessary. Its absence can lead to a situation where we produce a great deal for the warehouses but only a little of this will be used.

[Novikov] In my opinion only a state conversion program is capable of ensuring a mutual tie-in of all sides' interests. Its strategy must be worked out at the level of the government and not of ministries. Ministries and enterprises deal with questions of tactics.

There is much talk in the defense industry workers' environment about the need for adopting a Law on Conversion. True, the attitude toward this is ambiguous, but one thing is clear: it is impossible to resolve such a complex process without state legal regulation.

[Bychkov] Unquestionably there has to be a set of measures, including establishment of a most-favored regime for manufacturing products intended for the agro-industrial complex: on taxation, the wage fund, resources, prices...

Many burning questions were raised in the letter from the heads of our sphere to USSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman I. S. Belousov. Measures now are being taken.

One can believe that the conversion flow will successfully be transferred from a spontaneous state into a reliable channel through common efforts. And this will bear good fruit.

Costs of Conversion at Voronezh Missile Engine Plant

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second edition p 2

[Article from Voronezh by PRAVDA Correspondent V. Stepnov: "Not Just Fire Can Fly from a Missile Nozzle..."]

[Text] *The delay in conversion is irritating many. Why, people ask, are these defense industry workers dawdling? Why do they not wish to use their colossal scientific-technical potential for the good of the people? Far from everyone understands that conversion itself demands no small amount of personnel and funds, and that with a conjunctural attitude toward it, it will turn into another campaign.*

The most prestigious enterprise in Voronezh probably is the Khimavtomatika Design Bureau. Despite a dense cover of secrecy, city-dwellers guessed that it had nothing to do with chemical production automation, but they did not speak about the true profile of the production out loud. Now it is different.

"The collective works for space," says A. Konopátov, chief designer and USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member. "We design missile engines and usually fabricate them together with the Voronezh Machinery Plant. All missiles which inserted cosmonauts into near-Earth orbits were equipped with our engines. We took a direct part in creating the Energiya booster missile hydrogen engine for the Buran craft."

Conversion also extends to Khimavtomatika, i.e., like everyone, it has to reduce basic production and shift to the output of ground products. What kind?

The enterprise has a powder metallurgy production. Very sophisticated imported equipment has been installed here with a cost in six figures. Parts of very intricate configuration and faultless quality are obtained from super-pure alloys based on titanium and nickel. The Voronezh personnel's product shown last year at the Leipzig International Exhibit-Fair was awarded a gold medal.

And so it is impossible to reprofile this production even if there was every urge to do so. Only that which is being done now can be done here. Manufacturing irons or meat grinders will require dismantling the existing equipment and installing new equipment. The loss to the state in this case will not be compensated by any consumer goods even if they are valued at the level of jewelry. The advisability of retaining the production of powder metallurgy and opening up the doors to orders from the side is obvious. In the final account, cooperation of "PO Box" installations with open enterprises also is conversion.

Alas, there is ill luck here as well. It turns out that defense industry workers have gone so far in S&T development that their technologies can be used widely in enterprises that are related in level, and under our conditions this means also related in specific nature. For other enterprises it is only in exceptional cases. Inasmuch as there are few orders and basic production has been reduced, capacities in the ultramodern building are underloaded. Thus conversion already has resulted in losses.

One might ask what is hampering the sale of basic products under present conditions of an acute currency shortage? In the final account missile engines also are commodities. Conversion cannot be regarded as a mandatory break-up of organized production and turned into a goal in itself. Countries which are developing outer space most likely show an interest in our engines.

"And why not?" A. Konopátov answered the question with a question. "The export of missile engines is a guaranteed and prestigious method of earning currency, with a handsome profit for oneself and for the state and without detriment to the country's defense might. But this is a question that is not within my competence. It can be resolved at a government level."

The chief designer's words were recalled in the building where Design Bureau officials had accommodated a tricot factory. The missile engine testers demonstrated what women's blouses they had mastered. I turned the simple little things over in my hands and imagined how much highly fashionable clothing and footwear, the most modern household equipment, and other goods in short supply could be purchased with money made from the sale of just one engine.

Operation of Freight Transfer Facility in Tallinn

90UM0507A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Yu. Samsonov: "How They Inspect the Steamships"]

[Text] The Tallinn Separate Control Post (OKPP) controls the flow of freight through the Tallinn and Novotalinn ports, fishing vessels both in coastal waters and in the Atlantic, and the flow of passengers through the maritime terminal and the airport.

While around 1 million people passed through the OKPP last year, more than 1.5 million are expected this year. Things are especially difficult for the border troops in the spring and summer, when thousands of motorboats and yachts literally "besiege" the Estonian capital. The number has increased 10-fold in the past two years.

"Our main job," Lt Col Yuriy Sergeyevich Sokolov, OIC of the OKPP, "is to prevent the illegal passage of people, weapons and ammunition. This year, incidentally, we have already confiscated six gas-operated spray guns. In addition, while we were formerly a maritime KPP [control post], we are now also an air and even a motor-vehicle control post. A ferry now runs between Helsinki and Tallinn, you know."

...The spacious maritime passenger terminal, split down the middle by passport check booths, was still empty. On "that" side members of an OKPP team headed by Maj G. Kazantsev, its chief, were preparing to begin working. The Tallink ferry had arrived in the city with 700 passengers and 62 motor vehicles.

Now the luggage of the Tallink had been brought onto the wharf, and the vehicles were coming ashore, one after another. Capt V. Mikhaylov, OIC of the border guard detail, issued an order to Jr Sgt Ye. Kepa, and the latter went over to Chingiz, a German shepherd tied nearby. They soon began going over the long line of bags and suitcases.

"I acquired Chingiz as a month-old pup at a club," the border guard told me later. "Even before my induction I dreamed of working with a dog on the border."

Now the operation was completed. Jr Sgt Kepa reported to Capt Mikhaylov that the baggage inspection had revealed no signs of weapons or explosives.

In the meantime the passengers had been going through the passport check, and their luggage was now being inspected by customs officials. The detail began inspecting the vehicles. The team's OIC and I observed their work.

"We can inspect the number of vehicles which arrived today in two hours. The passport check takes slightly less. This is too slow, of course. We need more modern equipment and more people to speed up all of the procedures. Another ferry will soon begin running. It will have a larger capacity than the Tallink. A new building is presently being built for us. In it we will be able to process passengers through in three lines. But who knows when that will be?"

Life is indeed changing rapidly today. And it demands equally rapid response to all the changes. This is where the border troops clearly lag behind. Judge for yourself. I was told by Maj G. Kazantsev that the T/O for the OKPP still includes sharpshooters, machine-gunners and grenade throwers. What is needed, however, are people with a knowledge of foreign languages and with a good legal background. The lack of television equipment makes it necessary to post soldiers at various corners of the wharf. This is not only a squandering of personnel; it also does not always create a good impression on the passengers. Gennadiy Timofeyevich also thinks that it is time to design a new uniform for the border troops, which differs from the general military uniform.

...Vehicles, vehicles. Each of them has to be opened, documents have to be checked, and every cranny where illegal items could be hidden has to be inspected. Extra items have to be removed from the vehicle for this. Not everyone wants to bother, though. One resident of Estonia, for example, was returning from Finland. The border guards told me that her vehicle had been just as crammed with all sorts of thing when she left as it was now. Instead of obeying the rules requiring that she submit the vehicle for inspection, however, she began asking the border guards to break those very rules. Nor did she refrain from poking fun. The detail was inexorable, however. This was their job.

Observing the scene, I recalled being told how just recently some participants in an Estonian congress who lived in Canada had created a scene. They had insulted the border guards and refused to show their papers. They made videotapes, apparently thinking this would unnerve the border guards. The act of provocation was unsuccessful, however. The OKPP workers stood firm. They had to summon the police to subdue the raging "guests," however. Unfortunately, the border guards could do nothing. They lack the authority. It is not surprising that even though the hooligans apologized to them, they did so only as to individuals and not as to representatives of the authorities.

The inspection was completed. The last vehicle had driven through the gate of the "controlled territory." I suddenly heard a plaintive whine. Chingiz, who had sniffed his way over 62 vehicles, was sitting there, downcast, shivering from the cold. Even for him it was difficult to spend several hours on the wharf, pierced by the sea wind.

Conference on Minradioprom Conversion

90UM0711B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jun 90 p 4

[Article by A. Longinov: "A Catalyst to Conversion"]

[Text] A conference was held in Moscow on 26 June on the conversion of enterprises and organizations within the Minradioprom [USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry]. The conference was held at the Scientific Research Institute for Radioelectronics Economics and Information.

More than 200 managers, economists and planners took part in mapping out the primary strategy for setting up future contracts and agreements, relying on detailed information about what resources each branch of industry possesses, and what each is expected to provide. Most important at the conference was, of course, the decision to produce electronics equipment for the consumer industry.

All information support requirements for conversion are handled by the "Profile" system, a product itself of the electronics industry. "Profile" is able to provide speedy, comprehensive answers to many questions, including those concerning product inventory, where and by whom the product is developed, manufactured and marketed, as well as providing information on the manufacturing technology and manufacturing costs. The conference participants took note that such information is becoming a powerful catalyst for conversion.

Defense Industry Output of Consumer Refrigerators

90UM0704A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 90 p 5

[Article by Major I. Ivanyuk, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent: "Conversion Without Much Effort: The Peoples' Controllers and the Peoples' Deputies Have Inspected the Work of the Defense Industrial Ministries"]

[Text] For a long time I have been dreaming about acquiring a refrigerator, but I have not had any luck. Where have they hidden all of these remarkable household appliances, which successfully exploit the second principle of thermodynamics and, in recent times, the long-suffering patience of our customers? What prevents them from producing more of them and making them of a good quality?

The answer to these and other questions was to have been provided by the Joint Session of the USSR Peoples' Control Committee and the Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Consumer Goods, Trade, Municipal and Other Services for the Population. At this session they analyzed the work of the defense complex in producing refrigerators for the home.

"Refrigerators Instead of Weapons"—in this case this formula was not very accurate. All of the key departments that were checked, including the USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry, the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry, the USSR Ministry of the Aviation Industry, the USSR Ministry of General Machine-Building and the USSR Ministry of Ship Building, were basic suppliers of this product line to the market even before all of this. And last year their enterprises manufactured 6,800,000 refrigerators, which amounted to 97.5 percent of refrigerator production in the country.

Alas, for the present this is not enough. One can, of course, put the blame on the growth of money in the hands of the population and on the premium demand, but the fact remains: 92 refrigerators are needed for every 100 families in our country. This is one and a half to two times less than in the countries of Western Europe; and only 49 out of 50 families can even guess about the conveniences created by a deep-freezer in their day to day lives.

In these conditions last year's state order has not been fulfilled; and what is more, a bit less than three fourths of the assignment for two-chamber refrigerators has been met. The commercial trade network did not receive 99,000 deep-freezers. And this lag is carrying over into the current year.

And that which is being produced is not of the quality that we would like. For the most part Soviet refrigerators do not compare favorably with the best foreign models. Twenty to thirty percent require more energy; one third are heavier; and they make a fair amount of noise. According to data of the Vesta Scientific-Production Association, because of the fact that, at first glance, the lag is not of primary importance, every year the nation is losing more than ten billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, 31,000 metric tons of rolled metal, and 10,000 metric tons of aluminum sheet.

And all of this could be avoided if only quality went into the product each and every time. After all, defective products are a common feature. For example, last year some 839,000 refrigerators and deep-freezers were returned to manufacturers or repaired within the warranty period. Expenses for eliminating defects exceeded 17,000,000 rubles.

Quite a few negative facts were brought to light during the investigation, both at individual enterprises and in the branch "headquarters," which now are actively involved in conversion affairs. For example, at the "Refrigerator" Plant, which is a part of one of the USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry's scientific-production associations, last year's plan was underfulfilled by almost 40 percent. What is more, one in seven refrigerators reached the commercial trade network in a non-working condition or immediately broke down.

Another two enterprises of the USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry are not managing to fulfill the state order

for the production of refrigerators. An alarming tendency to adjust plans downward has also been noted within the branch. As we can see, the defense industry workers are not especially attracted to the possibility and necessity of increasing consumer goods production. This year the ministry's top managers have asked repeatedly that the government decrease the state order by 50,000 refrigerators. And without having received a "go ahead," they have proceeded to give the plants a reduced assignment.

The USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry, which produces 40 percent of the country's refrigerators, has chosen a similar tactic. Out of 24 models that it produces only one meets world standards. The percentage of complaints and warranty repairs in the branch is almost a third higher than on the whole for the defense complex.

Last year there was a drop as compared with the preceding year in the output of refrigerator equipment within the USSR Ministry of the Aviation Industry. What is more, for the most part outdated models are coming off the conveyor belt; and the first four-year assignment of the current five-year plan is 10 percent short of its mark for the production of two-chamber refrigerators.

One could spend a long time listing shortcomings. But, as the participants in the session underscored, in the present situation it is important to find ways to solve problems. The previous estimate, as it is explained, can no longer be justified. The earlier estimate was made in an effort to increase the output of refrigerators at the start of 1988 by transferring the enterprises of the former USSR Ministry of Light and Food Machine-Building Industry to the defense complex. Alas, we still have not managed to bring this branch of industry up to the level of the "defense industry workers."

In his speech the chief of the Scientific-production Association, A. Turchak, spoke about the millions of rubles and all of the efforts of designers and workers that have been invested in the "Refrigerator" Plant. But at the enterprise the commission found all of the same old amateurish production practices, the violation of technological and labor discipline, and a lack of sanitation.

The branch scientific-technical program, of which First Deputy Minister of the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry S. Chernov spoke, still is not providing the needed output. After all, in his very words, the percentage of civilian production at branch enterprises will increase in the next five-year plan from 55 to 70 percent. It would be nice if this output met the high standards of the military acceptance process.

Quite a bit is required to solve problems having to do with filling the market with modern refrigerators. First of all, several plants must be expanded and rebuilt and new production capacities must be brought on line within the very near future. Secondly, the rapid output of key parts, including compressors and condensers, must be ensured. Assemblies and units remain a stumbling block. These parts are supplied by civilian organizations, primarily the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry and the USSR Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry. Perhaps, as of today this is the weakest link in the conversion chain.

In summarizing the results of the discussion, the Chairman of the USSR Committee of Peoples' Controllers, G. Kolbin, primarily generalized those speeches of the peoples' deputies, the members of the Committee of Peoples' Controllers, and specialists, which touched upon the switching over to new conditions of economic management. The list of questions that arose on this score is quite extensive. Do we need to sell one in six refrigerators overseas and then use the earned hard currency to purchase materials for their production as we are now doing? How can we make the acquisition of imported equipment efficient? At present, purchases of equipment abroad are neither speeding up the creation of new production capacities nor raising the technical quality of the manufactured articles. Such new forms of conducting business as creating joint enterprises, associations and holding companies are not being put to use. The issue of how to balance the consumer market and to provide anti-monopolistic measures will soon be no idle question.

These and other problems were reflected in the decree that was passed by the session. A commission was also created to work on proposals that have been received and to prepare notes for the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Legal Justification for Alternative Civil Service Examined

90UM0569A Moscow CHELOVEK I ZAKON in Russian No 3, Mar 90 pp 27-32

[Article by Major of Justice A. Pchelintsev: "Freedom of Conscience and...Military Duty"]

[Text] A young man refused to serve in the Army. Not because he was too spoiled and feared the hardships of military service. No. His religious convictions did not allow him to take up arms and become a soldier.

One does not have to be a lawyer to guess the subsequent fate of this young man. After all, probably everyone knows that refusal or avoidance of Army service is a crime and is punished by imprisonment. But let us consider: is harsh punishment worthwhile in such cases? Is it fair? Is it justified?

I expect that many readers will answer these questions in the affirmative, pointing to the USSR Constitution, which states that military service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces is the honorary obligation of Soviet citizens, and to the Law on Compulsory Military Service, article 3 of which states that all males citizens of the USSR, regardless of race and national affiliation, religious denomination, education, residence, social or financial status are obliged to perform active military service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces.

However this same Constitution proclaims that freedom of conscience is the inalienable right of every Soviet citizen.

Without a doubt the exercise of rights and freedoms is inseparable from a citizen's performance of his duties. The enjoyment of rights and freedoms also should not harm the interests of society and the state.

Today national legislation views the refusal or avoidance of military service out of religious convictions as a most flagrant violation of civic and military duty. But perhaps we should look again at the legal status of the USSR citizen, and critically rethink the social and legal stereotypes prevailing in our country, including those pertaining to freedom of conscience.

Consider this: most often believers who refuse to take up arms for religious or moral and ethical rules are prepared to conscientiously perform any other work, however humble or difficult. So probably it would be more logical not to criminally prosecute them for refusal to serve in the Army, but in such cases to grant them the opportunity to perform non-military service. Especially since in 1988 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights acknowledged that the opportunity to perform alternative civilian service by pleading freedom of conscience was a legitimate human right.

And while we talk loud and long about the infringement of human rights in the capitalist world, in almost all countries of the West persons who refuse to be drafted to

military service for religious motives are given the opportunity to perform alternative service in the civilian sector (health care, charitable societies, etc.).

This question has also been resolved in a positive manner in some socialist states. For example, in Hungary believers—Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Nazarenes—were exempted from the obligation to perform military service with weapons, and received the right to forego military training and serve out their required term in the construction troops.

In June 1989, amendments were made to the Law on National Defense at a session of the Hungarian parliament. In accordance with these amendments, the Hungarian Republic now permits service not only in the construction troops, but also in other state and social civilian organizations, for reasons of conscience. And here is another example. In July 1989 the Sejm in Poland adopted into law a new form of performance of military service, which was dubbed "substitute service." It is used only in peacetime with two justifications: religious conviction or pacifist principles of the draftees. The term of substitute service is set at 36 months, and for persons with higher education, 24 months. This term must be served at enterprises to protect the environment, in social welfare, public services, or water utilities.

Alternatives to mandatory military service have not been unknown in the laws of our country either.

In 1885, the Regulation on Compulsory Service stated that practicing Mennonites did not have to bear arms. According to the regulation, they could work off their service either in the shops of the naval department, or in fire or forest brigades (in the latter case as foresters, wardens, and caretakers).

Later, on 23 January 1918, the young Republic of the Soviets adopted the decree "On the separation of Church from State and School from Church." Paragraph 6 of the decree stated: "No one can avoid performance of his civic duties by pleading his own religious views. Exceptions to this provision are granted on the condition of **replacement of one civic obligation by another** (writer's emphasis) in each individual case by decision of the people's court."

Developing this provision, the decree of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] dated 22 April 1918 "On mandatory training in military art" provided that persons whose religious convictions did not allow them to use weapons could be called on to learn only those duties not related to the use of arms.

On 4 January 1919, V. I. Lenin signed the Decree on Relief From Compulsory Military Service. According to the decree, those unable to participate in military service out of religious convictions were granted the right, at the decision of the people's court, to replace this for a specific term with medical service, primarily in hospitals for infectious diseases, or with other corresponding generally beneficial work chosen by the draftee himself.

As we see, such humane decisions were made at a most trying time for the Republic, in the heat of the civil war, when the fate of Russia was being decided and the Army was urgently in need of reinforcements. But you see, at that time the level of religious consciousness among the nation's populace was very high, and consequently there were also many such believers whose religious convictions did not allow them to take up arms.

Unfortunately, in the second half of the 20s, the decrees of the VTsIK dated 22 April 1918 and of the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] dated 4 January 1919, as well as orders of the RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] and the People's Commissariat of Justice issued on their basis were repealed.

And although the Laws on Compulsory Military Service of 1925 and 1930 formally permitted alternative service, in fact it was completely eliminated. To a great extent this was encouraged by the Provision on Military Crimes of 1927, which prescribed criminal prosecution "for avoidance of military service under the pretext of religious convictions." The term "under the pretext" meant an actual absence of religious views in the person attempting to avoid military service for religious motives. However one need not be a genius to understand the meaning of this formulation in the legislation of the times. And alternative service was repealed once and for all in 1939 in the USSR Law "On Compulsory Military Service."

However I should note that the Decree on the Separation of Church from State and School from Church has never been repealed, and it is in effect to this day. Thus perhaps today, when there is intensive work in progress to improve the Soviet legislation (a draft law has been prepared "On freedom of conscience and religious convictions," and draft laws are being devised "On the Defense of the USSR" and "On the Universal Military Obligation and Military Service"), we should recall the forgotten provision of the Decree on the Separation of Church from State and School from Church, on the opportunity to replace the obligation of military service with alternative civilian service for religious reasons. Especially since in the modern world, as we have learned, this question has long ceased to be discussed, and has reached the level of practical action.

A natural question might occur to the readers: With the introduction of alternative civilian service, will not avoidance of military service by unconscientious youth, under the pretext of alleged religious convictions, as well as other abuses, become possible?

In order that this not happen, a reliable legal mechanism is required for the replacement of military service with civilian service. Here probably we should allow for the experience of past years. In the early 20s the procedure for replacement of military service with alternative service was quite well organized and comprehensively regulated. For example, it was established that the question of replacement of military service with civilian would be

decided in court. By decree of the SNK, RSFSR dated 14 December 1920, when considering cases of this type the court should be guided by: a) corroborative testimony and other data pertaining to the way of life of the draftee, confirming the level of sincerity and consistency in his practice of religious teachings; b) the conclusion of experts, both on the question of whether the specific religious teaching truly ruled out participation in any sort of military service for a consistent adherent, and on the question of whether this individual truly belonged to that particular sect or religious teaching.

This same decree stipulated that experienced and trustworthy representatives of the corresponding religious faiths would be invited to the people's court to offer their expert testimony, primarily from among those living in the specific region who were very familiar with the way of life of the followers of the given teaching.

In my view, with allowance for the modern level of development of our society, the question of the replacement of military service by alternative civilian service may be turned over to draft boards for consideration. These should include followers of the religious cult, provided naturally that the corresponding written requests of the draftees are submitted ahead of time.

Since freedom of conscience is a moral and ethical category which does not lend itself readily to objective control, in addition to the draftee's statement, one must consider his entire way of life and the extent to which he strictly observes the religious precepts and canons which he cites. In order to do this, I believe it necessary to ascertain whether the young man belongs to a religious organization, and also to obtain a written petition from that organization asking that the draftee be allowed to replace military service with alternative civilian service.

Another no less important problem is that the alternative civilian service be comparable to military service in terms of difficulty. Since the hardships and difficulties of military service generally are incomparable with civilian service, then probably it is necessary for civilian service to be more lengthy. For example, in certain European countries alternative service is fifty percent longer than military service. And I believe that in the Soviet Armed Forces its duration should be 36 months. This service could be performed in military Sovkhoz and animal husbandry facilities, of which we have more than 160, or in hospitals, fixed health-care centers, fire units, etc.

It seems to me that alternative civilian service should be carried out just as compulsory military service, without pay, except for the minimum necessary living expenses.

It would also be justified, after conclusion of the term of alternative civilian service, that persons performing be enrolled in the reserve for 20-25 years. They may be called up to provide assistance in the event of natural calamities, major catastrophes, and accidents (as reserve service members can be called up to training assemblies and musters). Here the time of alternative service should be counted as work time and service time for pensions.

And avoidance of alternative service should be viewed as a punishable, socially dangerous act.

When all the necessary conditions are observed, there are grounds to assume that alternative civilian service, even in a hospital or fire department with longer terms of service, is not much of an indulgence, and that not many unconscientious and spoiled young persons will want to do it in place of military service, under the pretext of religious convictions.

As a sufficiently effective mechanism of replacement of military service with alternative civilian service out of religious motives is created, it will become possible in the near future to consider the question of this replacement both for philosophical and pacifist convictions. It goes without saying that this requires creation of certain objective prerequisites both in our society as a whole, and in the Army in particular. Otherwise we might go astray, and create serious problems.

I have dwelt only on one very important group of problems related to the exercise of freedom of conscience and military duty. I want to mention certain other no less important problems that arise in this area. For instance, in my view we should consider the need for legal guarantees for the realization of religious norms under Army conditions. As has already been mentioned, by no means every creed bans the taking up of arms. However, religious service members are often put in situations which in fact do not allow them to freely exercise their constitutional right of freedom of conscience. I dare to express my personal opinion that the League of the Militant Godless that existed in the country at the end of the 20s and 30s has retained many of its adherents in the ranks of the Armed Forces to our day. Adherents mainly of atheist work methods, the essence of which boils down to prohibitions and bans. More than once the press has reported incidents in which service members were not allowed to wear crosses under their uniforms, to possess religious literature or other religious attributes under the pretext that this was not provided for by military regulations. We also know of cases when officers were not promoted because of their religiousness. All this undoubtedly offends the honor and dignity of believing citizens, infringes their constitutional rights, and is an example of the bureaucratic, callous attitude of certain zealous superiors toward their men.

There are also examples of another type. In connection with the familiar decree granting deferments to students of daytime academic institutions, in July 1989 the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an elucidation which ran as follows: "A deferment is not granted to students of religious seminaries and academies, in accordance with the USSR Law on compulsory military service. In view of the fact that the decree of 1918 separated the church from the state, these academic institutions are not the same as secular academic institutions." If we follow elementary logic, quite the opposite conclusion flows from this elucidation—the students of clerical seminaries and academies in general are not to

be called into the ranks of the Armed Forces, since here indeed the church is separated from the state. However today the question is not posed in this way. Clearly it would be fair to apply to this category of Soviet citizens the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 10 April 1989, which granted deferments to students of daytime higher academic institutions.

I believe that all these problems are links of the same chain, the insufficient legal regulation of this question. How can we not turn to historical experience here? The order of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council [RVSR] No 1 dated 3 January 1919 prescribed, for example, that classes in military units and institutions scheduled for Christmas Eve and Christmas be moved to different days. And RVSR Order No 590 of 7 March 1922 allowed another 11 religious holidays for various nationalities in units of the Red Army, in addition to the general holidays. These were celebrated either on days of generally decreed holidays or on other days off. A calendar of religious holidays was appended to the order for individual nationalities, and ratified by the College of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities.

Possibly this seems not uncontroversial, and to some may appear extreme. But today it is quite apparent that there are problems here, and that they demand the most serious and attentive study and immediate resolution. We know that the Foundations of Criminal and Executive Legislation being developed by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs provide for a special article guaranteeing freedom of conscience in places of incarceration. Obviously service members cannot be in more straitened circumstances than these. The draft of new Interior Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces is presently being developed. It would be a good idea to reflect these questions in it.

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Comments on Prospects for Professional Army

90UM05164 Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 6 Mar 90
(Signed to press 16 Mar 90) p 18

[Article by Senior Lieutenant N. Vasilyev: "What Sort of Army Do We Need?"]

[Text] Forgive the plain talk, but I will begin with the main question: do we need an army? Do not hasten to call me a pacifist; I agree with the majority on this matter: yes, we do need an army. But here is a different question: do we need the sort of army we now have? I will answer categorically no! It seems to me that sensible people within the civil sector feel this way. This can be seen partly in publications, in the press and on television. The population is worried and coming up with ideas, and so forth. We military personnel often relate to their advice with irritation, although in the final analysis we must explain a very basic thing: "he who pays, orders the music." The people are spending their hard-earned,

badly needed billions of rubles to maintain us; and at the very least it is wrong to show departmental snobbishness toward the working class and farmers, who generally want to help us.

The issue of the volunteer army shows up in the press from time to time and with enviable constancy it is "withdrawn" by a higher officer. Although in principle this issue is addressed to the USSR Supreme Soviet. The impression prevails that a volunteer army "is not advantageous" for our higher command, although, I agree that today we are not yet ready for such a step. But there is something we can do at this time to make part of the armed forces into a volunteer service. For example, there is the submarine service, which has the most difficult conditions of service.

Of course, a professional army is not possible under the organic structure now in existence. But in the final analysis it is better to have an expensive army that is combat ready than to have an expensive army that is less combat ready. This is an indisputable truth.

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Number of 1989 Draft Evaders Noted

90UM0575B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian 27 Apr 90 p 4

[Article by V. Shchedrin: "How Is the Spring Draft Going?"]

[Text] A session of the College of the Main Military Procuracy, held yesterday in Moscow, was devoted to this and other problems associated with implementation of the Law on Compulsory Military service.

The alarm of military legal organs, in connection with various types of violations of legality during the draft of youth to military service, is not without grounds. The total number of persons of draft age who evaded the draft in 1989 increased almost six-fold in comparison with 1988, and amounted to 6,647 individuals. But these are last year's figures. How is the situation now, when the Spring draft is under way? We posed this question to the first deputy of the Main Military Procuracy, Maj Gen of Justice L. Zaika.

"The overall socioeconomic situation in the country is naturally leaving its mark on the situation developing with respect to the Spring draft. However despite certain difficulties with the draft, overall I believe it will be successful. In brief I would describe the state of affairs thus: the situation is controllable. In this situation we require a group of measures that should be carried out with full coordination between party, state, military, and legal organs."

Ukraine: Call for Change in Draft Law

90UM0739A Moscow *SOBESEDNIK* in Russian No 24, June 1990 p 3

[Article by SOBESEDNIK Special Correspondent Sergey Romanovskiy: "Don't Take Me: How the Spring Call-Up to Soviet Army Ranks is Going in the Ukraine"]

[Text] This year military commissars have had a noticeable increase in troubles. Their main grief is the chronic nonfulfillment of draft plans, which is assuming threatening proportions. Those who did not "take up arms" this spring divided into two groups, "legals" and "illegals." The former include draftees suffering from illnesses based on which they are excused from service. The list of these illnesses substantially expanded in 1990.

The other group of draftees is made up of "refuseniks," those who evade service in the Army for various motives, including political or religious. It is necessary to tell about them especially...

The "League of Independent Ukrainian Youth" (SNUM), which calls for a boycott of the draft, operates the most actively against service in the Soviet Army. Its ideas enjoy especially great support in Lvov and Ivano-Frankovsk Oblasts, but even in Kiev young sellers of informal newspapers who should be receiving notices from military commissars any day now do business with customers exclusively in "occupation rubles."

Even in an Oblast such as Charkov, which is so well off with respect to the draft, some 700 persons did not show up at induction centers as a result of SNUM's anti-Army propaganda (RUKh does not share its views).

Many draftees resort to cunning to evade service. They write applications about their desire to enter military schools. The military commissar naturally releases them from the spring draft, but when it comes time to gather up their things and set off to this same school to take exams many take their applications back and have a good time until fall, while their peers already are cleaning barrack floors. Many enter higher educational institutions and their life paths cross no more with the rayon military commissars.

Of course, it would be worthwhile for highly placed military persons from the Ministry of Defense who handle mobilization and cadres work to think about some kind of countermechanism in this regard, but a person who does not wish to serve in the Army and who is compelled to put on a field overcoat still will worm his way out somehow. In my view, this is why the time has come today finally to consider such concepts as a "professional army" and "alternative service," and not see intrigues of imperialists and nationalists behind them.

The prestige of the military person is falling. According to data from Army General D. F. Sukhorukov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Cadres Directorate, an average of 4.5 persons competed for one place in military schools in 1988, 2.5 in 1989, and there will be

even fewer in the present year, according to preliminary calculations. For example, only 31 percent of the proposed number of school-leavers were recruited for naval schools and 74 percent for MVD schools in the Kiev Oblast Military Commissariat.

It is basically city draftees who evade active compulsory service. Rural lads join formation if not willingly, then at the very least without expressing the wish not to serve out loud. "At one time our Army was called a workers' and peasants' army," sadly noted Lieutenant Colonel V. Feklistov, chief of the Kiev Oblast Military Commissariat Political Department, "but if things continue as they are, it soon will become simply a peasants' army."

By the way, Viktor Dmitriyevich is very dissatisfied with the fact that at the induction center his rural lads from the oblast hang around Kiev residents for several days and become infected with anti-Army sentiments from them. To avoid this pernicious diffusion, Lieutenant Colonel Feklistov even proposes to separate the oblast and city induction centers. But does this make sense? For rural and city draftees still will have to serve together. Murder will out...

What is to be done in this situation? Will we be able to overcome difficulties to which the Army is unaccustomed in selecting young replacements? There is no question we will be able to do so in the future if we begin radical military reform immediately, but the military even now needs new, wise laws governing if not relations within the Army itself, then at the very least relations with society.

The need for a change in existing legislation can be illustrated by a typical example. It is common knowledge that the present spring draft is being carried out by USSR Council of Ministers decree. While our induction boards previously always were headed by military persons, at the proposal of the USSR Minister of Defense they were supposed to have been headed by responsible ispolkom officials, representatives of Soviet authority, beginning with the present year, but the latter stubbornly resisted; they were not about to do so. Together they allude to the law "On Universal Military Obligation," Article 27 of which states black on white that induction boards must be headed by military commissars.

The law has become obsolete, but there is no other law. And in that same Ukraine military commissars do not have the power to call members of cooperatives to reservist active duty training because we simply did not have that layer of workers 20 years ago when the law on compulsory military service was adopted. Both the cooperatives and the Ministry of Defense refused to pay them average wages for time at the training courses.

There is a saying: the one-eyed is king among the blind. It is especially suited to the Army, where people try to compensate for thundering legal nihilism with bureaucratic rule-making. This is the same as fighting inflation with a printing press. For example, instead of thinking

about improving the life and routine of military commissariat officials, the USSR Minister of Defense recently published an order to build sports facilities in all military commissariats without exception.

Of course, physical fitness is a sore issue for the Army; many draftees cannot even keep hold of the horizontal bar, let alone pull up on it. But everything in its own time. People usually engage in athletic exercises either at home or already in the troops, but hardly in the cramped courtyard of military commissariats, where draftees are in transit, as they say, from home to the induction center. In addition, it is no secret that many of them arrive at military commissariats somewhat not themselves; simply speaking, they are drunk. So is it really necessary to cast millions of rubles to the wind only to help future soldiers sober up faster?

There are a great many questions, but this does not at all mean that no changes for the better are occurring in the Army. For example, one can only welcome the decision to let married soldiers serve near home if possible (in previous years a stern order was issued according to which new recruits were even taken a thousand kilometers away from home areas). The General Staff decision not to send draftees previously evacuated from the 30-km Chernobyl zone to the troops where there is contact with missile fuel components also is greeted with understanding in the Ukraine...

Nevertheless, these are half-measures. As an organism, the Army needs a more serious perestroika than what is being carried on now.

Commissariat Obstructed by Local Authorities

90UM0732A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Jul 90 p 3

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain 3rd Rank V. Yermolin under rubric "Direct Line: What KRSNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondents Transmitted Yesterday": "From Shyaulay: Military Commissariat Under 'Siege'"]

[Text] We already reported that a kray defense department section was established in this Lithuanian city to "work in the sphere of the former military commissariat." That is what Section Chief Z. Orentas declared in an interview for republic radio. The event is by no means commonplace. It indicates that processes aggravating the situation in the republic continue to develop even apart from the will of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, which is known to have taken a number of specific steps on the path to a compromise.

Orentas frankly told Shyaulay Military Commissar Colonel I. Gliznuta: "If the republic leadership makes concessions to Moscow, we will go underground." The "we" in this case also includes those young people who have been drawn onto the path of evading military

service in the USSR Armed Forces by the propaganda of Orentas, as well as no small detachment of deserters hiding in nearby forests.

"I met with Orentas to try to come to a mutual understanding with him, for it is a question of the fate of young people," Ivan Antonovich told me, "but no conversation came about. To him we are occupiers." This says everything.

It must be said that the Lithuanian government in the person of local authorities is giving the department's section all possible assistance. Rooms have been set aside for it, card files of young citizens of draft age from the rural area have been provided, and a "most favored" regime has been established in general. And of course there is quite a different attitude toward the military commissariat.

"Essentially there has been an unending 'siege' of the military commissariat for a long time now," says Colonel

Gliznutsa. All forms of financing have been stopped by the local Soviet, the Internal Affairs Section refuses assistance, relations with rural passport bureaus have been completely interrupted, and our queries and appeals are ignored by enterprises and establishments. . . . The press of moral terror is growing. Threats to military commissariat officials and their families already are being backed up by hooligan escapades in some places."

The military commissar expressed the hope that upcoming talks between delegations of the USSR and Lithuanian SSR also will be reflected positively on the situation of military commissariats in the republic. In any case, Colonel Gliznutsa believes that further defiant activity by organizations similar to the one headed by former military construction worker Z. Orentas is fraught with an unpredictable aggravation of the situation.

1961 Submarine Reactor Incident

90UM0733A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jul 90
Second Edition p 4

[Article by PRAVDA Special Correspondent V. Izgarshiev under rubric "Top Secret": "A Quarter-Century Before Chernobyl"]

[Text] *Sometime after the loss of the nuclear-powered submarine "Komsomolets" in April 1989, two veteran submariners, N. Zateyev and G. Kuznetsov, visited the PRAVDA military section. Both of them now are captains 1st rank (retired). Zateyev spent eight years under water just as a submarine commander. He sailed almost all the seas and oceans and has served abroad. Three orders recognize his services to the Navy. Captain 1st Rank Kuznetsov's biography is no less impressive.*

"Did you have occasion to read the novel 'Vechnyy ogon' [Eternal Flame]?" was the question with which Nikolay Vladimirovich Zateyev began our conversation.

Unfortunately one does not have time for everything that has been printed, as they say.

"Here is the problem," explained Zateyev. "The author wrote in the prologue that events related in the novel allegedly are fictitious, but should something of the sort happen in reality, Soviet navy men would act just as courageously and selflessly as the heroes of 'Vechnyy ogon.' But the events did occur—aboard the nuclear-powered submarine which I commanded," continued Zateyev.

"It turns out that the lines in the foreword were needed for censorship?"

"Very likely..."

The nuclear submarine commanded by Nikolay Zateyev was proceeding to a new area of the North Atlantic assigned by the senior commander after completing a difficult phase of the exercise codenamed "Arctic Circle." Missile launches and an exit from beneath the Arctic ice lay ahead. Duty aboard the ship, one of the firstborn of the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine fleet, was going with faultless precision according to the rhythm rehearsed on the lengthy practice cruise. The ocean depths were quiet and motionless. All machinery and the main power plant were operating normally and nothing presaged misfortune. The next leaf on the calendar in the captain's cabin had been turned over back since evening—4 July 1961.

At 0415 hours the port reactor's emergency shielding suddenly was triggered. An emergency incident? It seemed so. Monitoring instruments showed a sharp drop in primary loop pressure to zero. The main and auxiliary pumps supporting circulation of the loop's heat-transfer agent stopped (or, more accurately, jammed as a result of the pressure drop) and the level in the volume compensators fell.

I quote all these technical terms from the words of the submarine commander: he gives them smoothly, having memorized them for years to come.

And so the unexpected had occurred aboard the nuclear submarine. There were no specific recommendations in the instructions for this incident, although its likelihood had been foreseen. What was to be done? How could they act to prevent a meltdown of the fuel elements, reactor failure, and a catastrophic spread of radiation? The instruction suggested removing heat released by the fuel elements by pouring (pumping) water through the core.

But how? In what way? The design of the first reactors had no special systems or devices for this purpose.

A critical situation shaped up. Based on the advice of department heads and engineers, it was decided to set up a nonstandard cooling system and use the on-board fresh water reserve for this.

A struggle began for the life of the ship and the crew. In the course of two hours the cooling system was put on line and the threat of reactor failure was eliminated. But at what cost? It was clear that everyone who volunteered to work on the reactor would receive very high doses of radiation.

"Boris, do you know what you're getting into?" Zateyev asked Lieutenant Korchilov.

"I know, Commander, but I can think of no other way."

The commander distinctly realized that there simply was no other way.

Here are the names of those who, sacrificing themselves for the sake of saving the crew and ship, did not waver and performed their duty to the end in the reactor compartment and adjacent compartments:

Lieutenant Boris Korchilov, Chief Petty Officer Boris Ryzhikov, Petty Officer 1st Class Yuriy Ordochkin, Petty Officer 2nd Class Yevgeniy Kashenkov, Seaman Semen Penkov, Seaman Nikolay Savkin, Seaman Valeriy Khartanov, Captain-Lieutenant Yuriy Povstnyev.

I quote the list in the sequence given by Zateyev.

Captain 3rd Rank Anatoliy Kozyrev, Captain-Lieutenant Vladimir Yelin, Chief Petty Officer Ivan Kulakov and Senior Lieutenant Mikhail Krasichkov received very high doses of radiation.

Not one crew member avoided his share of the rem's. Ship's Physician Major A. Kosach and Chemical Department Chief Captain N. Vakhrameyev had more than enough work to do. All concerns for assisting victims fell on their shoulders. It was the first time they had encountered such patients and such an unbelievable situation. The suffering of those who received a radiation dose above the permissible norm cannot be told. People's faces changed and their powers of speech failed...

A fire broke out twice in the reactor enclosure. A cushion of steam was found beneath the reactor compartment deck (which was pressurized). As the reactor was flooded with water, the lines turned into a dangerous radiation source. "They were glowing," said Zateyev.

The commander instructed that seamen not engaged in rescue operations or on watch be removed to the upper deck.

But it is not said for nothing that it never rains but it pours. The submarine's lengthy cruise at great depths while assaulting the ice fields affected the structure of the main transmitter antenna insulator, and the ship was left without communications with shore. Moreover, she was alone in a deserted corner of the ocean. It was 1,500 nm to base.

Go home? But this would take so much time on one reactor in a surface condition that the consequences of people being in that level of radiation, even if all of them would shift to the upper deck, were unpredictable. By the way, they were fully predictable! No one would be left with any hopes of survival.

Zateyev made a decision to take the opposite course to close with our other ships in the exercise area. He was figuring on one thing: contacting them using the low-power emergency transmitter and requesting that they transmit a report on the incident to shore. There was of course no small amount of risk, as the submarines might have left the exercise area, but there was no alternative. After informing the crew of his decision, the commander ordered retracing their course.

The risk justified itself. A rendezvous took place. The commanders of two diesel submarines, captains 3rd rank Lev Vasser and Zhan Sverbilov, responded to the distress signal. At their own responsibility and risk and without authorization of the command authority, they both immediately left the area where they were performing training missions and hastened to assist the ship in distress under conditions of a storm which had begun that was so common in these latitudes.

With the approach of Vasser's submarine, communications were established with command posts of the Navy and the Northern Fleet. The diesel submariners tried to take the submarine in distress in tow, but attempts failed because of the storm.

It was with great difficulty that they managed to evacuate the seriously ill and seamen who were not engaged in their immediate duties from the nuclear submarine to Sverbilov's submarine which had arrived.

The odyssey of the submariners who had come to grief continued. Alarming reports were radioed ashore. The shore gave advice to feed the exposed seamen fresh vegetables, fruits and juices. It stands to reason that none of the three items had been aboard for a long time.

The second-to-last radio message was sent. Zateyev requested that he permit personnel to abandon ship. The

shore was silent. Realizing that permission was not coming and it was already simply foolhardy to be aboard the nuclear submarine without risk to life, Zateyev ordered everyone to be evacuated to the diesel submarine.

But first the crew placed all machinery and systems in an inoperative condition. In short, everything was done to ensure the nuclear submarine's survivability afloat and the ocean's ecologic safety.

As prescribed by regulations, Zateyev was last to abandon ship. Captain-Lieutenant Vladimir Pogorelov, electrotechnical division officer, was with him.

An entry remains in the ship log of Vasser's submarine that at the nuclear submarine commander's suggestion, two live torpedoes were readied aboard the diesel submarine to sink the nuclear submarine in case she was subjected to attempts by any uninvited foreign representatives to get aboard her. Well, such were the times—general suspicion, mistrust, and opposition of a far from imaginary enemy.

Fortunately, the torpedoes were not needed.

It was a difficult, stormy passage home, with a transfer to a destroyer which arrived... There was the radiological decontamination procedure, and then hospital ashore. The seriously ill were sent to the Biophysics Institute. And there was the absurd fall of one of the helicopters with sick submariners aboard before the eyes of the entire hospital and all those seeing them off. True, there were no victims. Fate had prepared a different ordeal for the submariners. Those who were ill died from the atom.

And there was also an investigation of many days into the actions of the commander and other persons in authority, with minutes, testimony, explanations, and night summons...

The fate of those who received extremely heavy doses of radiation was decided within a week; the others had to lie around in hospital beds.

One street in an Arctic naval garrison bears the name Boris Korchilov. By the way, the commander recommended the lieutenant for the Hero of the Soviet Union title. Naval higher-ups in Moscow instructed otherwise: "An emergency incident... He will make do with an order."

Modest monuments stand over the graves of Yu. Ordochkin, Ye. Kashenkov, S. Penkov, N. Savkin and V. Kharitonov in Moscow's Kuzminskoye Cemetery. There are memorial epitaphs on the graves of B. Korchilov and Yu. Povstye in Krasnenkoye Cemetery in Leningrad. V. Ryzhikov is buried in Zelenogradskoye Cemetery near Leningrad.

And the other members of the crew? They rode or flew away to all parts of the country. The fate of some is unknown. With regard to the Muscovites, they gather each year at Kuzminskoye Cemetery, and on Navy Day

they come with wives, children and grandchildren to ulitsa Kirova, 5 in the suburban Moscow settlement of Skhodnya. Petty Officer 1st Class (Reserve) Viktor Strelets, former proprietor of the nuclear submarine's storage battery, lives at this address.

The first meeting in Skhodnya took place at the request of Strelets many years ago. The petty officer appealed to colleagues for help in finishing his house. Everyone came and helped. This was on the navymen's holiday.

Since then the meetings in Skhodnya have become traditional, considering that there is also a house for this.

A special government commission recognized the personnel's actions in eliminating the emergency situation aboard the ship as proper. The navymen's capable actions were recognized once again somewhat later, in October 1961, at an important conference which was deciding the question of continuing construction of the nuclear submarine fleet. It was said that the sacrifices made by the crew had not been in vain.

The lesson was of benefit. Authorized emergency water flooding systems were installed in all operating reactors or envisaged in planned reactors of a similar type.

Many seamen, petty officers and officers were decorated with orders and medals for courage and heroism (some posthumously) and the entire crew was recognized with valuable engraved gifts from the minister of defense. In presenting the orders and medals, then Leningrad Naval Base Commander Admiral I. Baykov "soothed" the

navymen who had not yet recovered from the shock: "Why do you consider yourselves heroes? Accidents also happen on our streetcars in Leningrad." By the way, there was no award at all for some submariners.

Perhaps now it is also worthwhile to return to this question of awards. I realize it is not the important thing, but it is never too late to do justice to people, for they were the first to do battle with the atom and win.

Then, at the dawn of the atom, none of them yet knew what consequences for all living things and for our entire Mother Earth a reactor explosion might lead to. People learned this after Chernobyl.

But at that time 25 years still remained until it happened.

The commander now has one concern: to find all of the crew and find out how and on what they are living. Perhaps assemble them at that same hospital, in the Military Medical Academy? Let the specialists see and check on how those pernicious rem's affected the heroes' health...

He writes to the command authority of the Navy, to the Minister of Defense and to highly-placed persons, and by the way, he finds support. It is up to the navymen. Where are you, comrades? Respond.

"And how about the submarine?" the reader will ask. She is in the Northern Fleet order of battle. Back then she was brought to base by the fleet salvage vessel "Aldan." The shipbuilders repaired and corrected everything and the nuclear submarine continues her service.

Norwegian Naval Commander Interviewed

90UM0707A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 July 1990 p 3

[Interview of Rear Admiral Thomeson, Norwegian naval forces commander by B. Popov, APN Correspondent: "Admiral Thomeson: Contacts Should be Constant"]

[Text] In a suburb of Bodoe, far from the stranger's eye, is found the Northern Norway Naval Forces Headquarters. Naval Forces Commander, Rear Admiral Thomeson did not respond to the request for an interview with special enthusiasm, but he did not send me back to Oslo to a higher command for authorization.

[Popov] What do you feel, Mr. Rear Admiral, to what degree has the improvement in the international situation made on the opposition of the naval forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty in Northern Europe?

[Thomeson] The more open nature of relations between the East and the West have doubtless eased tension in this region. Both sides have demonstrated their readiness to become oriented around a defensive concept. As a citizen, I view the development of this process with great optimism, but as commander of naval forces I should not exclude the fact that at any moment the situation can change and confrontation reach a critical point.

[Popov] Are you aware that the Soviet Northern Fleet has begun a gradual reduction in the number of its fighting units?

[Thomeson] I agree with the statement that quantitative strength is being reduced by writing off old ships. But new, more powerful types of ships like the "Sovremennyy", "Udaloy", or "Kirov" are being brought in to replace them. We should also not forget that every year the Soviets build eight of the most modern submarines. Hence, by reducing in quantity, it is simultaneously possible to increase the fighting power of the fleet.

[Popov] The Soviet command is disturbed that every year large NATO naval exercises are held on the shores of Northern Norway with American aircraft carriers taking part. Could not these maneuvers be conducted in a region further away from Soviet territorial waters?

[Thomeson] Norway is a small state which is not in position to defend itself from an attack by a more powerful enemy like the Soviet Union, for example. We must constantly engage in mutual support with the other members of NATO. This cooperation to a large degree is maintained via the sea lines of communication through the Atlantic. Under extraordinary circumstances the threat of destroying these sea communications can occur only from the Soviet Northern Fleet. If the Soviet Union

tries to achieve this mission, its ships can find themselves in the Norwegian Sea in direct proximity to Northern Norway's shores. In order to defend ourselves from the consequences of such a turn of events, every year NATO conducts exercises in just this region, and the powerful aircraft carriers of the 2nd U.S. Atlantic Fleet play an important role in them. In these exercises, as a rule, drills are developed using coastline broken by fjords and lots of small islands to protect the ships from missile attack. These exercises should not put the Northern Fleet commanders on their guard: first, they are about 1800 kilometers from the Soviet border; second, they are of a defensive nature; and third, at the conclusion of each the American vessels always return back to the States.

[Popov] Is there something in the activities of the Northern Fleet which disturbs the naval commander of Northern Norway?

[Thomeson] We follow the exercises of the Northern Fleet, and I could take note of the fact that their character has changed. The exercises have come to be more defensive, but at the same time more complex with the participation of submarines, surface vessels and aircraft. The might of the Northern Fleet, if one may express it in that way, makes an impression. Its combat readiness is maintained at a very high level. While the commanders of the Northern Fleet are not granted any calm by American aircraft carriers, I am upset by the Soviet amphibious forces, particularly when they conduct their exercises in attack operations.

[Popov] Has not the time come to reduce our naval capability on a mutual basis and remove the mistrust of one another?

[Thomeson] The countries of the Warsaw Pact use primarily land communications for their mutual support. For NATO its naval capability has greater importance. Hence, on the NATO side there is still no effort being made for talks on reducing naval forces. Incidentally, in my opinion, agreements are possible in this area, for example, in reducing sea-based missiles and, in part, long range ballistic missiles, nuclear warheads, and other things.

[Popov] Are any kind of contacts between navies possible? For example, mutual ship visits or participation of observers in exercises?

[Thomeson] Concerning observers, then such proposals were from the Soviet side. But I think that the presence of one or a couple of officers on one ship or another during exercises does not do much. Today it is possible to follow the actions of a potential enemy successfully by being on their ships. With regards to friendly visits, I support this idea and would hope that such contacts would become regular. However, so far as I know, there are no concrete plans on that score.

Iraqi Possession of Frog, Scud Missiles Noted*90UM0726A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jul 90 p 4*

[Letter to the editor and response: "'Abed,' 'Tammuz'-...."]

[Text] "I have read that Iraq has modern missile weapons. What kind of missiles are we talking about?"

Lieutenant Yu. Tsybin Moscow Military District"

Iraq has various classes of surface to surface missiles. Among them: Abed and Tammuz with a launch range of 2,000 kilometers; Al-Abbas (up to 860 km); and, Al-Hussein (up to 650 km). Furthermore, the Iraqi Army has Soviet manufactured missiles in its inventory, those that are well-known in the West under the name SCUD-B and FROG-7.

In December 1989, Iraq also carried out the launch of a three-stage missile that is capable of placing an artificial Earth satellite into orbit.

The answer was prepared according to foreign press articles.

Bulgarian Military Reductions*90UM0726B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jul 90 p 3*

[Letter to the editor and response: "The BPA [Bulgarian People's Army] Today"]

[Text] You reported about Bulgarian People's Army reorganization and reduction plans. How are they being implemented?

O. Simonenko Marshupol

Bulgaria, along with other Warsaw Treaty state participants, has assumed the obligation to unilaterally reduce its armed forces to stimulate development of peaceful processes and to accelerate disarmament in Europe. These obligations have been fulfilled today.

BPA [Bulgarian People's Army] strength has been reduced by 10,500 men and totals 107,000 servicemen. This was achieved by disbanding the Party political staff in the troops and the majority of military construction units. Combat units were not subjected to significant reductions since this could have been reflected in the state's defense capability at the present time.

The BPA's quantity of arms and military equipment was also reduced. Thus, there are 10 percent fewer tanks (2,000 units) and there are 200 fewer artillery systems (8,790). After the reductions, there are 214 combat aircraft in the BPA and 100 combat and auxiliary ships in the Navy today.

The ratio of military expenditures in the Bulgarian State Budget has also been reduced. If they totaled 8.78

percent (662 million lev) of the State Budget in 1986, this year this sum has been reduced to 6.24 percent (566 million lev).

The answer was obtained from the People's Republic of Bulgaria Embassy in the USSR.

Commentary on U.S.-Greek Basing Agreement*90UM0729A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jun 90 p 3*

[Article, published under the rubric "International Commentary," by Maj M. Pogorely: "Movement by Inertia"]

[Text] All U.S. military bases were to be removed from Greek soil by the time of signing of a new U.S.-Greek treaty on cooperation in defense matters. This was predetermined by a preceding treaty, which lapsed at the end of 1988, but nevertheless bases remain on Greek soil at the present time. In addition, the new agreement between the United States and Greece which was signed a few days ago legitimized the status of the majority of U.S. bases in this country for an additional eight years.

One cannot help but note the following in this connection. In the past the Greek Government headed by Andreas Papandreu repeatedly declared its determination to end the U.S. military presence in that country. As many political observers stressed at the time, however, in actual fact this was more of an act of extortion against Washington, an endeavor to "pry" more dollars out of the United States in exchange for the right to maintain Pentagon facilities, while the bases served as the object of the haggling. One must admit that this bargaining was largely successful. Total annual U.S. military aid to Greece was boosted to approximately 350 million dollars.

The question of bases also naturally arose with the present Greek Government. In order to reduce the intensity of anti-American demonstrations and to facilitate the signing of a new bases treaty, the Pentagon "sacrificed" Hellenikon Air Base and the naval communications facility at Nea Makri. In the opinion of the WASHINGTON POST, operations at these facilities will be terminated precisely due to the fact that they are "too much in full view" and are directly associated in the minds of the Greeks with the presence of U.S. forces in that country. At the same time the Pentagon is planning to move with as little fanfare as possible part of the equipment and personnel from these closed-down bases to a location more distant from the public eye, to the island of Crete, where the United States continues to operate Iraklion Air Base and a very large base at Suda Bay for the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Incidentally, the majority of about 20 so-called "small" military installations, including nuclear storage depots, communications facilities, communications intelligence and electronics intelligence facilities, will remain untouched.

As I see it, the signing of a new treaty on U.S. bases in Greece constitutes motion by inertia, as it were. The inertia of U.S. "bases policy," according to which 1,500 Pentagon installations are deployed in various parts of the world. Even today, when truly revolutionary changes are taking place in the world, when initial major steps have now been taken to lessen the level of military confrontation, particularly on the European continent, the United States continues to cling to its bases. This particularly applies to Southern Europe. The Pentagon resorts to various ruses in order to maintain its military presence in Italy, Spain, and Turkey. The signing of the new treaty with Greece is another example of this.

Constantine Mitsotakis, head of Greece's conservative government, declared in turn that in his opinion problems pertaining to the U.S. bases are presently of no interest to the Greek people. The Coalition of Leftist and Progressive Forces, the Greek Communist Party, and that country's major antiwar movements, however, have already sharply protested the presence of U.S. bases on Greek soil. They all express concern over the subordination of Greece's national interests to U.S. interests, as well as over the threat to peace and stability in the region.

U.S.-Singapore Talks on Military Facilities

90UM0743A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Jul 90 p 3

[Article by V. Vinogradov under rubric "International Notes": "Killing Two Birds"]

[Text] The WASHINGTON POST reported that the United States and Singapore are holding talks on concluding an agreement which would allow U.S. warships and aircraft to use military installations on Singapore territory. Later other mass media also reported this. After this, an official Pentagon representative confirmed the authenticity of such reports, but in so doing especially emphasized that it was not a question of establishing a new permanent U.S. military base in the region.

It will be recalled that specific talk about the possibility of stationing U.S. ships and aircraft in Singapore began last fall. At that time a broad wave of protests rose against the "Singapore initiative," as journalists dubbed it, especially in countries of Southeast Asia. The public did not wish new U.S. military bases to appear in the region.

In those days Singapore seemingly went back on its word under pressure of criticism. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew himself assured people with whom he talked during

a visit to Indonesia that his country "did not intend to accommodate U.S. military bases," and somehow the question faded into the background of itself. But the present WASHINGTON POST report shows that its active discussion also continued there "in the background" by interested parties—the United States and Singapore.

True, it really is not a question of establishing a permanent U.S. military base in Singapore. According to the WASHINGTON POST, the agreement which the Pentagon was intensively pushing through provides that several U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers (which can carry nuclear weapons aboard) will be stationed at a Singapore Air Force base for 6-7 months a year and U.S. Navy ships (which can have nuclear weapons aboard) will be able to use Singapore port facilities for repairs, refueling and replenishing stores. "This is not a permanent presence," the WASHINGTON POST quotes the words of a highly placed U.S. official, "Nevertheless, it will show that we continue to be in Asia."

A show is a show, but it seems to me that this is not the chief meaning of the talks being held, for it is no accident that nothing was heard about them for over a half-year. Obviously all this time Washington had a faint hope for a favorable outcome of U.S.-Philippine talks on the future of Pentagon bases in the Philippines, but the talks began, then were interrupted, and the fate of the bases was hanging by a thread. Here is where the "Singapore option" was again brought to light.

There is no doubt that Washington views conclusion of an agreement with Singapore as a means of exerting substantial pressure on the government of the Philippines. Evidently Washington generally is not beyond killing two birds with one stone, as the saying goes: specifically, having the "intimidated" Philippines agree to extend U.S. military presence in the country while Washington at the same time has in its hand an agreement signed with Singapore. From the standpoint of Pentagon strategists, everything simply would be outstanding, i.e., having the old bases preserved and being able to use the Singapore bases. And if the situation with the Philippines does not turn out well after all, that too is no misfortune: the Pentagon will have the Singapore installations at its disposal.

Speaking recently on a U.S. Fox Network television company program, U.S. Secretary of Defense R. Cheney declared that despite substantial positive changes occurring in the world, the United States should keep its military presence on the territory of other states. And Washington's actions in Southeast Asia irrefutably attest to the fact that it intends to prolong its military presence in this region for as long a period as possible.

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